According to the Gaalo latest report on Somalia, the dam terrorists are smarter than the Federal and State Governments on every level of Governance.
https://www.hiiraan.com/pdf_files/2018/SEMG/SEMG Somalia report 2018.pdf
1. They have accountable competent organization.
2. No mooryaans stealing money anywhere in the organization.
3. They have check and balances.
4. Ability to infiltrate any department in the Federal Government.
5. Most advanced Intelligence organization in Africa.
6. Sophisticated non-corrupt Financial Institution.
7. Ability to manufacture explosive devices
8. Ability to construct their own electric Detonator.
9. Citizens purposely driving through Al Shabaab territory to avoid corrupt double charging Government check points.
10. Fearless fighters un-match by any other force on the ground.
Domestic Financing
Al-Shabaab’s taxation system
https://www.hiiraan.com/pdf_files/2018/SEMG/SEMG Somalia report 2018.pdf
1. They have accountable competent organization.
2. No mooryaans stealing money anywhere in the organization.
3. They have check and balances.
4. Ability to infiltrate any department in the Federal Government.
5. Most advanced Intelligence organization in Africa.
6. Sophisticated non-corrupt Financial Institution.
7. Ability to manufacture explosive devices
8. Ability to construct their own electric Detonator.
9. Citizens purposely driving through Al Shabaab territory to avoid corrupt double charging Government check points.
10. Fearless fighters un-match by any other force on the ground.
The Center has also confirmed that Al-Shabaab has constructed its own improvised electric detonators, reducing the need to import them from abroad, as they have done in the past.
Domestic Financing
Al-Shabaab derives its revenue from a variety of domestic sources, primarily taxation on transiting vehicles and goods, business and agricultural taxation, and forced zakat (alms) levies. Al-Shabaab’s financial system is systematic and centralized, with revenue directed from regional departments to the financial hub in Qunyo Barrow, in Jilib district, Middle Juba region. The funds are then at the disposal of the head of the Al-Shabaab Department of Finance (Maktabka Maaliyada), Hassan Afgooye, and its governing council (Shura) to distribute to specific Al-Shabaab departments.
Despite having steadily ceded territory since 2011, Al-Shabaab still functions as a shadow government in areas that it no longer physically controls, collecting taxes and providing services such as Islamic courts.
The Monitoring Group’s investigations indicate that Al-Shabaab remains in a strong financial position despite ramped-up aerial strikes targeting the group. Indeed, Al-Shabaab is likely generating a significant budgetary surplus; money is not a limiting factor in its ability to wage its insurgency.
Al-Shabaab’s taxation system
Across southern and central Somalia, Al-Shabaab delineates its taxation system into four distinct revenue streams: taxation of farms and agricultural produce (dalag), registration and taxation of transiting vehicles (gadiid), taxation of goods being transported (badeeco) and taxation of livestock sales (xoolo). Checkpoints are managed by district finance officers, who direct revenue to Al-Shabaab’s regional finance offices, and in turn the national finance office in Qunyo Barrow. At every level, collection of revenue is tightly controlled and internally monitored and audited.
Al-Shabaab’s domestic revenue generation apparatus is more geographically diversified and systematic than that of the Federal Government or the federal member states. The Al-Shabaab checkpoint taxation system is applied consistently across southern and central Somalia, albeit with variations in rates across regions. Al-Shabaab delivers an accountable and predictable system of taxation, including the provision of receipts. In contrast to checkpoints controlled by Federal Government or federal member state forces, Al-Shabaab does not doubly tax drivers who have paid at another location. As a result, commercial drivers often prefer transiting via checkpoints controlled by Al-Shabaab, rather than federal or regional forces.
Al-Shabaab’s most lucrative checkpoint lies approximately 160 km north-west of Mogadishu on the road to Baidoa, at Jameeco in Bay region. A senior Al-Shabaab defector — who was in command of the Jameeco checkpoint until March 2018 reported that the checkpoint generated approximately $30,000 per day ($10 million annually).
On 30 March 2018, a joint AMISOM and Somali National Army operation in Afarirdod village in Hiran region resulted in the death of Al-Shabaab’s regional head of finance, Mohamed Nuur. Recovered from the scene were three ledgers, later obtained by the Monitoring Group, containing detailed accounts of Al-Shabaab’s revenue and expenses in Hiran region from October 2014 to March 2018.
The ledgers display a sophisticated accounting system whereby Al-Shabaab collects revenues and conducts internal transfers using cash (both United States dollars and Somali shillings), mobile money, hawala money transfer and possibly bank accounts. The EVC Plus mobile money service of Hormuud Telecom Somalia Inc. supports the efficient functioning of Al-Shabaab’s financial system, allowing the group to transfer a significant percentage of its funds to its financial hub in Middle Juba region without the need to physically transport the entire amount in cash across hostile territory.