The alchemist
VIP
It's based on modern ethnonationalism fostered from the relations with people south of them throughout the early "modern" to extant times. They had greater coherent will as their experiences were coherent. They experienced several famines and bombardments from the Showan-Amhara powers that later gave much land away to the loyal local gentry, moreover, raising the taxes five times higher. Haile Selassie took away the hereditary power of the Tigray leaders, instead giving them to Showan administrators. Derg communists undermined their sense of representation by implementing a systematic, centralized homogenization campaign that they felt repressed them. The Tigray people also did not like the Amhara centralization of the government, represented in the linguistic predominance and generally high cultural Amhara vernacular within the state body.
These people had built collective resentment and channeled them through fighting. It's because of their specific history and regional and demographic background than any specialty.
Either way, when they use the power themselves, they are, more or less, more of the same to us Somalis, so it does not matter much who is in power, as we have seen during Ethiopia's history. The only people that are outgroup and should receive separate consideration are the Eritreans. The rest are compromised: Oromo, Tigray, Amhara, and all these other minor groups that, on the surface, don't look different from those mentioned peoples because of the influence they received from the centralization of Ethiopia, want the same Ethiopia, only with their people represented at the helm. They all want the same destination but want to be the driver of the car and choose what route is the best to that destination. That destination is contrary to Somali interests.
When analyzing Ethiopia, discern how their macro-longterm interests are consistent with little to no deviating effects despite the often volatile domestic affairs, with volatility not shifting from the long-term policies, nor do they change opinion on foreign policy to the degree of the domestic political drama. People make this mistake often. You might see them employ several strategies to meet those same interests but don't make the mistake of perceiving that as fundamentally different.
These people had built collective resentment and channeled them through fighting. It's because of their specific history and regional and demographic background than any specialty.
Either way, when they use the power themselves, they are, more or less, more of the same to us Somalis, so it does not matter much who is in power, as we have seen during Ethiopia's history. The only people that are outgroup and should receive separate consideration are the Eritreans. The rest are compromised: Oromo, Tigray, Amhara, and all these other minor groups that, on the surface, don't look different from those mentioned peoples because of the influence they received from the centralization of Ethiopia, want the same Ethiopia, only with their people represented at the helm. They all want the same destination but want to be the driver of the car and choose what route is the best to that destination. That destination is contrary to Somali interests.
When analyzing Ethiopia, discern how their macro-longterm interests are consistent with little to no deviating effects despite the often volatile domestic affairs, with volatility not shifting from the long-term policies, nor do they change opinion on foreign policy to the degree of the domestic political drama. People make this mistake often. You might see them employ several strategies to meet those same interests but don't make the mistake of perceiving that as fundamentally different.
