mohammdov
Nabadshe
You were paying taxes to Sultan Barghash and you say they saw you as an enemy You like to distort history and lie This is in your cultureThe Omani Arabs he was bragging about in a previous page had to rely on allying with Somalis to curb the influence of Oromos and control Swahilis:
“When most later observers recorded their visits to the Lamu archipelago and district, the powerful Oromo people, who could deal so arrogantly with their visitors, had been subdued and re- duced in number by the steady encroachments and sudden raids of Somali and Masai. This is a development which bears heavily on the history of Lamu district. Until the last third of the nine- teenth century, however, there was no group of people which influenced the political and economic activity of this area more than the Oromo . The Pokomo of the lower Tana River were vulner- able, sedentary cultivators; the Oromo were mobile pastoralists. The nomadic Boni and Sanye, equally mobile, were, if not the slaves of the Oromo, their dependent subordinates. Moreover,
the Swahili-speaking peoples and the Arabs and Asians of the islands and coast were Muslim, while the Oromo in the nineteenth century held to their traditional religion. The spiritual dis- tance and resulting fear and hate between these peoples was a basis for the unsettled state of affairs which prevailed in the Lamu hinterland throughout the nineteenth century”.
“ In the 1840s the Arabs reached an agreement with the Somali residents of Siyu, a move which was instrumental in subduing Bwana Mataka. They also saw the necessity of acquiring the cooperation of Mzee bin Seif, whose influence extended over much of the Bajun population. Mzee bin Seif may have emphasized his ethnic identity in his encounters with the Arabs, who were not completely familiar with Bajun numbers or their split allegiances. They dealt with him very carefully, overlooking such breaches as occurred in the 1870s.
It soon became clear to the Arabs that local power bases were
not stationary and that dissidents were as apt to disrupt Arab
goals through guerrilla warfare on the mainland as through more conventional means on the islands. In their attempts to destroy
the mainland bases of power, the Zanzibaris established themselves
on the mainland, through military garrisons. They forced the Nabahanis to retreat from Kau and later attacked them in the forest. Although they managed to gain control of the Tana-Ozi river system, military expeditions into remote areas proved futile because of the difficulty of fighting in unknown terrain far from the coast.
A more effective strategy, and one which closely followed the pattern established by other groups in the district, was the connection the Arabs formed with the pastoral Darod Somali of the mainland,
an alliance which brought the political affairs of the district to
a climax in the Oromo-Somali war of the late 1860s. In contrast to
the alliances made by Ahmed and Avatula, which overlooked religious diversity in order to achieve their goals, the Arab connection with
the Somalis was strengthened by the two parties’ mutual adherence
to Islam. Undoubtedly, the Zanzibari governors of Lamu used this
tie to its fullest advantage, sometimes stressing this feature
of their ethnicity in contrast to the unbelieving Oromo. One
example of such action was Sud bin Hamed's enforcement of harsh
Islamic law when dealing with the Oromo. The Arabs were also aware that Somali pastoralists were the only means at their disposal for attacking the Oromo, the key to political resistance in the district, who must be punished for aiding the Witu Swahilis. The Zanzibari”
“and the Darod Somalis were natural allies in another sense as well. While some individuals had lived or traded in Lamu district in previous decades, both groups were essentially outsiders, new elements in old conflicts which involved all peoples of the area. The Arabs eventually succeeded in upsetting the balance of power in the district, through the Somali defeat of the Oromo. Unfortunately this disruption of the balance of power also upset the economic benefits which the Zanzibaris hoped to reap.
Nineteenth-century conditions as well as the types of political systems found in Lamu district permitted an unusual degree of mobility in leadership. On the mainland, stateless societies
such as those of the Oromo and pastoral Somali allowed forceful individuals to wield extensive power in practice if not in theory.
Moreover, the social structure and situations of the Boni and watoro invited the direction of an aggressive outside leader.
On the islands, the town governments had histories of sporadic succession crises and family rivalries often leading to violence and disruption. During the nineteenth century, when Arab rule threatened Swahili society and the economic advantages of island- dwellers, loyalties were drawn to strong personages who could help the islanders retain their institutions—on the mainland, if necessary—just as earlier allegiances had been centered on stationary communities. Opportunities existed for individual leaders to gain power over multiethnic amalgams as well as over traditional communal groups and the factions within them”.
