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37. Al-Qaida affiliate Harakat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujaahidiin (Al-Shabaab) (SOe.001) began 2019 with the strategic intent to intensify attacks and maintain momentum in Somalia and abroad.28 During the reporting period, Al-Shabaab shifted from a strategy involving high-impact attacks to one of sustained, frequent and eventually daily multiple attacks. In Mogadishu, it ordered the removal of closed-circuit televisions to hinder monitoring of its activities. On 23 March, Al-Shabaab detonated four explosives within one hour in different locations in Mogadishu. Member States observed that Al-Shabaab has further enhanced its improvised explosive device capability with more powerful home-made devices.
38. Member States attribute the upsurge in attacks by Al-Shabaab to several factors. First, many high- and middle-level commanders and fighters relocated from their bases in lower Shabelle to safe havens in the Mogadishu environs owing to the
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ongoing military offensive of the African Union Mission in Somalia and were thus able to enhance coordination in executing complex attacks. Second, the mass dismissal of security personnel in early 2019 created a vacuum that helped Al-Shabaab to reorganize and take strategic positions for attacks. Some of the discharged personnel joined the ranks of Al-Shabaab, boosting its capabilities with much-needed training, skills and insider knowledge of government operations and key targets.
39. According to several Member States, the most critical factor contributing to Al-Shabaab’s resilience is its institutionalized and secure revenue base (see S/2018/14/Rev.1, para. 40; S/2018/705, para. 46; and S/2019/50, para. 45). Al-Shabaab continues to expand the scope of its extortion activities in the geographical areas and commercial sectors under its control. In recent months, for instance, Al-Shabaab paralysed supply routes of major towns by closing access roads to government-controlled areas. This consequently opened a lucrative income stream after the group negotiated and increased levies from commercial, public transport and humanitarian agencies operating across Somalia.
30 In May 2019, Al-Shabaab closed the port of Mogadishu for six days, reopening it only after an agreement was made with the business community regarding its extortion payments.31 Similar negotiations took place in the Bakaara market.32 In addition, Al-Shabaab expanded taxation to include flight tickets and telecommunications companies and secured control of revenue from Ceelasha Biyaha and parts of Yaaqshiid and Huriwa districts.
40. Member States reported continued forced conscription, training and radicalization activities (see S/2019/50, para. 46). One Member State reported that approximately 200 recruits had completed training and been recently deployed in the Middle Juba region. Similarly, the head of the Amniyat33 in the Banaadir region recently requested that more fighters be deployed to Mogadishu. Consequently, Al-Shabaab ordered those unable to pay the high extortion payments to enrol their children in the group’s ranks.