Samaalic Era
QurboExit
On state formation
Political scientist Jeffrey Herbst argues that interstate war is a requisite factor in the formation of strong states.[44] Using Europe's history of state formation as his model, Herbst identifies interstate war as the factor that enabled states to effectively collect revenue and to generate a spirit of nationalism, two results that Herbst considers "crucial developments" in the formation of strong states.[44]:118 War increases both a leader's incentive to establish an efficient system of taxation and the population's willingness to assent to higher taxes.[44]:119–21The existence of an external threat is also a powerful impetus for the development of a cooperative or unified state.[44]:122 Because the system of revenue collection, increased rate of taxation, and spirit of nationalism generally persist after war ends, war can have long-term consequences on a state's formation.[44]:121–2 This is particularly true of states in regions or periods of consistent warfare because states generally either adapted or were conquered.[44]:120 Herbst postulates that the stability of borders and lack of credible external threats between African states could result in "a new brand of states", those that will "remain permanently weak".[44]:119
Charles Tilly, an American sociologist, political scientist, and historian, claims that within the context of European history, "war makes states."[45] While the purposes of war were to expand territory and to check or overcome neighboring states, the process of war inadvertently engendered European-style state-building. War making resulted in state making in four ways:[45]
Political scientist Jeffrey Herbst argues that interstate war is a requisite factor in the formation of strong states.[44] Using Europe's history of state formation as his model, Herbst identifies interstate war as the factor that enabled states to effectively collect revenue and to generate a spirit of nationalism, two results that Herbst considers "crucial developments" in the formation of strong states.[44]:118 War increases both a leader's incentive to establish an efficient system of taxation and the population's willingness to assent to higher taxes.[44]:119–21The existence of an external threat is also a powerful impetus for the development of a cooperative or unified state.[44]:122 Because the system of revenue collection, increased rate of taxation, and spirit of nationalism generally persist after war ends, war can have long-term consequences on a state's formation.[44]:121–2 This is particularly true of states in regions or periods of consistent warfare because states generally either adapted or were conquered.[44]:120 Herbst postulates that the stability of borders and lack of credible external threats between African states could result in "a new brand of states", those that will "remain permanently weak".[44]:119
Charles Tilly, an American sociologist, political scientist, and historian, claims that within the context of European history, "war makes states."[45] While the purposes of war were to expand territory and to check or overcome neighboring states, the process of war inadvertently engendered European-style state-building. War making resulted in state making in four ways:[45]
- War making that culminated in the elimination of local rivals gave rise to one centralized, coercive strong state power that had a large-scale monopoly on violence.
- Eventually, this large-scale monopoly on violence held by the state was extended to serve the state's clients or supporters. This encouraged pacification, led to the formation of police forces, and provided protection as a state service.
- War making and military expansion would not be possible without extracting resources from the population and accumulating capital. Historically, this led to the establishment of fiscal and accounting institutions to collect taxes from the population to fuel war.