A fairly short paper that describes the dynamics faced by both states and the role that the quest for recognition, or lack thereof, plays in creating "national" cohesion. Pages 15, 16 and 17 describe very well the problem that Puntland's political elite have been struggling with for the past 20 years. How do you build up your state while also vying for influence in Mogadishu? The authors argue that the focus of Puntland's political elite has led to them ignoring political development at home. This paper is a must read for anyone interested in the future development of federal states in Somalia. The same problems will face Jubaland, Galmudug etc... in the future.
@Boqor Quark Boqor Cisman I am starting to think that separating from Mogadishu may have been the better route for Puntland to pursue. It seems that you were right that remaining involved in the politics of the South did real damage to Puntland's project of state building.
Some excerpts:
@Boqor Quark Boqor Cisman I am starting to think that separating from Mogadishu may have been the better route for Puntland to pursue. It seems that you were right that remaining involved in the politics of the South did real damage to Puntland's project of state building.
Some excerpts:
The personal benefits of participating in the TFG were undoubtedly attractive to many of Puntland’s leaders, as they were to some Somaliland leaders; unlike Somaliland leaders, however, Puntland politicians faced little chastisement for participating, as participation was an important means of ensuring Majerten representation in the federal system. Because participation in the TFG did not depend on democratic elections, Puntland politicians had little incentive to create stronger democratic institutions back home (Dill 2010). Why subject their continued access to the TFG and its resources to democratic elections if they did not have to? The links between Puntland and the TFG effectively raised the stakes of Puntland politics without requiring democracy. The access to the TFG “conferred by holding an office in Puntland . . . [fueled] competition and political rivalry and [diminished] elite interest in good governance at home” (Dill 2010:291).
However, we argue that Puntland’s decision not to seek independence sets it apart in key ways from Somaliland and other de facto states. Using existing literature and information collected in sixty-nine formal and twenty informal interviews with businessmen, government officials, clan elders, and aid officials in Somaliland and Puntland during the summer of 2011, we demonstrate that Puntland’s continued participation in successive efforts to form a government of Somalia has complicated its local state-building endeavor by limiting support in the business community and creating incentives not to democratize. In contrast, we argue that Somaliland’s independence agenda has had a unifying effect, which encourages support in the business community and creates pressures to democratize.
From our perspective, neither international recognition nor reincorporation into a federalist Somalia is inherently preferable; arguments for both spark considerable debate (for a summary of various groups’ positions, see Ahere 2013). We simply argue that, in the short run, the decision to pursue recognition as a sovereign state has helped unify people behind the nascent state of Somaliland and created pressures for democratization; by contrast, the decision to maintain ties with Somalia has complicated Puntland’s efforts to build a strong, democratic provincial state. This is not to say that in the long run, international recognition will solve all Somaliland’s challenges, or that Somaliland could not someday reunite with Somalia, though the idea remains anathema to many; nor is it to say that Puntland will not become a more democratic province in a unified Somalia or potentially pursue its own independence.