Al Shabaab's motivations for recruitment vary widely, with some reasons appearing reasonable while others are deeply rooted in Kharijite ideology. However, one of the key factors driving their appeal, in my opinion, is the perceived justification provided by AMISOM. The presence of a foreign military supporting a weak regional and federal government leads many disenchanted with their leadership relying on non-Muslims, thus pushing them towards Al Shabaab. The sight of Ugandan, Ethiopian, or Kenyan troops in places like Mogadishu, Afmaadow, Merka, or Baidoa isn't welcomed, especially among the young and impassioned.
As long as AMISOM remains in Somalia, Al Shabaab will continue to find fertile ground for recruitment and sympathy. Removing AMISOM and demonstrating the benefits of federally and regionally administered areas through foreign investment, improved security, and greater freedoms compared to Al Shabaab-controlled zones seems like a straightforward solution.
However, the challenge lies in the aftermath once AMISOM is ousted. We might face a situation similar to Iraq in 2013 or Afghanistan in 2022. While elite units like GorGor and Danab are showcased, they are only a small fraction of the broader military, which relies heavily on a patchwork of clan militias, retired warlords, and poorly trained infantry.
Reflecting on Iraq, there's hope in realizing that they managed to bounce back and reverse ISIS gains by retaining a core of well-trained and loyal soldiers, integrating them with die-hard militias to reform the army. Somalia needs a pragmatic approach: expanding the armed forces, extensive retraining, and effective military leadership.
A major concern is the lack of diversity within the armed forces, leading to disproportionate sacrifices and posing potential threats due to clan dominance. Widening the recruitment base and fostering diversity within units can eliminate tribal conflicts and increase national cohesion.
Every region in Somalia struggles with youth unemployment. For Federal Member States , integrating their own people into the national army with federal salaries redistributed to their regions via remittance can be mutually beneficial. The FGS would gain a more loyal, well-trained army less prone to tribal infighting, promoting stability and unity.
Why hasn't this occurred? What I'm suggesting isn't overly complex, but since Barre's ousting, military forces in every Somali region have been kept on a tight leash. Apart from grappling with tribal conflicts, establishing a robust armed forces structure poses the risk of another coup, particularly if the armed forces unite based on non-clan ideology. Authorities prefer relying on decentralized tribal militias rather than consolidating power into a hierarchical armed forces structure, as the latter inherently concentrates power. I believe the conflict between SL and SSC is a good example of both, fact is the SL army is starved because every major subclans make sure to stall all the good military vehicles and such for themselves. The fight in their eyes was Somalilands and not theirs, something which in the case of the SSC was not the case, where the war was a fight bethween them, as in all of them, and the other, in this case Somaliland.
The same way the fight between the FGS and Al shabaab is not viewed as in us and them, but for the layman two third parties fighting against one another wherein one does not feel particular loyalty to any of the two. That loyalty needs to be earned.
TL;DR
As long as AMISOM remains in Somalia, Al Shabaab will continue to find fertile ground for recruitment and sympathy. Removing AMISOM and demonstrating the benefits of federally and regionally administered areas through foreign investment, improved security, and greater freedoms compared to Al Shabaab-controlled zones seems like a straightforward solution.
However, the challenge lies in the aftermath once AMISOM is ousted. We might face a situation similar to Iraq in 2013 or Afghanistan in 2022. While elite units like GorGor and Danab are showcased, they are only a small fraction of the broader military, which relies heavily on a patchwork of clan militias, retired warlords, and poorly trained infantry.
Reflecting on Iraq, there's hope in realizing that they managed to bounce back and reverse ISIS gains by retaining a core of well-trained and loyal soldiers, integrating them with die-hard militias to reform the army. Somalia needs a pragmatic approach: expanding the armed forces, extensive retraining, and effective military leadership.
A major concern is the lack of diversity within the armed forces, leading to disproportionate sacrifices and posing potential threats due to clan dominance. Widening the recruitment base and fostering diversity within units can eliminate tribal conflicts and increase national cohesion.
Every region in Somalia struggles with youth unemployment. For Federal Member States , integrating their own people into the national army with federal salaries redistributed to their regions via remittance can be mutually beneficial. The FGS would gain a more loyal, well-trained army less prone to tribal infighting, promoting stability and unity.
Why hasn't this occurred? What I'm suggesting isn't overly complex, but since Barre's ousting, military forces in every Somali region have been kept on a tight leash. Apart from grappling with tribal conflicts, establishing a robust armed forces structure poses the risk of another coup, particularly if the armed forces unite based on non-clan ideology. Authorities prefer relying on decentralized tribal militias rather than consolidating power into a hierarchical armed forces structure, as the latter inherently concentrates power. I believe the conflict between SL and SSC is a good example of both, fact is the SL army is starved because every major subclans make sure to stall all the good military vehicles and such for themselves. The fight in their eyes was Somalilands and not theirs, something which in the case of the SSC was not the case, where the war was a fight bethween them, as in all of them, and the other, in this case Somaliland.
The same way the fight between the FGS and Al shabaab is not viewed as in us and them, but for the layman two third parties fighting against one another wherein one does not feel particular loyalty to any of the two. That loyalty needs to be earned.
TL;DR
- Removing AMISOM grants the government the legitimacy it requires and weakens the fertile ground from which Al Shabaab draws recruits.
- To avert collapse, it's crucial to overhaul the army, transforming it into a more diverse and meritocratic institution. This restructuring aims to alleviate concerns some may harbor about the military.
- Additionally, the government should surpass Al Shabaab in governance and development efforts to win the hearts and minds.
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