AMISOM/ATMIS and Al Shabaab the cycle that keeps on fueling one another and military rambling.

[JamalFarah]

Al Shabaab's motivations for recruitment vary widely, with some reasons appearing reasonable while others are deeply rooted in Kharijite ideology. However, one of the key factors driving their appeal, in my opinion, is the perceived justification provided by AMISOM. The presence of a foreign military supporting a weak regional and federal government leads many disenchanted with their leadership relying on non-Muslims, thus pushing them towards Al Shabaab. The sight of Ugandan, Ethiopian, or Kenyan troops in places like Mogadishu, Afmaadow, Merka, or Baidoa isn't welcomed, especially among the young and impassioned.

As long as AMISOM remains in Somalia, Al Shabaab will continue to find fertile ground for recruitment and sympathy. Removing AMISOM and demonstrating the benefits of federally and regionally administered areas through foreign investment, improved security, and greater freedoms compared to Al Shabaab-controlled zones seems like a straightforward solution.

However, the challenge lies in the aftermath once AMISOM is ousted. We might face a situation similar to Iraq in 2013 or Afghanistan in 2022. While elite units like GorGor and Danab are showcased, they are only a small fraction of the broader military, which relies heavily on a patchwork of clan militias, retired warlords, and poorly trained infantry.

Reflecting on Iraq, there's hope in realizing that they managed to bounce back and reverse ISIS gains by retaining a core of well-trained and loyal soldiers, integrating them with die-hard militias to reform the army. Somalia needs a pragmatic approach: expanding the armed forces, extensive retraining, and effective military leadership.

A major concern is the lack of diversity within the armed forces, leading to disproportionate sacrifices and posing potential threats due to clan dominance. Widening the recruitment base and fostering diversity within units can eliminate tribal conflicts and increase national cohesion.

Every region in Somalia struggles with youth unemployment. For Federal Member States , integrating their own people into the national army with federal salaries redistributed to their regions via remittance can be mutually beneficial. The FGS would gain a more loyal, well-trained army less prone to tribal infighting, promoting stability and unity.

Why hasn't this occurred? What I'm suggesting isn't overly complex, but since Barre's ousting, military forces in every Somali region have been kept on a tight leash. Apart from grappling with tribal conflicts, establishing a robust armed forces structure poses the risk of another coup, particularly if the armed forces unite based on non-clan ideology. Authorities prefer relying on decentralized tribal militias rather than consolidating power into a hierarchical armed forces structure, as the latter inherently concentrates power. I believe the conflict between SL and SSC is a good example of both, fact is the SL army is starved because every major subclans make sure to stall all the good military vehicles and such for themselves. The fight in their eyes was Somalilands and not theirs, something which in the case of the SSC was not the case, where the war was a fight bethween them, as in all of them, and the other, in this case Somaliland.
The same way the fight between the FGS and Al shabaab is not viewed as in us and them, but for the layman two third parties fighting against one another wherein one does not feel particular loyalty to any of the two. That loyalty needs to be earned.

TL;DR

• Removing AMISOM grants the government the legitimacy it requires and weakens the fertile ground from which Al Shabaab draws recruits.
• To avert collapse, it's crucial to overhaul the army, transforming it into a more diverse and meritocratic institution. This restructuring aims to alleviate concerns some may harbor about the military.
• Additionally, the government should surpass Al Shabaab in governance and development efforts to win the hearts and minds.

 

[Pastoralist]

The 5000 Eritrean troops from previous term were multi clan. Hassan went around asking their clan, to see if they were tribal or not. They were rewarded with a set up in GM which awaited their demise. Assassinations of generals with undisclosed locations (only the government would know). Generals were ordered to lead their soldiers into clear death traps in GM, when they refused, they were removed from their position and replaced. Upon going into this trap, hundreds of soldiers would die at a time. A government compromised to AS is the cause of this.

under Hassan sheikh, the SNA has suffered more casualties than ever before seen. You know the problem, but let’s not sugarcoat.

 

[JamalFarah]

The 5000 Eritrean troops from previous term were multi clan. Hassan went around asking their clan, to see if they were tribal or not. They were rewarded with a set up in GM which awaited their demise. Assassinations of generals with undisclosed locations (only the government would know). Generals were ordered to lead their soldiers into clear death traps in GM, when they refused, they were removed from their position and replaced. Upon going into this trap, hundreds of soldiers would die at a time. A government compromised to AS is the cause of this.

under Hassan sheikh, the SNA has suffered more casualties than ever before seen. You know the problem, but let’s not sugarcoat.

HSM camaign has been, the westpoint rapport itself has said so, absolutely terrible. HSM is very much to blame as he is the majority shareholder of the lack of advancement and the high attrition cost of the handful of gains made. That same rapport however wasn't to kind of Farmaajo.

"..Somalia’s political leaders have also sometimes tried to politicize the SNA. Under President Farmaajo, for example, SNA units were deployed to coerce domestic political opponents, not just al-Shabaab."


You're correct about the appalling treatment of Eritrean troops, with a desertion rate reaching approximately 25%. However, considering the overall clumsiness of the campaign, I would lean towards attributing it more to incompetence than deliberate malice, looking at the high attrition rate for the troops outside of the eritrean regiment.

 

[Itsnotthateasy]

TL;DR

• Removing AMISOM grants the government the legitimacy it requires and weakens the fertile ground from which Al Shabaab draws recruits.
• To avert collapse, it's crucial to overhaul the army, transforming it into a more diverse and meritocratic institution. This restructuring aims to alleviate concerns some may harbor about the military.
• Additionally, the government should surpass Al Shabaab in governance and development efforts to win the hearts and minds.

None of these will work. Number 2 is the most complex point but essentially the FGS requires corruption to work, I know that sounds counter intuitive but it's the reality. Loyalty to the FGS is created through corruption, so it prevents the kind of institutional reform you are adovacating for.

FGS will collapse it's absolutely unavoidable. The only question is when.

1.

Tribal elders are used to deliver a stark message to Afghan troops often holding positions in district centres. The message is usually; “The non-believers are leaving Afghanistan. They are defeated. Your leaders are corrupt. You can surrender now and we will protect you; or you can fight and we will kill you.”

2.

In the absence of a strong central government backed by a national army, Colin Jackson notes, loyalties engendered by financial patronage formed the fragile connective tissue uniting the country.238 To overcome weakness in the central government, former President Karzai fell back on a patrimonial model of redistributing resources on a personal basis to consolidate control.239 The state’s high degree of centralization meant that the executive went largely unchecked by the judicial or legislative branches, facilitating systemic corruption,
which went largely unaddressed. As Executive Director of Integrity Watch Afghanistan Ikram Afzali told SIGAR, rather than becoming a vehicle for service delivery, state institutions instead became “engines of facilitating corruption and ensuring elite interests.”240


3.

A 2015 study of the Afghan private sector by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute concluded, “The significant amount of aid and vast international military spending
post-2001 has re-ingrained a culture of aid-rentierism: the Afghan elite competes internally for political rents from the international community.”224 Murtazashvili has argued that the volume of foreign aid, combined with a central government that was unaccountable to its people and “beholden only to international donors,” delegitimized the Republic in the eyes of the Afghan people and contributed to its collapse. “Money cannot win hearts and minds,” she writes.

The United States believed that economic and social development programming would increase support for the Afghan government and reduce support for the Taliban insurgency. For example, according to USAID’s “U.S. Foreign Assistance for Afghanistan Post Performance Management Plan (2010–2015),” security and stability goals were woven into initiatives as diverse as public health, governance, education, and agriculture. These goals included building active support for the government (health), supporting and reinforcing efforts to improve security (governance), increasing the legitimacy of the Afghan government (education), and increasing confidence in the Afghan government. Similarly, economic growth was seen as a key driver of security, based on the assumption that a robust economy would keep young men in the workforce and out of the insurgency, create confidence in the government, and generate revenues that would enable the Afghan government to deliver services and mitigate its dependency on foreign donors.331 However, the theory that economic and social development programing could produce such outcomes had weak empirical foundations. As far back as 2010, a report summarizing expert views concluded that there was “a surprisingly weak evidence base for the effectiveness of aid in promoting stabilization and security objectives.”

 

[JamalFarah]

None of these will work. Number 2 is the most complex point but essentially the FGS requires corruption to work, I know that sounds counter intuitive but it's the reality. Loyalty to the FGS is created through corruption, so it prevents the kind of institutional reform you are adovacating for.

FGS will collapse it's absolutely unavoidable. The only question is when.

1.

Tribal elders are used to deliver a stark message to Afghan troops often holding positions in district centres. The message is usually; “The non-believers are leaving Afghanistan. They are defeated. Your leaders are corrupt. You can surrender now and we will protect you; or you can fight and we will kill you.”

2.

In the absence of a strong central government backed by a national army, Colin Jackson notes, loyalties engendered by financial patronage formed the fragile connective tissue uniting the country.238 To overcome weakness in the central government, former President Karzai fell back on a patrimonial model of redistributing resources on a personal basis to consolidate control.239 The state’s high degree of centralization meant that the executive went largely unchecked by the judicial or legislative branches, facilitating systemic corruption,
which went largely unaddressed. As Executive Director of Integrity Watch Afghanistan Ikram Afzali told SIGAR, rather than becoming a vehicle for service delivery, state institutions instead became “engines of facilitating corruption and ensuring elite interests.”240


3.

A 2015 study of the Afghan private sector by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute concluded, “The significant amount of aid and vast international military spending
post-2001 has re-ingrained a culture of aid-rentierism: the Afghan elite competes internally for political rents from the international community.”224 Murtazashvili has argued that the volume of foreign aid, combined with a central government that was unaccountable to its people and “beholden only to international donors,” delegitimized the Republic in the eyes of the Afghan people and contributed to its collapse. “Money cannot win hearts and minds,” she writes.

The United States believed that economic and social development programming would increase support for the Afghan government and reduce support for the Taliban insurgency. For example, according to USAID’s “U.S. Foreign Assistance for Afghanistan Post Performance Management Plan (2010–2015),” security and stability goals were woven into initiatives as diverse as public health, governance, education, and agriculture. These goals included building active support for the government (health), supporting and reinforcing efforts to improve security (governance), increasing the legitimacy of the Afghan government (education), and increasing confidence in the Afghan government. Similarly, economic growth was seen as a key driver of security, based on the assumption that a robust economy would keep young men in the workforce and out of the insurgency, create confidence in the government, and generate revenues that would enable the Afghan government to deliver services and mitigate its dependency on foreign donors.331 However, the theory that economic and social development programing could produce such outcomes had weak empirical foundations. As far back as 2010, a report summarizing expert views concluded that there was “a surprisingly weak evidence base for the effectiveness of aid in promoting stabilization and security objectives.”

Interesting, but observers have already noticed that Somalia and Afghanistan do differ in a fundamental from one another:"In Somalia, the ATMIS exit raises legitimate security concerns, but a similarly rapid and complete collapse of the SNA and total victory for al-Shabaab is unlikely. Not only would the SNA retain significant external security assistance from the United States, Turkey, the European Union, UAE, Qatar, the United Kingdom, and other countries, but ATMIS’ departure would undermine a key element of al-Shabaab propaganda. Moreover, the SNA already endured the partial withdrawal of a key security partner when the Trump administration removed most of the roughly 700 U.S. troops from Somalia in December 2020. The impact on the SNA was not positive but nor was it catastrophic: "

Besides an important passage in your own post: "the volume of foreign aid, combined with a central government that was unaccountable to its people and “beholden only to international donors,” delegitimized the Republic "

Again, accountability to its people is the key element here, without that any aid and development will never "buy" legitmacy in the eyes of the people. Difference in Somalia is that Al shabaab is legtimate disliked by the majority of the country, compared to the Taliban who enjoyed larger acceptance.

"The state’s high degree of centralization meant that the executive went largely unchecked by the judicial or legislative branches, facilitating systemic corruption,"

Federalism and a decentralized power structure may alleviate some issues, but the 4.5 system and clan-based leadership selection are breeding grounds for systematic corruption. Gradual democratization in Somalia will likely reduce corruption over time.

Your argument is interesting, especially considering the potential scenario if AMISOM were to depart. I believe the government could establish legitimacy in the eyes of the majority, though there's a chance Somalia might resemble the South Vietnamese government, struggling for years until its eventual overthrow without gaining widespread support. Alternatively, Somalia could solidify into distinct federal and Al Shabaab-controlled zones, akin to the situation in the Philippines with a demarcation line. However, it's more plausible that the government, if strengthened, could pressure Al Shabaab enough to engage in talks and concessions, leading to some integration into the government, similar to aspects of the Iranian model.

 

[Pastoralist]

"..Somalia’s political leaders have also sometimes tried to politicize the SNA. Under President Farmaajo, for example, SNA units were deployed to coerce domestic political opponents, not just al-Shabaab."

Its unfortunate that all the opposition which had actual good character got stuck with the Shabaab collaborators. So farmaajo turned into a dictator during his departure for aggravating them all. Not just the traitors to our nation.

A military takeover by means of a mixed army composing of all clans, and trained towards ending the division of Somalis. There’s no better ending for Somalia. Some of these opposition he was trying to arrest were a national security threat, not just “political opponents”. Madobe was attacking beledxawo with militia so he sicked the SNA on him. Some of these guys genuinely deserved arrest and he let them go, and let them off with removing them from their position.

besides that, you have a good perspective of the politics. His family on here deny what’s happening to the soldiers

 

[Itsnotthateasy]

Interesting, but observers have already noticed that Somalia and Afghanistan do differ in a fundamental from one another:"In Somalia, the ATMIS exit raises legitimate security concerns, but a similarly rapid and complete collapse of the SNA and total victory for al-Shabaab is unlikely. Not only would the SNA retain significant external security assistance from the United States, Turkey, the European Union, UAE, Qatar, the United Kingdom, and other countries, but ATMIS’ departure would undermine a key element of al-Shabaab propaganda. Moreover, the SNA already endured the partial withdrawal of a key security partner when the Trump administration removed most of the roughly 700 U.S. troops from Somalia in December 2020. The impact on the SNA was not positive but nor was it catastrophic: "

Besides an important passage in your own post: "the volume of foreign aid, combined with a central government that was unaccountable to its people and “beholden only to international donors,” delegitimized the Republic "

Again, accountability to its people is the key element here, without that any aid and development will never "buy" legitmacy in the eyes of the people. Difference in Somalia is that Al shabaab is legtimate disliked by the majority of the country, compared to the Taliban who enjoyed larger acceptance.

"The state’s high degree of centralization meant that the executive went largely unchecked by the judicial or legislative branches, facilitating systemic corruption,"

Federalism and a decentralized power structure may alleviate some issues, but the 4.5 system and clan-based leadership selection are breeding grounds for systematic corruption. Gradual democratization in Somalia will likely reduce corruption over time.

Your argument is interesting, especially considering the potential scenario if AMISOM were to depart. I believe the government could establish legitimacy in the eyes of the majority, though there's a chance Somalia might resemble the South Vietnamese government, struggling for years until its eventual overthrow without gaining widespread support. Alternatively, Somalia could solidify into distinct federal and Al Shabaab-controlled zones, akin to the situation in the Philippines with a demarcation line. However, it's more plausible that the government, if strengthened, could pressure Al Shabaab enough to engage in talks and concessions, leading to some integration into the government, similar to aspects of the Iranian model.

I agree there are many differences between Somalia and Afghanistan and so the situation will not play out the same.

Militarily the FGS will hold out better because of having more partners, distributing the load and not relying so heavily on one partner like Afghanistan.

The political point is key, the FGS is incentivized to centralize power. Right now, the FGS has diversified enough to not rely on any one international partner enough to truly influence it (why HSM is always making deals). International partners will be concerned by the centralization of power but won't be in a position to stop it. In a post a while back I wrote that political collapse was the most likely scenario and preceding that will be significant centralization of power over the next few years.

We already see the FGS removing UNSOM as a roadblock to their power grab.

I see disputed elections and power struggles within the FGS itself as a trigger point for the meltdown.

 

[JamalFarah]

I agree there are many differences between Somalia and Afghanistan and so the situation will not play out the same.

Militarily the FGS will hold out better because of having more and smaller partners, distributing the load and not relying so heavily on one partner like Afghanistan.

The political point is the key I feel, the FGS is incentivized to centralize power. Right now, the FGS has diversified enough to not rely on any one international partner enough to truly influence it. International partners will be concerned by the centralization of power but won't be ina position to stop it. In a post a while back I wrote that political collapse was the most likely scenario and preceding that will be significant centralization of power over the next few years.

We already see the FGS removing UNSOM as a roadblock to their power grab.

I see disputed elections and power struggles within the FGS itself as a trigger point for the meltdown,.

A political collapse leads to balkanization, and in the ensuing power struggle, old grievances resurface, allowing Al Shabaab to emerge as the predominant force and govern Somalia entirely.

It's a delicate balance, as every influential figure in Somalia understands that pushing the "balkanization" button could result in unpredictable and unfavorable consequences. Many regions are already entertaining separatist ideas, preventing any single faction from believing they can seize control of Somalia through sheer force. People will just run and try and grab as much land that they can before the "Police" aka the UN arrives and writes down where the new broders are.

Every country is only allowed one seccionist region before the existance of the country aught to be questioned.

Hell it might be HSM who pushes it, once he believes hes strong enough to govern all of the south as a dictator vs being the de jure weak "democratic" president of all of Somalia strung along endless regional and tribal negotiations.

 

[Zak12]

Comparing Al Shabab to Taliban is silly. The Taliban had the support of the largest and most powerful tribe in Afghanistan the Pashtun and discriminated against minorities. Al Shabab is the total opposite case where not a single major clan support them whereas they find much of their support base among minorities. To give you a sense of scale, Al Shabab being as powerful as the Taliban would be equivalent to Darod, Hawiye and Dir all supporting Al Shabab.

FGS may have too little support as well but Al Shabab is just too destructive and evil as an ideology to garner any real support by Somalis. The 2017 Mogadishu bombing alone should be proof of that.

 

[Burqad]

The African troops and American drone strikes are often used by the strongest clan in a region to suppress and oppress weaker clans which drives them into AS’s arms.

 

[Garaad Awal]

Iraq was saved by fervent Shia Militias who felt that Da3ish was an existential threat to the Shias of Iraq. These powerful militias that arose to fight Da3ish were equipped and funded by Iran. Well-Equipped Fervent soldiers of the Shia backed by Iran & the Iraqi Shia govt (with Western& regional air support) vs Fervent Da3ish Salafi Jihadists who were not as well equipped with zero air power.

Somalian govt troops cannot replicate this as their war with Shabaab isn’t religious nor can they ever field troops that are as motivated as the Kababs.

A better Iraq scenario that the federal govt and the west can try is by arming & supporting local clans. The Americans bypassed the anti-Sunni govt in Baghdad and began arming local Sunni tribes in Anbar. These tribes with the help of American air support managed to defeat Da3ish’s predecessor Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).The Da3ish had nightmares of that scenario so when they were in Syria and other rebels began resisting them, they chose to insult them calling them sa7awaat which is what the tribal council that defeated AQI were called (Reawakening council)

The only problem with such a strategy is that the Xamar govt is already weak and with such strong clan militias, it will be a recipe for instability for decades to come as clans after defeat of Shabaab begin to clash with each other.

 

[Flightboi]

None of these will work. Number 2 is the most complex point but essentially the FGS requires corruption to work, I know that sounds counter intuitive but it's the reality. Loyalty to the FGS is created through corruption, so it prevents the kind of institutional reform you are adovacating for.

FGS will collapse it's absolutely unavoidable. The only question is when.

1.

Tribal elders are used to deliver a stark message to Afghan troops often holding positions in district centres. The message is usually; “The non-believers are leaving Afghanistan. They are defeated. Your leaders are corrupt. You can surrender now and we will protect you; or you can fight and we will kill you.”

2.

In the absence of a strong central government backed by a national army, Colin Jackson notes, loyalties engendered by financial patronage formed the fragile connective tissue uniting the country.238 To overcome weakness in the central government, former President Karzai fell back on a patrimonial model of redistributing resources on a personal basis to consolidate control.239 The state’s high degree of centralization meant that the executive went largely unchecked by the judicial or legislative branches, facilitating systemic corruption,
which went largely unaddressed. As Executive Director of Integrity Watch Afghanistan Ikram Afzali told SIGAR, rather than becoming a vehicle for service delivery, state institutions instead became “engines of facilitating corruption and ensuring elite interests.”240


3.

A 2015 study of the Afghan private sector by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute concluded, “The significant amount of aid and vast international military spending
post-2001 has re-ingrained a culture of aid-rentierism: the Afghan elite competes internally for political rents from the international community.”224 Murtazashvili has argued that the volume of foreign aid, combined with a central government that was unaccountable to its people and “beholden only to international donors,” delegitimized the Republic in the eyes of the Afghan people and contributed to its collapse. “Money cannot win hearts and minds,” she writes.

The United States believed that economic and social development programming would increase support for the Afghan government and reduce support for the Taliban insurgency. For example, according to USAID’s “U.S. Foreign Assistance for Afghanistan Post Performance Management Plan (2010–2015),” security and stability goals were woven into initiatives as diverse as public health, governance, education, and agriculture. These goals included building active support for the government (health), supporting and reinforcing efforts to improve security (governance), increasing the legitimacy of the Afghan government (education), and increasing confidence in the Afghan government. Similarly, economic growth was seen as a key driver of security, based on the assumption that a robust economy would keep young men in the workforce and out of the insurgency, create confidence in the government, and generate revenues that would enable the Afghan government to deliver services and mitigate its dependency on foreign donors.331 However, the theory that economic and social development programing could produce such outcomes had weak empirical foundations. As far back as 2010, a report summarizing expert views concluded that there was “a surprisingly weak evidence base for the effectiveness of aid in promoting stabilization and security objectives.”

FGS will never collapse. About the corruption part. That isn't unique to Somalia. Half of the rest of Africa does the exact same thing and they survive just fine.

Isn't Ethiopia built the same exact way on corruption? How else do you convince multiple different ethnicities to join the FGE? How else do you convince these people in the FGE to ignore seeing their ethnic people dying in war with the Military?

Also money can win hearts and minds as long as at the very least some of that money is used on infrastructure spending.

Afghanistan was rather pathetic. The majority of the Military didn't even try fighting. They just immediately surrendered. This scenario will never happen in Somalia.

 

[Pastoralist]

There’s retardation in the minds of Somalis that AS are a threat capable of beating Somalis when we defeated much worse. During 2019-2022 our NISA was a top 10 intelligence agency in Africa as sources indicated. Our gorgor is trained to NATO standards, so stop covering for the AS sympathizing government which screws over our SNA, potential, and citizens when even IC knows our country is failing due to corruption. Corruption includes compromising positions to AS, ghost soldiers (this is something Hassan sheikh introduced and it’s the main reason Afghanistan fell), lowering army wage, lowering morale, not pushing anti AS propaganda (the president is more focused on propagating his own election run), having a foreign minister as our defence minister, having the guy that gave qalbi dhagax to Ethiopia as NISA director, not mourning soldiers who have passed, selling army weapons, army weapons and clothing being found in the shabaab possession. Get a damn president who takes AS seriously, not one who’s posing to receive aid from IC to defeat them. This neef needs to leave, and Somalis will see to that. No sugarcoating necessary, Somali’s in Mogadishu are aware of the reality on the ground aswell. 1000km freed, but still fell short and committed treasonous crimes against our army.

 

[johnsepei5]

Let me remind you guys there is whole battalions of Ethiopian troops sitting in Somalia

no one sure whether they will leave when the mandate is up