Somaliland and Puntland Receive Higher Diaspora Remittances Than the Rest of Somalia

General Asad

And What Is Not There Is Always More Than There.
Every year, members of the Somali diaspora send approximately $1.4b to their family, relatives, and friends in Somalia, exceeding all humanitarian and development assistance to the country. The remittances comprise around 25 percent.

Somalia’s annual overseas development assistance is estimated at $1.3bn.

Funds transfers from overseas citizens back into their home country play a very important role in countries like Somalia, where a large number of its citizens fled to the outside world, especially to the West, following the collapse of the state. These transfers help recipient families pay for their monthly basis needs such as food, water, education, and healthcare. It also helps families get access to credit. Sometimes, it helps many Somalis survive recurring droughts.

This money—usually small monthly contributions taken directly from working Somalis in the diaspora—is nothing short of a lifeline for the Somali people.

But what is less understood is how that money, the diaspora remittances, can contribute towards inequality among Somali communities, and which regions in the country receive more than others.

Yet only an estimated 40 percent of the population receives remittances. For these households, monthly remittance receipts range from $50 to more than $300, with an overall monthly average income from remittances of $229.

A report by the Rift Valley Institute, a non-profit organisation operating in Eastern and Central Africa, shows the relationship between remittances and the relative vulnerability of certain communities, and how remittances can contribute towards inequality.

According to the report, there is a clear link between the average levels of remittances, and the regions in which they are received. Regions in the north, Somaliland and Puntland, receive on average $254 per month, while regions in the south of the country, excluding the capital city, Mogadishu and the port city of Kismayo, receive $119; a significantly lower monthly total.

Populations who do not benefit from remittances are disproportionately found in the south, where there is a larger rural population, and where marginalised and ethnic minority groups are mainly found.

There is also a clear link between the distribution of remittances and dimensions of migration. The Somalis, who out-migrated first, predominantly came from the north of the country, particularly from Somaliland and Puntland. These diaspora populations are now well-established in the United States and Western Europe. These patterns have been further entrenched by subsequent migration, which is facilitated by remittance transfers from existing migrant communities in host countries and other formal processes, including family reunification programmes.

The rebellion in Somaliland (now a self-declared republic) against the government of President Siyad Barre, in the late 1980s, led to a mass exodus to foreign countries, especially to the US and the UK, before the rest of the country followed suit after the collapse of Barre’s government in 1991.

This regional inequality was considered an important factor in how the dynamics of the Somalia famine of 2011 developed, with remittance-receiving communities being less vulnerable to famine.

Clan dominance and socio-economic profile of particular clans also affect how remittances are distributed.

The 2017 drought and associated humanitarian crisis showed how Somali clans demonstrated contrasting abilities to mobilise external support and, by implication, levels of resilience.

The large and dominant clans, as well as the small but well-connected ones, were able to raise funds abroad due to their historical migration patterns and the size of their current diaspora populations.

However, clans that are agro-pastoralists and whose communal identity is based on a combination of family-lineage and land-based territory responded to the drought less successfully.

Clans whose family structures are looser and who historically have had a less prominent national political profile, and whose diaspora is smaller, raised comparatively little money from abroad.

Despite playing a crucial role in Somalia’s economy and helping families meet their basic needs, remittances do contribute to inequality.

https://thefrontiere.com/somaliland...est-of-somalia/amp/?__twitter_impression=true
 

Odkac WRLD

جندي صومال
VIP
Lol every MJ I know over 25 has a professional job or business or multiple jobs myself included :rejoice:

not surprised at all that Puntland is rolling in remittance dough
The three Somali doctors I know are all Mj :kodaksmiley:
 

Macalin M

Out here
Why did they exclude kismayo and mogadishu? I would of expected most of their data (from the south) would come from those two cities, seeing as they are more easy to do than say for example a village like jalalaqsi.
 

General Asad

And What Is Not There Is Always More Than There.
Why did they exclude kismayo and mogadishu? I would of expected most of their data (from the south) would come from those two cities, seeing as they are more easy to do than say for example a village like jalalaqsi.

I think they were trying to show how much federal states are getting in terms of remittances.
 

Bohol

VIP
That is not a good news for Somaliland and Puntland it means their populations rely on remittances to survive. Were's there is more self reliant people in the south.
 

Macalin M

Out here
That is not a good news for Somaliland and Puntland it means their populations rely on remittances to survive. Were's there is more self reliant people in the south.
Well apart from Xamar and kismayo. I would’ve loved to see the data including those two cities. It would’ve shown the full picture.
 
Every year, members of the Somali diaspora send approximately $1.4b to their family, relatives, and friends in Somalia, exceeding all humanitarian and development assistance to the country. The remittances comprise around 25 percent.

Somalia’s annual overseas development assistance is estimated at $1.3bn.

Funds transfers from overseas citizens back into their home country play a very important role in countries like Somalia, where a large number of its citizens fled to the outside world, especially to the West, following the collapse of the state. These transfers help recipient families pay for their monthly basis needs such as food, water, education, and healthcare. It also helps families get access to credit. Sometimes, it helps many Somalis survive recurring droughts.

This money—usually small monthly contributions taken directly from working Somalis in the diaspora—is nothing short of a lifeline for the Somali people.

But what is less understood is how that money, the diaspora remittances, can contribute towards inequality among Somali communities, and which regions in the country receive more than others.

Yet only an estimated 40 percent of the population receives remittances. For these households, monthly remittance receipts range from $50 to more than $300, with an overall monthly average income from remittances of $229.

A report by the Rift Valley Institute, a non-profit organisation operating in Eastern and Central Africa, shows the relationship between remittances and the relative vulnerability of certain communities, and how remittances can contribute towards inequality.

According to the report, there is a clear link between the average levels of remittances, and the regions in which they are received. Regions in the north, Somaliland and Puntland, receive on average $254 per month, while regions in the south of the country, excluding the capital city, Mogadishu and the port city of Kismayo, receive $119; a significantly lower monthly total.

Populations who do not benefit from remittances are disproportionately found in the south, where there is a larger rural population, and where marginalised and ethnic minority groups are mainly found.

There is also a clear link between the distribution of remittances and dimensions of migration. The Somalis, who out-migrated first, predominantly came from the north of the country, particularly from Somaliland and Puntland. These diaspora populations are now well-established in the United States and Western Europe. These patterns have been further entrenched by subsequent migration, which is facilitated by remittance transfers from existing migrant communities in host countries and other formal processes, including family reunification programmes.

The rebellion in Somaliland (now a self-declared republic) against the government of President Siyad Barre, in the late 1980s, led to a mass exodus to foreign countries, especially to the US and the UK, before the rest of the country followed suit after the collapse of Barre’s government in 1991.

This regional inequality was considered an important factor in how the dynamics of the Somalia famine of 2011 developed, with remittance-receiving communities being less vulnerable to famine.

Clan dominance and socio-economic profile of particular clans also affect how remittances are distributed.

The 2017 drought and associated humanitarian crisis showed how Somali clans demonstrated contrasting abilities to mobilise external support and, by implication, levels of resilience.

The large and dominant clans, as well as the small but well-connected ones, were able to raise funds abroad due to their historical migration patterns and the size of their current diaspora populations.

However, clans that are agro-pastoralists and whose communal identity is based on a combination of family-lineage and land-based territory responded to the drought less successfully.

Clans whose family structures are looser and who historically have had a less prominent national political profile, and whose diaspora is smaller, raised comparatively little money from abroad.

Despite playing a crucial role in Somalia’s economy and helping families meet their basic needs, remittances do contribute to inequality.

https://thefrontiere.com/somaliland...est-of-somalia/amp/?__twitter_impression=true
Are you from somaliland ?
 
Remittances will be going down over time anyway. I doubt the next generation will send as much money back home as their parents. It'll be interesting to see how the region will cope since it constitutes such a large part of the economy.
 
Remittances will be going down over time anyway. I doubt the next generation will send as much money back home as their parents. It'll be interesting to see how the region will cope since it constitutes such a large part of the economy.

Yep has to be mitigated with development although there is a huge young Somali diaspora in Germany
 
The world bank already stated this.


31599
 
Southerners also have more lush lands, thus they can export produce at a larger scale.
The statistics are not reliable as alshabaab is controlling large parts of the south and most of the population of the south is in IDP camps. They’re probably using somalias gobol population statistics and dividing it by the amount of remittances that is received which makes no sense seeing as 800k idps are in xamar alone.
 
Why did they exclude kismayo and mogadishu? I would of expected most of their data (from the south) would come from those two cities, seeing as they are more easy to do than say for example a village like jalalaqsi.
because the south is larger than those two towns, even within Mogadishu there is a gap I would guess.
 

Macalin M

Out here
because the south is larger than those two towns, even within Mogadishu there is a gap I would guess.
That would be the sensible thing to imagine but with so many living in Xamar we can’t be so sure if it’d be low. Dependence on remittances needs to decrease nevertheless. like someone else in this thread said, The next gen ain’t sending money back so it’s either fix up or they’re f’ed
 

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