Random Oromo history thread!
- Thread starter Abba Sadacha
- Start date
''The most important of the other races that occupy this portion of Africa is the Galla/Oromo. These Oromos have, at different periods, for some 100 years past, seized uon the most fertile provinces of the ancient empire of Abyssinia, and have spread themselves from the red sea and the blue nile to the equator. They are divided into numerous tribes, having the 1 common characteristic of being undaunted horsemen. So strong is this propensity, that the tribe of Azebu Gallas, who occupy a territory between teegray and the red sea, purchase horses from the colder provinces of warrahaimano and wallo, and mount 10,000 horse, in a district unfavorable to the existence of the animal, and where it is never bred.
Could these tribes, 50 or 60 in number, unite, nothing could withstand their numbers and impetuosity, and they would trample under foot, like a Scythian host, all the land as far as Khartoum; but, occupied as they are by intestine wars, there is little probablity of such a torrent, unless a chief should arise amongst them like Mohammed Gran, that famous warrior, who led the armies of Adal, renowned for strength and swiftness of foot, even to the vicinity of Gondar; and would, 350 years since, have extinguished the Abyssinian name and faith, but for the timely succour of Portuguese kill and valour.''
[Abyssinia and Its People; or, Life in the Land of Prester John, Pages 196-198; published in 1868]
Could these tribes, 50 or 60 in number, unite, nothing could withstand their numbers and impetuosity, and they would trample under foot, like a Scythian host, all the land as far as Khartoum; but, occupied as they are by intestine wars, there is little probablity of such a torrent, unless a chief should arise amongst them like Mohammed Gran, that famous warrior, who led the armies of Adal, renowned for strength and swiftness of foot, even to the vicinity of Gondar; and would, 350 years since, have extinguished the Abyssinian name and faith, but for the timely succour of Portuguese kill and valour.''
[Abyssinia and Its People; or, Life in the Land of Prester John, Pages 196-198; published in 1868]
It's funny, in the early 1800s to 1880's it was those of Oromo decent that was ruling Ethiopia.
What happened?
Some Oromo's always had influential positions, some didn't. some were of the 'conquered' and others were of the 'conquerors.'
''The Oromo region, which stretches across Ethiopia began to loom large in relation to a much smaller Tigray in
the north and other regions adjacent to it. The Oromo nationalists' map even includes parts of the Tigrayan region - the Rayya-Azabo areas. The relative richness of the Oromo area as well as the population size of the Oromo people gave added importance and real assets, which the Oromo elite used in their mass mobilization drive.
The third major external factor was the triumph of the Eritrean and
Tigrayan nationalists. Especially, the independence of the former has had a reverberating effect both on the rising tide of Oromo nationalism as well as on the elite aspiring to lead it. In fact, the success of Eritrea and Tigray - the Oromo population is, at least, more than six times larger than each of them -has created a rising expectation among the Oromo people and its elite, a
temptation very difficult to resist. The birth of independent states such as Ukraine on the ruins of the disintegrated Soviet Union and other countries
of Eastern Europe have further heightened expectations among the Oromo elite fighting for an independent Oromia republic.
The universal awakening of the Oromos immediately led to two things: the frustration and impatience of the TPLF leaders, who hoped to easily
tame and control Oromo nationalism through the OPDO, which has never been anywhere near to capturing Oromo nationalism, and the OLF leaders, who were overwhelmed by the rising tide of Oromo nationalism and had no
strong structure in place to control and lead it towards the desired goals.
Consequently, confrontation between the TPLF- dominated TGE and the OLF almost led the country to the brink of yet another civil war. The mediation of the Eritreans, who were then more supportive of the TPLF
designs and the donors did help very little to avert the looming
confrontation. The 1992 regional elections further hastened the looming confrontation.
Following the proclamation of the regionalization policy of 1992,
which was based on Article Thirteen of the Charter, the elections of the regional and local councils were scheduled for June 1992. To ensure the fairness of the process, a large contingent of international observers were
invited and allowed to be stationed wherever they wanted to be. However, the much-publicized elections, the first acid test for the TPLF sponsored democratization, were doomed to fail from the beginning. First, all of the multi-ethnic political groups, which had long years of experience were ruled out of the game from the start. Secondly, the newly created major
political groups, such as Southern Ethiopian Peoples’ Democratic Union(SEPDU), All Amhara People’s Organization (AAPO) were maneuvered out. Thirdly, and more importantly, the thin rope that tied the OLF to the TPLF-dominated TGE broke as distrust and mutual suspicion reached their climax.
Consequently, the OLF, which was the major contender of power,
was forced to withdraw from contesting the elections and subsequently from the T.G.E. itself. This made the elections totally an EPRDF affair
What happened was that the TPLF, whose central objective was to consolidate power, had become less worried about the international legitimacy than in 1991, thought it was time to cut the OLF down to size, while the OLF thought losing the elections in an unfair political game was a costly political venture in the eyes of its supporters. In other words, the stake was too high for both actors. For the former, it was the question of handing over the Oromo region, which is the country’s largest administrative unit that houses its single largest population, and above all,its storehouse in terms of resources. For the latter, to accept willingly the dominance of a minority over Oromo areas is to commit political suicide.
At any rate, the forced withdrawal of the OLF and the other independent Oromo and non-Oromo organizations in the 1992 elections had the effect of heralding a death blow both to the democratization of the Ethiopian state and the decentralization of policy thereof. What has emerged is a one-party
rule.
The forcing out of the OLF from the legal political process and the
continued foundering of the Ethiopian democratization, have led the Oromos to a new type of political and economic marginalization. The OPDO, true to its creation by the TPLF itself, could not move beyond the structural limits and opportunities given to it by its creators, and hence has
become an instrument of indirect rule, a classic case of controlling the fate and resources of other peoples. As the OPDO appears to lack both the
legitimacy to represent the Oromo people and the educational skill to run a transparent and accountable administration, there are a lot of compounded
problems in the Oromo areas. As a result, human rights violations have been high, elections were seriously flawed, and economic development
seems to be lagging in Oromo areas, in light of their potential for
development and contribution to the national treasury.
Yet another serious problem in the Oromo areas is the drought, which formerly mostly affected the northern parts of the country. Most areas, which used to be affluent in the Oromo region, have now become prone to drought. The central government seems to be slow to respond and, when it responds, applies a political criterion in the distribution of national and
international aid. Like the supply of fertilizers, food aid to the needy has been politicized and there are alarming reports in the independent press that peasants known to have supported the opposition or voted for the
opposition have become targets of the angry government cadres who are obstructing external food aid to the hungry.10 The health-care system seems to be deteriorating in the Oromo areas, as elsewhere. Two years ago many Oromo peasants lost their lives to malaria within a few kilometers of Addis Ababa at a point in time when the country's Minister of Health was himself an Oromo, which has further exposed the OPDO officials disregard, if not
powerlessness, to promote the interest of the very people they claim to represent.
After the local and regional elections of June 1992, several national and regional elections were held in 1994, 1995, 2000 and 2001. The 1994 elections were for a Constituent Assembly, whose role was limited to the rubber-stamping of the TPLF authored National Constitution. The 1995 elections were to bring to a close the long-delayed transition period and to
manufacture public support and legitimacy for the new regime through “popular” elections as promised in the 1991 Charter. The 2000 national and regional elections and the local elections that followed in 2001 were all aimed at further consolidation of power by the TPLF/EPRDF.''
the north and other regions adjacent to it. The Oromo nationalists' map even includes parts of the Tigrayan region - the Rayya-Azabo areas. The relative richness of the Oromo area as well as the population size of the Oromo people gave added importance and real assets, which the Oromo elite used in their mass mobilization drive.
The third major external factor was the triumph of the Eritrean and
Tigrayan nationalists. Especially, the independence of the former has had a reverberating effect both on the rising tide of Oromo nationalism as well as on the elite aspiring to lead it. In fact, the success of Eritrea and Tigray - the Oromo population is, at least, more than six times larger than each of them -has created a rising expectation among the Oromo people and its elite, a
temptation very difficult to resist. The birth of independent states such as Ukraine on the ruins of the disintegrated Soviet Union and other countries
of Eastern Europe have further heightened expectations among the Oromo elite fighting for an independent Oromia republic.
The universal awakening of the Oromos immediately led to two things: the frustration and impatience of the TPLF leaders, who hoped to easily
tame and control Oromo nationalism through the OPDO, which has never been anywhere near to capturing Oromo nationalism, and the OLF leaders, who were overwhelmed by the rising tide of Oromo nationalism and had no
strong structure in place to control and lead it towards the desired goals.
Consequently, confrontation between the TPLF- dominated TGE and the OLF almost led the country to the brink of yet another civil war. The mediation of the Eritreans, who were then more supportive of the TPLF
designs and the donors did help very little to avert the looming
confrontation. The 1992 regional elections further hastened the looming confrontation.
Following the proclamation of the regionalization policy of 1992,
which was based on Article Thirteen of the Charter, the elections of the regional and local councils were scheduled for June 1992. To ensure the fairness of the process, a large contingent of international observers were
invited and allowed to be stationed wherever they wanted to be. However, the much-publicized elections, the first acid test for the TPLF sponsored democratization, were doomed to fail from the beginning. First, all of the multi-ethnic political groups, which had long years of experience were ruled out of the game from the start. Secondly, the newly created major
political groups, such as Southern Ethiopian Peoples’ Democratic Union(SEPDU), All Amhara People’s Organization (AAPO) were maneuvered out. Thirdly, and more importantly, the thin rope that tied the OLF to the TPLF-dominated TGE broke as distrust and mutual suspicion reached their climax.
Consequently, the OLF, which was the major contender of power,
was forced to withdraw from contesting the elections and subsequently from the T.G.E. itself. This made the elections totally an EPRDF affair
What happened was that the TPLF, whose central objective was to consolidate power, had become less worried about the international legitimacy than in 1991, thought it was time to cut the OLF down to size, while the OLF thought losing the elections in an unfair political game was a costly political venture in the eyes of its supporters. In other words, the stake was too high for both actors. For the former, it was the question of handing over the Oromo region, which is the country’s largest administrative unit that houses its single largest population, and above all,its storehouse in terms of resources. For the latter, to accept willingly the dominance of a minority over Oromo areas is to commit political suicide.
At any rate, the forced withdrawal of the OLF and the other independent Oromo and non-Oromo organizations in the 1992 elections had the effect of heralding a death blow both to the democratization of the Ethiopian state and the decentralization of policy thereof. What has emerged is a one-party
rule.
The forcing out of the OLF from the legal political process and the
continued foundering of the Ethiopian democratization, have led the Oromos to a new type of political and economic marginalization. The OPDO, true to its creation by the TPLF itself, could not move beyond the structural limits and opportunities given to it by its creators, and hence has
become an instrument of indirect rule, a classic case of controlling the fate and resources of other peoples. As the OPDO appears to lack both the
legitimacy to represent the Oromo people and the educational skill to run a transparent and accountable administration, there are a lot of compounded
problems in the Oromo areas. As a result, human rights violations have been high, elections were seriously flawed, and economic development
seems to be lagging in Oromo areas, in light of their potential for
development and contribution to the national treasury.
Yet another serious problem in the Oromo areas is the drought, which formerly mostly affected the northern parts of the country. Most areas, which used to be affluent in the Oromo region, have now become prone to drought. The central government seems to be slow to respond and, when it responds, applies a political criterion in the distribution of national and
international aid. Like the supply of fertilizers, food aid to the needy has been politicized and there are alarming reports in the independent press that peasants known to have supported the opposition or voted for the
opposition have become targets of the angry government cadres who are obstructing external food aid to the hungry.10 The health-care system seems to be deteriorating in the Oromo areas, as elsewhere. Two years ago many Oromo peasants lost their lives to malaria within a few kilometers of Addis Ababa at a point in time when the country's Minister of Health was himself an Oromo, which has further exposed the OPDO officials disregard, if not
powerlessness, to promote the interest of the very people they claim to represent.
After the local and regional elections of June 1992, several national and regional elections were held in 1994, 1995, 2000 and 2001. The 1994 elections were for a Constituent Assembly, whose role was limited to the rubber-stamping of the TPLF authored National Constitution. The 1995 elections were to bring to a close the long-delayed transition period and to
manufacture public support and legitimacy for the new regime through “popular” elections as promised in the 1991 Charter. The 2000 national and regional elections and the local elections that followed in 2001 were all aimed at further consolidation of power by the TPLF/EPRDF.''
Great article , keep going lolz
Akisho and jaarso are Oromos they were in oromo migration I have proof on this too
Oromos weren’t ruling Ethiopia it was Amhara and tigrayans
Liar they are ethnic Somali dir who were somalirized
they are my Oromo brothers cali madaxweyne diris fake if you didn’t knowAttachments
elaborate
Well if you know akisho we’re known to spearhead the oromos to hararghe and to jigjiga areas and the jaarso and Itu oromos were with them in the oromos migrations and wardey also known as warra dayya spearheaded the oromos into jubbaland and NFD the problem was these two akisho and Wardey was they went to deep into Somali territory even the akisho went as far as Djibouti so that’s how they got assimilated into dir and Gaal Gurey the man wiil waal killed was a Akisho Galla
Afran Qallu are originally oromos who just assimilated Hararis,Harlas and Somalis into their clan structure
There’s an entire Afran qallo sub that is called Hawiye and breaks down into Gorgarte, Gugundhabe and Karanle. Does any of that sound Oromo to you?
Chill out with this barbarian mindset
Garaad diinle
Jaarso is an oromo name meaning old man and the name is found all over the oromo region but nowhere in somalia. Jaarso themselves are a mix clan consisting of somalis and oromos. They clashed with native somalis and absorbed them and today some jaarso adopted somali language and culture but most of them are still oromo, even the ones who adopted somali culture still interact with their oromo speaking jaarso clans men.
Akisho were named by a habashi historian around the 16th century as being one of the names of the oromo clans that came from across the river. Akisho clan today that bordars somalis are made of both somalis and oromos. A lot of akisho adopted islam early in their history and some of them settled among the somalis and only recently relatively speaking did they adopt somali clan names.
The wardey are minorities in southern jubaland and southern nfd. According to their oral history they came from a place in the borana region around the 16th century and conqured native somali clans one of whom is madinle.
Most wardey live across the tana river and even there they not only have somalis living among them such as surre but also the oromo speaking warday say that they absorbed somali clans such as tuna meaning tunni, garri meaning garre and gita meaning jidda who taught them islam. Today these warday who lives west of the tana have a number of somali cultural practices not found in other oromo clans.
Akisho were named by a habashi historian around the 16th century as being one of the names of the oromo clans that came from across the river. Akisho clan today that bordars somalis are made of both somalis and oromos. A lot of akisho adopted islam early in their history and some of them settled among the somalis and only recently relatively speaking did they adopt somali clan names.
The wardey are minorities in southern jubaland and southern nfd. According to their oral history they came from a place in the borana region around the 16th century and conqured native somali clans one of whom is madinle.
Most wardey live across the tana river and even there they not only have somalis living among them such as surre but also the oromo speaking warday say that they absorbed somali clans such as tuna meaning tunni, garri meaning garre and gita meaning jidda who taught them islam. Today these warday who lives west of the tana have a number of somali cultural practices not found in other oromo clans.
which somalis?
I am just joking dawg, I am better than Oromos I would never kill women, children and civilian men, nor would I assimilate oromos or sterilize them but the fact is that you guys do it
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