The past week has seen turmoil in Mogadishu. We’ve seen fighting in areas of the capital between militia groups and the security forces of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) which has cost lives and damaged public property. We have seen main roads blockaded with makeshift piles of sand and debris. Images and videos of militiamen with weaponry initially circulated, with footage of them being chased by the heavy armaments of the Federal security forces circulating around soon after.
The most heart-breaking of images were of Somalis fleeing the capital. Regardless of blame, such events are a dark reminder of the callous and cruel nature of war. A nature Somalis are all too familiar with.
The high tensions were immediately cooled when leaders of Galmudug, Hirshabelle and the Prime Minister Rooble made a statement which set back the political stalemate to the 17th September Agreement. A decision endorsed by the President in his state speech that very night and voted on by Parliament today.
However, after so many years of peace in the capital, what has caused this uproar and violence? Who was behind these militia groups which infiltrated the city and attacked security forces? Let’s take a look at the series of events which led to this catastrophe:
Tensions between the ‘Coalition of Presidential Candidates‘ and the FGS
The tensions between the opposition group calling itself the ‘Council of Presidential Candidates’ (CPC) and the Federal Government reached high levels when the FGS refused to incorporate the group into talks between the FGS and FMS regarding the signing of the 17th September Agreement. The CPC claimed that President Farmaajo was a candidate for the Presidency. Therefore, he could not participate in the meetings as a representative of the Federal government anymore but rather is a Presidential candidate with equal rights to the other aspiring candidates. Consequently, the CPC argued it has an equal right to participate in the talks.
Upon further inspection of such an argument, it is evident that it is flawed within its crux. The President was elected as the leader of the FGS and was the main signatory of the 17th September Agreement for the Federal government last year. The agreement has already been endorsed by all signatories and was legalised under Law 30. Therefore, there is not a need for the CPC to sign an already agreed upon legal text.
The concept of the President holding office during periods of elections is a standard procedure in other countries with Federal systems. For example, former US President Donald Trump remained as President during his campaign to be re-elected. He held office for a further two months after his electoral defeat to smoothen the transition of power.
Indeed, the demand by the CPC has no legal basis as the question of the elections on a federal level and state level are only the responsibility of Federal and State officials and not Presidential candidates as said in the Somali Provisional Constitution. Additionally, the fact that they were not original signatories of the agreement meant that there was no need for their presence for FGS and FMSs to sign the final implementation.
Events of February 19th
The events of the 19th have been shrouded in political smoke and mirrors. For weeks prior to the incident, the CPC had been calling for protests in the capital to challenge the President regarding his term expiration. This was during a period of high levels of COVID-19 contraction in Mogadishu which resulted in the government introducing restrictions to reduce transmission and to tackle the security issue posed by Al-Shabaab infiltrating protests. The security issue was particularly of concern because the CPC requested no state security be present, including police. Rather, the CPC would have its own militia to protect themselves, a request the FGS vehemently rejected.
The morning of the 19th was a frightful one in Mogadishu. The rebel former general Indha-Cadde infamously declared on a radio that government had been toppled in the early hours of that morning. This was followed by a series of gun fights and explosions which rocked the city. By the morning, the city was in relative peace and it appeared that the FGS security forces had repelled the attack by rebel forces. However, heavy damaged was sustained at the airport and opposition leaders Hassan Sheikh and Sheikh Sharif reported to have been attacked by government forces at their hotel in the capital. Something adamantly denied by the FGS.
This very incident would spark a mistrust between opposition politicians and the government. This would also be used by leaders of Puntland and Jubaland as a political card to continue their stalling to sign the 17th September agreement which they had been doing during the eight months prior.
This would be the birth of the CPC’s political coalition with Jubaland and Puntland against the FGS and the implementation of direct elections.
The formation of ‘Madasha Badbaado Qaran‘ or ‘Somali National Salvation Forum‘
By the end of March, the President had called for five meetings regarding the signing of the 17th September agreement including Garowe, Mogadishu and Samareeb which were all rejected by leaders Deni and Madobe. Instead, Deni and Madobe began a game of cat and mouse, first requesting the meeting to be only Mogadishu, then rejecting Villa Somalia and requesting specifically Xalane which the President eventually accepted. This meeting occurred at Afisyooni which leaders of Puntland and Jubaland initially refused to attend despite their request being fulfilled. It is important to note that during their arrival to the capital, both Deni and Madobe came to Mogadishu with weapons which they would leave behind on their departure.
It is during this period, that the leaders Deni and Madobe joined forces with the CPC and leader of the Upper House to form the group named ‘Badbaado Qaran‘. A group claiming to save the country from political collapse. This group would have regular meetings to address and discuss political responses to both the political impasse at home and abroad. It engage in acts that could be deemed a national security threat. For example, it condemned Turkey for training Somali armed forces in the fight against Al-Shabaab.
The group was represented by Deni and Madobe at the Afisyooni talks which would eventually begin after the UN security council statement. Within three days, the talks would collapse. This was mainly due to the FGS’s rejection of conditions set out by the leaders of Puntland and Jubaland. This included included the sacking of most military commanders and disbandment of all Federal institutions. Indeed, such requests are unconstitutional and are in fact detrimental to Somali political stability and state security. No government would accept such terms which definitively proved the lack of appetite and rejection to hold elections by leaders of Puntland and Jubaland (Badbaado Qaran).
