WHY THE USA SHOULD NOT RECOGNIZE SOMALILAND
December 20, 2021Osman Hassan
Joshua Meservey, senior policy analyst at the Heritage Foundation, a US conservative think tank, advocated in a recent policy paper that the United States recognize Somaliland as an independent state.
His advocacy was supported by Stephen M. Schwartz, a retired member of the Senior Foreign Service who served as the first U.S. Ambassador to Somalia (2016-17) since 1991 when the Somali government collapsed and the country fragmented into clan-based enclaves such as Somaliland and Puntland.
The crux of Mr. Meservey´s discourse boils down to a quid pro quo deal between the US and Somalia´s one-clan secessionist enclave calling itself Somaliland. The deal is to give the USA a base at Berbera and the enclave is to be accorded recognition in return.
What clearly dictates the deal is Washington´s needs. A strong relationship with an independent Somaliland, he argues, would hedge against the U.S. position further deteriorating in Djibouti, which he claims is increasingly under Chinese sway.
It is all reminiscent of the logic driving the 19th Century scramble for the Somali homeland among European colonial powers, each vying for a place on this strategic region as a safeguard against threats posed to its interests by its rivals.
So, if the USA are losing to China in Djibouti, the answer is to get another base elsewhere by one means or another, this time in Berbera in Somalia´s rebel one clan rebel enclave.
When it comes to justifying recognition for Somaliland, Mr. Meservey comes up with a number of flawed or tenuous claims. Thus, he points to its “sincere commitment to democracy” and how it has “successfully operated autonomously for 30 years, has a critical mass of the attributes of statehood, was once independent, and wishes to revert to that status within colonial-era borders, the standard the African Union uses to determine statehood”.
Recognizing the enclave, he stresses, would be a reward for its achievements, and in particular its “commitment to democracy”. If that was the case, the enclave would not have been asked a base in return. It is a simply a barter deal, each side giving the other what it wants.
All the same, his justifications for the recognition of the enclave can be rebutted or debunked outrightly. One such justification Mr. Meservey cites is Resolution 16 (1) on border disputes among African States, adopted by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in July 1964, which he argues supports Somaliland’s claim to its former colonial borders and hence its separate status from Somalia.
This is a misrepresentation of the resolution which requires “all Member States” to “respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence”.
clearly, it applies to independent States which joined the OAU since its establishment in May 25, 1963. It cannot apply to Somaliland which ceases to exist as a separate territory in 1960, and therefore could not have been a “member State” of the OAU. It applies to Somalia (incorporating Somaliland) as a member State and its borders with its neighbours.
A second justification Meservey cites in support of recognition is his claim that “over 60 percent of the “Somalilanders”, who voted in a referendum 1961, rejected ratifying the provisional constitution for the Somali Republic”.
This figure can only refer to voters from what is now the secessionist clan. Needless to say, the rest of northern clans/regions overwhelmingly voted in favour of the constitution. Somalia is run along clan lines even to the present day and what matters is how these different clans, north and south, voted. In the case of the referendum referred to, all the other clans voted in favour of the constitution.
Another referendum Meservey cites in support of recognition is one held in the secessionist enclave in 2001. Those who voted were those in favour of the secession. Unionist regions refused to participate in what they saw as treason. The outcome of a referendum organized by the ruling SNM rebels among its clan supporters was a foregone conclusion. Suffice to say, one clan’s self-serving referendum does not bind the rest of Somalia nor justify its recognition.
Mr. Meservey also invokes the Montevideo Convention as supporting Somaliland demand for recognition. Article 1 of the convention sets out the four criteria for statehood that have been recognized by international organizations as an accurate statement of customary international law:
The state, as a person of international law, should possess the following qualifications:
- A permanent population;
- A defined territory;
- Government;
- Capacity to enter into relations with the other states.
It has no defined territory since it has no demarcated border with unionist clans. It is not contiguous with the southern Somalia, Djibouti and only Ethiopia and hence cannot claim any borders with these neighbouring countries. Finally, it has no capacity to enter into relations with others States as a renegade entity. Altogether, it fails to meet the requirements for a State set by the Montevideo Convention
Meservey wants to make a case for recognition from the fact that the clan has been “autonomous” from Somalia for over 30 years. Needless to say, such separation would not have lasted for long if Somalia has not been mired in civil war, or fighting another intransigent insurgents, Al Shabaab, or has not been condemned to 30 years punitive UN arms embargo – advocated among others by the USA.
Such arms embargo hobbled the government to defeat the Jihadists, or end the secession by use of force or its threat, That is what explains their longevity and not the failure of successive Somali governments that have been denied the means to defeat them.
Meservey also advocates recognition of Somaliland to serve another objective, namely to end forever Somali irredentism and the quest for Greater Somalia. This is wishful thinking. Somali aspirations for unity are their common bond notwithstanding one clan’s secession. It is immortal as long as there are Somalis. Whether their aspirations are fulfilled or not is imponderable for now. It would depend as much on their determination as on the obstacles they face.
Last edited:
