Luo vs kalenjin beef in Kenya
- Thread starter Chaseyourdreamzz
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Landheere in form of money and and governance but not numbers.
Luhuas are landheere bit are like raxaweyn qabilo isu tagey.
Chaseyourdreamzz
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Kalenjin policemen beating luos in the streets
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Chaseyourdreamzz
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Somali politician alinur Mohamed voicing his opinion
Chaseyourdreamzz
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Kalenjin elders say they are loyal to ruto this can spiral out of control
Arrows?
Chaseyourdreamzz
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They wouldn’t last a day in SomaliaArrows?
You may laugh now, but when a militia of 200 shows up at your doorstep in the dead of night, it won’t be so funny. These people fought the British for 16 years using the same arrows you mock. They are skilled archers who employ guerrilla tactics, striking in large numbers with poisoned arrows under the cover of darkness. How do I know? Because our house was raided back in 2007. Over 100 of them arrived in the early hours of Valentine’s Day. They left my father lying in front of our home—with his neck and ribs broken, his body pierced with arrows, and his eyes gouged out.Arrows?
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Obviously not, if they're only armed with bows and arrows but the Kalenjin are divided into 11 culturally and linguistically related tribes totaling about 6.3 million people.
In Northern Kenya, the Pokot are practically born with an AK at the hip and the Sabaot once formed a militia (SLDF) that even gave the KDF trouble.
Think I previously mentioned that the Nandi fought the British for 16 years. They only lost because the British brokered a fake truce only to then ambush their spiritual leader Koitalel Arap Samoei.
The Kalenjin tribes:
Kipsigis (1.9 million),
Nandi (937,000),
Pokot (778,000),
Sebei (350,000),
Sabaot (296,000),
Keiyo (451,000),
Tugen (197,556),
Cherang'any (8,323),
Marakwet (119,000),
Ogiek (52,000),
Terik (323,230),
Lembus (71,600),
Sengwer (10,800).
If all these communities were to unite, they would pose a serious threat to any country/community. Just look at the havoc Al-Shabaab are wreaking with 15-18,000 men. Joseph Kony similarly killed more than 100,000 with a small militia.
The Kalenjin still practice cattle rustling, which often leads to deadly outcomes, and in times of conflict, they don’t adhere to normal codes of war (proportionality, humanity, and honor). It was a Kalenjin who ordered the execution of 5000 Somalis in Wagalla. This was two years after a Luo led coup against the government in 1982. It hardened him
During the PEV, they tracked down women seeking shelter in churches and burned them alive, along with children. Same thing in 1992 where they killed 5000 Kikuyus in Molo.
Somalis, I would think are a bit more civilised. Most of your people are businessmen, whereas these people still live in the dark ages. Imagine a father coming home from work, only to go out and "hunt"—that is the reality for many Kalenjins.
ChatGPT:
If we're comparing traditional Kalenjin warriors and Somali warriors, the outcome would depend on several factors, including tactics, weapons, and the specific historical context.
Kalenjin Warriors:
• Known for their endurance, agility, and expertise in archery.
• Used guerrilla tactics, ambushes, and deep knowledge of their terrain.
• Fought with bows, poisoned arrows, spears, and sometimes clubs.
Historically engaged in cattle raids and resisted colonial forces (e.g., the Nandi resistance against the British).
Somali Warriors:
• Highly mobile, often using horses or later camels for warfare.
• Skilled in both melee combat and ranged attacks, using spears, swords, and bows.
• Developed strong clan-based militias, capable of both large-scale battles and fast raids.
Fought against Ethiopian, Omani, and later European colonial forces.
Who Would Have the Advantage?
In open terrain (e.g., savannas or deserts): Somalis, due to their mobility, use of cavalry, and experience in large-scale warfare.
In forested or mountainous regions: Kalenjin warriors, who excelled in hit-and-run tactics and ambush warfare.
At long range: Kalenjin archers, depending on the effectiveness of their bows and poisoned arrows.
At close range: Somalis, due to their experience with swords and spears in direct combat.
Ultimately, it would depend on the battlefield and the circumstances. If the fight were prolonged, the Kalenjin endurance and guerrilla tactics could wear down the Somalis. However, in a direct, fast-paced battle, Somali warriors might have the upper hand due to their cavalry and combat experience against diverse enemies.
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Riftvalley
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Steeplechase man dem fadhi ku dirir
Chaseyourdreamzz
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This whole time I thought kalenjins where a settled agricultural community similar to the luos good insight on Nilotic history
which subclan of kalenjin produce most of the Olympic athletes ?
I believe that would be the Nandi.
Some are settled, others are primitive. They steal their neighbours cattle, and kill whoever gets in the way. During times of conflict (elections etc...) they usually show up in large numbers just to intimidate and leave a dozen people dead. You can't really defend yourself against an immoral enemy who's willing to kill anyone to get a W. Women, children, elderly, nobody's safe so you're forced to move until things calm down. Unless you have an AK you're helpless against archers.
Imagine getting this drilled in your head.
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Left a dozen innocent civilians dead in their wake.
Seventeen years ago, my mom went to bed next to her husband. The next morning, she returned to find our house burned down after spending the night in the woods with a child. She discovered our neighbor crying over a corpse covered with a sheet because the sight was too harrowing to bear. He had been completely disemboweled and tortured. "Animals" is the only word I can use to describe them. Even ISIS behead their victims quickly.
Nomadic tribes, in general, are a nuisance to their neighbors because, even with a standing army, it's hard to defend against bandit attacks. No one wants to lose loved ones in a senseless assault. Even if you retaliate, they'll eventually return, seeing that they are fighting for their survival. I consider them enemies of progress. I hear the Fulani of Nigeria are no different. In Isiolo, the Samburu have been doing the same thing to the Somali and Turkana, but I hear things have calmed down.
Edit:
Or not... this was posted 6 mins ago.
Somalis similarly used to conduct raids/ retaliatory raids on their Samburu neighbours during the colonial era but while you guys evolved, these nomads are still stuck in their primitive ways.
Edit:
Or not... this was posted 6 mins ago.
Somalis similarly used to conduct raids/ retaliatory raids on their Samburu neighbours during the colonial era but while you guys evolved, these nomads are still stuck in their primitive ways.
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Nigga comparing us to kalenjins.
Are u on crack??!
GTFOH.
Are u on crack??!
GTFOH.
Take a step back, set your ego aside, and actually process the information before responding like a buffoon. Now, tell me—where exactly did I bruise your fragile ego? Was it because I refuted the idea that a militarized Kalenjin group wouldn’t survive in Somalia, or because I compared your past cattle-raiding lifestyle to that of the Samburu? If it’s the former, then you’re an intellectual midget—no one has a monopoly on violence. You should have learned that after 35 years of insurgencies. If it’s the latter, I suggest you read the excerpt below—sounds a lot like the Samburu right?
#REPOST
The first major blow to colonial authority in the Northern Frontier District (NFD), later North Eastern province, happened in December 1915, when Aulihan Somalis residing in the area between the Lorian Swamp and Wajir mounted a huge raid on the Samburu to their west.
The attack which was conducted mainly by the Reer Tur Adi section supported by Jibrail, had devastating results. Besides the 54 Samburu, 3 Meru also perished, and the Somalis took thousands of cattle, small stock, and donkeys.
Following the raid, a British officer teamed up with Samburu warriors, to pursue the attackers, but they were forced to retreat.
Receiving anxious reports from the frontier, officials in Nairobi immediately reacted by dispatching reinforcements to the north.
Lieutenant Harry Rayne, who was a veteran of the Nandi punitive expeditions, was given charge of organizing a British patrol to bring back the stolen Samburu cattle. Rayne hoped to surprise the Aulihan in a dawn raid, kill as many as possible, and afterwards seize hostages to open talks on his terms.
At the same time that preparations for military reprisal were underway, the colonial administration sought nevertheless to negotiate with the southern Aulihan.
British officials held public meetings, with the Somalis where they demanded that the Aulihan return the stolen livestock to the Samburu and pay them dia, or blood money, at a rate of 20 cattle per victim.
Because of these meetings, the Reer Jibrail sections of the Aulihan returned most of their portion of the spoils, but not the Reer Tur Adi Aulihan who, according to the East African Protectorate Acting-Governor Charles Bowring, "escaped practically unpunished."
By the end of the year, the Aulihan still owed 2,400 cattle, 15,800 sheep and goats, and 350 donkeys by the government's reckoning. Only the Reer Abukr section of the Reer Tur Adi paid the entire fine assessed against them.
Finally, in January 1916, colonial government officials felt they had had enough with talking. Consequently, they gave the Aulihan less than a week to pay their fine. The Aulihan responded by asking for more time, but the request was denied.
But still, the British failed to take offensive measures against the Aulihan. At Wajir, the only action that the Acting DC took was to double the guard since he feared a night attack from the many Somalis who had assembled near the government station. The British deadline came and went with apparently little effect.
By mid January, the Wajir Acting DC was aware that there had been a dramatic change for the worse in the British position among them Somalis. This was after a caravan owned by the white-settler Denys Finch-Hatton, best remembered for his romance with the writer, Karen Blixen, was attacked by northern elements of the Aulihan.
The attackers killed 13 members of the caravan and stole stock. Several wounded men were left behind as the survivors trekked through scorched country without water, and a couple of the men who did reach Wajir later succumbed from thirst.
On 2 February 1916, the disaster that British officials had feared would one day happen in the NFD occurred in neighboring Jubaland. There, a large part of northern Aulihan led by Hajji 'Abdurrahman Mursaal surprised and killed the Serenli DC, Lieutenant Francis Elliot, and many of the British soldiers.
The incident actually arose from a dispute between Aulihan and Marehan Somalis not long after the outbreak of the First World War and from which a series of raids and reprisals had followed.
Following the deaths of nine Marehan at the hands of northern Aulihan and the looting of hundreds of camels, Lieutenant Elliot had publicly given 'Abdurrahman Mursaal an ultimatum to surrender the stolen animals to him within three days.
Instead, the government-paid Reer Waffatu headman defiantly delivered a gift of black animals that, by Somali custom, constituted an open challenge to the Serenli DC.
The undaunted, but injudicious, Elliot apparently was contemptuous of the threat and failed to take precautions. Instead, he continued his incredible practice of locking the garrison's rifles in the guardroom each evening before sunset. Moreover, he allowed a large contingent of Aulihan to camp just 100 yards from the government station.
At 7 P.M., while the askaris, were settling down to evening meals, the Aulihan burst upon the British post. They set the surprised soldiers' huts on fire, and killed many of them as they fled the flames. By one account, 'Abdurrahman Mursaal himself is said to have shot Elliot beneath the ear with a revolver, and by another, to have donned Elliot's sun helmet after the raid.
Dozens of Elliot's men were killed in the attack, while the survivors escaped across the Juba River to the nearby Italian post at Baardheere. The Somalis captured the company's maxim gun along with large quantities of arms and ammunition. For the next 18 months, Abdurrahman Mursaal's northern Aulihan, strengthened by the acquisition of British weapons, held free reign over much of Jubaland and threatened British rule in the NFD as well.
Indeed, a British officer with service in the region would later describe the Ogaden, of whom the Aulihan were a part, as "one of the most formidable fighting tribes in Africa" because of their mobility, remarkable endurance, and the skill with which they wielded their spears.
The reason why governments struggle to stamp out rebel groups is that they have to follow International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Without those restrictions, you’d see something like the Wagalla Massacre because cutting off the enemy’s supply chain isn’t hard if you know where to look.
A community like the Kalenjin, known for its guerrilla tactics (hit-and-run), would thrive anywhere in the world. By the time their enemies regroup, they’re already gone—leaving a trail of bodies behind. And if you try to chase them, you’re walking straight into an ambush on their turf, where they have the upper hand.
Consider this: a drive from Mandera to Isiolo takes about 14 hours in an ideal world. In reality, it’s probably double that due to bad roads. Now imagine commanding an army over that distance while hunting an enemy that's known for their endurance. It’s like trying to find a needle in a haystack because you don't know if they went straight to Isiolo or took the Moyale route (see map below, it's an 8 hr journey) and the civilians won't be of much help. The Americans had the same problem when they were hunting down Joseph Kony in the DRC.
NB: I find this lifestyle primitive and counterproductive to a civilized society. It's one of the reasons why places like South Sudan and the DRC continue to face intercommunal violence and insecurity.
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Let's be honest here: anyone who thinks the Kalenjin, or any other group for that matter, could waltz into Somalia and survive or win in a war against Somalis doesn’t truly understand the reality on the ground.
First of all, Somalia isn’t just a country—it’s a place that’s deeply connected to our identities, our families, and our history. We’ve been through so much together as a people. From the early days of resistance against colonizers to more recent struggles, we’ve always managed to keep our pride and unity intact. It’s more than just a matter of physical geography; it’s our spirit, and that’s not something anyone can easily break. Our clans, though diverse, come together when the land and people are threatened.
The environment itself would be a nightmare for outsiders. The deserts and semi-arid areas aren’t just empty stretches of land; they’re home to people who know every inch, every path, and every hidden resource. For someone who’s not born and raised in Somalia, that’s an enormous disadvantage. We know how to survive in this harsh terrain, how to deal with the heat, the droughts, the scarcity. That’s not something you can pick up overnight.
But it’s not just about the land—it’s about the way we live. We have a culture that’s shaped by generations of survival. Our bonds run deep. You come into Somalia, you’re not just facing one group, one tribe. You’re facing a people who understand each other, who have an unspoken solidarity that’s not just about geography, but about shared experiences of struggle. We’ve been through hardships that outsiders couldn’t even imagine, and we’ve always come out stronger. That unity, that sense of "us" versus "them," is powerful and deeply ingrained in us.
Let’s not forget, we know warfare. It’s not always about big armies or fancy equipment; it’s about being strategic, about knowing how to use the terrain to your advantage, about being relentless when it matters most. Somali guerrilla tactics are the stuff of legends. Our fighters are born into this culture. The Kalenjin may be fierce warriors in their own right, but they’d be up against a people who understand the ins and outs of survival and conflict in a way that no outsider can replicate.
And then there’s the emotional and psychological aspect of it. This is our home. Our families, our ancestors, our future—it’s all tied up in this land. You can’t just come in with your guns and expect us to back down. We’ll fight for it, not just because it’s where we live, but because it’s where we’ve always lived. There’s a difference between fighting for your home and fighting somewhere you’re not familiar with. The Kalenjin would quickly realize that this fight wouldn’t just be against a group of people—it’d be against the heart of Somalia itself.
In the end, we’re not just defending land. We’re defending who we are, who we’ve always been, and who we’ll always be. This isn’t some abstract idea for us. It’s real. So when someone suggests that the Kalenjin, or any other group, could just walk into Somalia and stand a chance, it’s hard not to feel that they’re dismissing everything we’ve fought for—and everything we stand for.
So, in short: they wouldn’t last. Not because they’re not brave, but because they’re up against something that runs far deeper than any outsider can understand. We’ve seen too much, and we’ll always stand firm to protect what’s ours.
In the end, we’re not just defending land. We’re defending who we are, who we’ve always been, and who we’ll always be. This isn’t some abstract idea for us. It’s real. So when someone suggests that the Kalenjin, or any other group, could just walk into Somalia and stand a chance, it’s hard not to feel that they’re dismissing everything we’ve fought for—and everything we stand for.
So, in short: they wouldn’t last. Not because they’re not brave, but because they’re up against something that runs far deeper than any outsider can understand. We’ve seen too much, and we’ll always stand firm to protect what’s ours.
