I'm going to do my best to not take some of these posters bait and stay out of the discussion currently in the gutter in the peripherals of this thread.
To address
@merka's post:
No one's going to war. Farmajo doesn't even control Suuqa Bakaaraha let alone koonfurta so his main priority will be to secure the south over the next few years.
If the south isn't secured during his term, then the status quo will continue. It's really that simple. You will see more macro regions and clan states pop up and the further weakening of the central government. This is obviously the situation that Siilyano et. Al would prefer. It requires no action on their part, they just sit back, collect their aid cheques and continue to steal the people of Somaliland's money while watching Farmajo struggle and fail. This is the only scenario where Somaliland has a chance at recognition as well.
If the south is reasonably secured during his term then 1 of 3 things will happen:
1. Renegotiations for reunification will start, due to pressure from international community. 4.5 will be abolished, or at the very least Isaaq joins 4.5 to make it a 5.5 system. There is no way Somaliland comes back without one of the 2 as a prerequisite. I obviously prefer that 4.5 be abolished all-together but knowing Somalis it probably won't be. There will be a new constitution, truth and reconciliation committee, and everything will have to be negotiated to appease Somaliland to come back. It will probably restructure Somalia into a new Somali republic with 2 formal political entities (Somalia and Somaliland), with 50/50 power sharing, revenue sharing and the equal splitting of the international aid budget, new elections, and full autonomy for Somaliland (think of Scotland or Quebec). There will be referendums in any disputed regions, and they will be able to choose which entity they'd like to join.
2. China - Taiwan type political situation, Somalia will still be too weak federally to actually do anything about Somaliland, since it will be in the process of rebuilding after 26 years at war. Somalia will still claim Somaliland as a part of its territory in the international community, and Somaliland won't receive any recognition from the IC. When Somalia rebuilds, it will just isolate Somaliland from the IC and Somalia will cut ties with any country that recognizes SL.
3. A North and South Korea type situation. Easily the worst outcome, both sides will build up military, and the eastern border with Somalia will be heavily fortified, with sporadic conflicts. Somaliland most likely becomes a pariah in the IC under this scenario, which is probably what Farmajo would like. Even then it would just mostly be hanjabad back and forth with occasional clashes, not full out war.
I've wanted to speak on this issue for quite sometime. I think it deserves its own post discussing the potential political dynamics, and I'll make one soon.