@awsaleban667 I was thinking about this topic again and digged around and found this
"got stalled when they reached the hostile highlands. There, the struggle turned into a war of attrition that the Somalis could not have possibly won; after all, the Ethiopian population was ten times larger than that of Somalia and just as fiercely patriotic. As Rene Lefort has observed, "Somalia had easily won the initial sprint, but lacked the staying power with which to win the long distance race."93 As the war dragged on, the Ethiopians were able to increase the Eastern Command from its peacetime strength of one poorly equipped infantry division to seven well- armed divisions, while Somalia's manpower became overstretched and under- supplied. The Somalis might have been ready for a short mobile campaign of up to six months, but they failed to win the war in that time as they had hoped. In- stead, the conflict turned into a contest of attrition in which the manpower and spirit of each nation was tested to the limit. The longer the war dragged on, the more weary the Somalis became. They had other problems pertaining to logistics and leadership. Fighting some 700 kms away from home, it soon became apparent the Soma- lis had overstretched themselves logistically. As the combat zone was deep in enemy's territory, their supply and communications systems became more vulner- able to disruptions by Ethiopian airmen and paratroopers, and the provisions for supply and reinforcement were woefully inadequate.94 If only they had limited themselves to seizing the Ogaden, they could have won at least a temporary mili- tary victory"
Was Ethiopia already winning before the Soviets and Cubans arrived? Between the stretched supply lines, the airstrikes and general exhaustion of the SNA, it seemed as though Ethiopia was already turning the tide of war. Siad Barre probably should have stopped at Ogaden.