Gathering and collection of historical somali documents and photographs

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Pro English Forces
1-Tribal Horse, recruited from the Dolbahanta, Ba Idris, Habr Yunis, and Midgan tribes, and No. IV, Gadabursi Horse, recruited about entirely from Gadabursi men. The strength of each corps was 600 horsemen, 550 horses or mules, and 50 foot levies. Each man was supplied with a rifle, bandolier, blanket, saddle, water-bottle, and one horse or mule. A red tobe* was also issued as a distinguishing badge. The term of enlistment was for three months from the date of commencement of the operations. Pay was at the rate of 30 rs. for headmen, and 15 rs.for others, per month. After the battle of Jidbalj, both corps were amalgamated and called the Tribal Horse, their combined strength being reduced to 750 men. Of these, 250 picked men were taken for operations with the Mounted Troops, the remaining 5OO returned to Ain Abo and Eil Dab for raiding parties.). Page 419

Dolbahantas had been specially enlisted as Ilaalos, on account of their superior value as Ilalos to Ishak men generally, and their knowledge of the country in which it was proposed to operate. As a result, however, of these desertions it was decided, with certain exceptions, to replace the Dolbahauta by Ishak, and to select such Ishak men from the Habr Toljaalu mostly, Saad Yunis being subjected to careful scrutiny. The exceptions alluded to consisted of : —

(i) Men who were known to have a blood feud with the Mullah

(ii) Men who had recognized guarantees in the sha^K) of relations of property in our sphere ;
and

(iii) A somewhat large percentage which the intelligence officers at Bohotlo was permitted to retain, in view of the intimate knowledge he had of the Bohotle men who had been with him for some time back. When these changes were carried out, the proportion showed about six Ishak to four Dolbahantas. Page 398

@Armadillo this is the otherside of the dhulbahante that is hardly mentioned

 

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These Illaalos were "jaajuusiin" notice how even the English say Dhulbahnate are much more superior in Jaajuusnimo then H.Y and H.J . Iam a fair debator 6 Isaaq = 3 H.Y and 3 H.J and 4 Dhulbahnate which means 40% Dhulbahnate , 30% H.Y and 30% H.J, they still got the edge on us when it comes to the skills of Jaajuusnimo and even the number and the company .

There was little diffaculty in obataining Ilaalos, the pay being good and the service popular. Enlistments were made, as a rule, through some principal men. This had drawbacks, as , for instance, it cannot be doubted but that some considerable “dustoorie” was brought into play; but it is the only practicable method at any rate at present and produce men who can be known and vouched for. The tow men through whom the largest number of enlistments were made were Hersi Isa (Rer Wais Adan) retained as a sort of principal headman to the whole Ilaalo establishment, and Ali Bulali ( a Burkat Achil).

@Armadillo @Crow @Farm @MSGA

 

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WALTER LITTLEFIELD, April 10, 1910:

And this brings us down to the Time covered by the Colonial Blue Book mentioned at the threshold of this article. It seems that early in 1906 some members of the Habr Unis tribe raided the Mad Mullah’s reservation and carried off a few hundred camels. The Mad Mullah quickly retaliated, laid waste the farms of this tribe, and captured and occupied the town of Burao, whose English garrison retreated. This of course, again brought him into conflict with Downing Street.

There ensued a long series of diplomatic correspondence between the Colonial office, which had in the meantime taken over the protectorate from the foreign office, and the commissioners in Somaliland. The Commissioners urged again and again that a strong expedition be sent out, while the Foreign Office thought that the Mad Mullah might be bought off by subsidy. To this Capt. Cordeaux replied:
“It would provide him with the means of purchasing more arms and ammunition and would encourage him to make further demands, which would become more extravagant as his strength increased.”

 

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In Capt. Cordeaux’s opinion only two courses were open: A total withdrawal from the protectorate or the dispatch of a well equipped expedition. To this the Colonial Office replied:

“A forward movement against the Mullah is quite out of the question.”

Then came this from the commissioner:

“I do not hesitate to say withdrawal in the face of an actively hostile Mullah would be disastrous not only to our tribes but also to our prestige throughout Northeast Africa."

 

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Collection 324A/131 Somaliland operations, 1919: report and recommendations for reward, measures to prevent mullah's escape (Mullah Mahommed Abdullah). IOR/L/MIL/7/14634 1919-1933
, and the list was as this:

1- The Mullah
2- Xaaji suudi(isaq)
3- Ibaarhim Buqul(isaq)
4- Abshir Dhoore.(majeerteen/rer khalaf)

 

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HL Deb 06 April 1910 vol 5 cc556-98556
LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON
I should like to recover my reputation in the estimation of the noble Earl. I said that Chitral and Afghanistan were cases where 595 in the one instance the policy of evacuation favoured by the Government of the day had been abandoned by their successors, and we had been compelled to go back, and where in the other it would be rash to prophesy as to the future. However, that is neither here nor there. There is another small point of fact about which I should like to put myself straight. There has been some dispute as to what has happened as the direct consequence of this evacuation of the interior of Somaliland. There has been a little controversy as to what has occurred in the case of these unfortunate Dolbahanta. The noble Earl represents the matter as an ordinary incident of tribal warfare—that these people attacked the Mullah's force and secured some momentary advantage, and the Mullah's force attacked them in return and they were defeated. It really is very much more than that

Mr Philip Glazebrook
House Of Commons. 24 February 1914
While affairs are getting worse and worse among our friendly tribes, the other problem, that of the Mullah, advanced one more step, by a raid on the Dolbahanta tribe in February, 1912, as a result of which a large number of the Dolbahanta became destitute refugees. We must remember that the Dolbahanta tribe is one of the friendly tribes who have taken our side in previous conflictswith the Mullah. I admit that the Camel Corps was not formed for the purpose of protecting them against the Mullah, but it was formed very shortly after, that date, and was ready by December, 1912.

THE EARL OF CREWE
That is not so. There has been a good deal of desultory fighting between the Mullah and the Dolbahanta for some time past. What really happened is that the Dolbahanta are now so well armed that they thought themselves strong enough to go and attack the Mullah.

LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON
I am speaking on the authority of those who have recently been in the country, who have just come from the country and have had contact with the tribes to which I refer. I am assured by them that these incidents have occurred since the intention of His Majesty's Government to retire became known. I mention it in illustration of the argument that the news of evacuation, and still more the effect of evacuation, have already had consequences which we should all deplore. One other word about the tribes. The noble Earl tells us that the tribes have always been armed. I believe he is not altogether correct in that statement.

THE EARL OF CREWE
I did not say that the tribes have been armed in the sense that every man, or anything like every man, has been armed, but a certain number of them have had arms undoubtedly.

 

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And this brings us down to the Time covered by the Colonial Blue Book mentioned at the threshold of this article. It seems that early in 1906 some members of the Habr Unis tribe raided the Mad Mullah’s reservation and carried off a few hundred camels. The Mad Mullah quickly retaliated, laid waste the farms of this tribe, and captured and occupied the town of Burao, whose English garrison retreated. This of course, again brought him into conflict with Downing Street.

CAPTAIN MALCOLM MCNEILL, D.S.O. 1902
CHAPTER IX Arrival at Lassadar — Hoar news and plans for future move- ments — March against the Arasama and Ali Gheri tribes- Reach Jilib — March same night and surprise the Rer Haggar next day — Reach Bohotlc — Stop three days — Sport near Bohotle — March south against Ali Ghcri— Long day in dense jungle — Reach Kounnis — Halt a week there — Sport near Kourmis — Novel way of punishing a man for sleeping on camel guard.

ON arrival at Lassadar we heard all the news of what had befallen the first column since they left us on June ist, and we also learned what were Colonel Swayne's plans for the next move. When the Mullah had been chased out of British into Italian territory, the Commandant of the Levy had written to the Consul-General asking for authority to follow him, and in the meantime he had determined to take steps to punish those tribes which had sided with him (the Mullah), and who had joined in the attack on our Zariba at Sanala.Many of the men who had fought against us had now gone back 133 In Pursuit of the " Mad " Mullah to their Karias — no doubt ready to rise again with Mahomed Abdullah, as soon as ever the coast was clear. The two principal offenders were the AH Gheri and the Arasama tribes, who had for a long time made the whole Dolbahanta country unsafe for Europeans without a large escort ; it was now time to settle with them once and for all. Bohotl6, a well-known watering-place, was the most con- venient base from which to operate, and on the afternoon of June i8th we started in that direction. On the 19th, after passing Wood-wood in the morning, we reached Jilib about i p.m., and halted there till evening. Meanwhile the mounted troops had started off to round up some Karias in the vicinity, and had not returned when we started again, which we did about 6 p.m. the same evening, leaving two companies at jilib. We marched steadily till about nine, when the moon went down ; we then slept on the ground where we were, starting again at dawn the next morning. After going about nine miles we came on a 133 In Pursuit of cluster of Karias belonging to the Rer Haggar, a sub-tribe of the Arasama. The various companies were sent out, each under a British officer, to capture and bring to one place as many camels and sheep as possible, and by noon there were gathered together into one central open space about 2,000 camels, and more sheep than I could have believed any single tribe In Somaliland possessed. The whole plain was simply covered with them, and they were still pouring in when we started in the afternoon for Bohotl^, said to be twenty- one miles distant. I estimated the number of sheep at about 15,000, but others put it at 20,000 to 25,000, and I daresay this was not far off the mark, considering that they never stopped coming in before we left. .... Eventually we started for Bohod^ shortly before 3 p.m., taking with us all the camels we had captured and as many 134 the "Mad" Mullah sheep as we could drive, which was but a small portion of what we had collected. We were agreeably surprised to discover that our desti- nation was only about fourteen instead of twenty-one miles off, and when we reached Bohotl6, which we did about 7 p.m., we found that the mounted corps and the two companies that had been left at Jilib had already arrived, and had made a strong Zariba into which we drove all our captures. The Camel Corps and Mounted Infantry had also made a good haul, mostly of sheep, which, when added to what we had ourselves brought in, made a good two days' work. We were all glad to get some fresh mutton to eat, as it formed a most agreeable change, both for officers and men, from the camel meat we had been living on for the last three weeks. From the 2 1 st to the 23rd of June we remained at Bohotl^. partly to rest the troops and partly to get information as to the movements and whereabouts of the AH Gheri to the southwards.
next day, the 25th, we continued our journey in the same direction, doing about twenty-two miles. During both the morning and after- noon marches we passed through some likely- looking places for game — in fact I saw some dibtag about 8 a.m. on an open plain, just after emerging from the thick thorn jungle which surrounds Bohotl6. We could not of course shoot now for fear of giving the alarm, but I made a note of the place in case we should come back by the same route.

On the 26th we started at 1.45 a.m. to attack some Ali Gheri Karias situated some distance from our camp. We found that they had moved into some very thick bush, through which we had to follow them, and in which we were at a considerable disadvantage, as of course these people knew every inch of the ground, and had purposely moved into this dense jungle to escape us if possible. The result was a running fight with the Ali Gheri which lasted till nearly noon, but with very little damage being done on either side. The Karias with their camels and other live stock »37 In Pursuit of were scattered all through the bush, and the various companies soon lost sight of each other on account of the thickness of the jungle, and the number of small Karias in separate places ; consequently only a general direction could be maintained. All the companies turned up by night-time at our new camp, which was pitched at a water-hole called Haigalld, about fifteen miles from this jungle, but they were never again together. During this day, although no damage was done, a fairly lively time ensued when the various companies, unable to see one another, began firing, which they did whenever they came upon a Karia or a batch of camels. It was impossible to tell from what quarter a bullet might come, and I think we were all relieved that no accident occurred. Added to this there was, of course, a certain risk of being rushed in the thick bush, as it was very hard to keep the companies intact, and had the Ali Gheri really made a determined stand they most certainly could have inflicted some loss on us.

 

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CAPTAIN MALCOLM MCNEILL, D.S.O. 1902

the Commandant of the Levy had written to the Consul-General asking for authority to follow him, and in the meantime he had determined to take steps to punish those tribes which had sided with him (the Mullah), and who had joined in the attack on our Zariba at Sanala. Many of the men who had fought against us had now gone back 133 In Pursuit of the " Mad " Mullah to their Karias — no doubt ready to rise again with Mahomed Abdullah, as soon as ever the coast was clear. The two principal offenders were the AH Gheri and the Arasama tribes, who had for a long time made the whole Dolbahanta country unsafe for Europeans without a large escort

•Proclaimation to the Dhulabahnate. April 30th 1901.

Be it known to all concerned among the Dolbahanta tribes that the expedition now about to be dispatched by the Government is not against the Darod tribes of the Dolbahanta; it is to operate against the Mullah Muhammad-bin-Abdullah and those who are affording him assistance. All persons found supporting this Mullah will be considered as hostile to the Government and will be treated as such; and tribes will be held answerable for their individual members. All tribes are therefore required to refrain from any dealings or Communications with the Mullah, to leave that part of the country in which he now is and his followers are, and to warn any of their members who may be with the Mullah to leave him at once as they will be held responsible for any acts committed by such against the Administration. J. Hayes Sadler, His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Somali Coast.

 

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on July 16 the Mullah was reported by the somali spies to be at Ferdiddin, barely foruteen miles away, and it was at once decided to make a night march,and attack the enemy at dawn. The mounted Corps were sent forward to reconnoitre.Porceeding forward the mounted corps under major Benyon , Captain Friedrichs,and Lietutenant Walshe, supported by 350 Dhulbahnate horsemen soon rounded a spure some two miles ahead.Heavy firing commented almost immediatly from behind the spure and from the crest of some hills near by, and Captain Friedrichs was killed at the very commencement of the action..Somaliland by Angus Hamilton page82-83.

 

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On getting this news I moved my force from Bohotele via Yaheyl and Weyla Hedd to Firdiddin, and attacked the Mullah at later place. The Mullah's Mijjertein rifelmen were in considerable strength with Lebel and Martini-henry rifles. His force were however scattered, and he himself was driven back into Italian territory.The Mijjertein lost heavily, and also the Mullah's own family. His brother-in-law, Gaibdeed, was killed, as well as two sons-in-law, Haji Sudi's brother and nephews, &c. Sultan Nur's camels and the Mullah's cattle were captured. The pursuit was carried on into the bush in the Haud” Command Papers volume 69 1902.Page 15.


He forgot to mention that all of the Dervish forces were Majeerteen and that among the top Dervish who were killed that day, out of 6 , 3 were Isaaq and 3 were Daarood, and the herd captured and looted were the Mullah's cattle and sultan Nuur's camels. Just few facts that wont work with the Dhulbahnate Kacaan version of history.

@Juuqbuuqluuq
We wuz darawiish, kiss the ring

 

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The British Government have signed protection treaties
with six Somaliland tribes: Gadabursi, Eesa,
Warsangeli, Habr Gerhajis, Habr Toljaala and
Habr-Awal. All the Articles in the Agreements and the
Supplementary Agreements signed with the Somaliland
tribes are similar except the Warsangali one.

ART. I. The Habr Gerhajis tribe do hereby declare that
they are pledged and bound never to cede, sell,
mortgage, or otherwise give for occupation, save to
the British Government, any portion of the territory
presently inhabited by them, or being under their
control.

ART. III. All British subjects residing in or visiting
the territories of the Habra Gerhajis tribe shall
enjoy perfect safety and protection, and shall be
entitled to travel all over the said limits under the
safe-conduct of the Elders of the tribe


ART. I. The Habr Toljaala tribe declare that they are
pledged and bound never to cede, sell, mortgage, or
otherwise give for occupation, save to the British
Government, any portion of the territory presently
inhabited by them, or being under their control.

ART. III. All British subjects residing in or visiting
the territories of the Habr Toljaalashall enjoy
perfect safety and protection, and shall be entitled
to travel all over the said limits under the
safe-conduct of the Elders of the tribe


ART. I. The Habr-Awal tribe do hereby declare that
they are pledged and bound never to cede, sell,
mortgage, or otherwise give for occupation, save to
the British Government, any portion of the territory
presently inhabited by them, or being under their
control.

ART. III. All British subjects residing in or visiting
the territories of the Habr-Awal shall enjoy perfect
safety and protection, and shall be entitled to travel
all over the said limits under the safe-conduct of the
Elders of the tribe

@Fiidmeer @Gucci mane @Lordilord
@Abdurahman_somali

@Suldaanka

 

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Class V.—COLONIAL SERVICES.—SOMALILAND.
HC Deb 24 February 1914 vol 58 cc1619-91
§Mr. GLAZEBROOK
On the 3rd January comes the Report of the Commissioner, which appears in the Blue Book, telling of the Mullah's overtures to the remainder of the Dolbahanta tribe in the Ain Valley. The Mullah has a very clear grasp of the situation in Somaliland, and says that they have been severely punished for allegiance to an infidel Government, which affords them no real protection. The Government in turn urged the remainder of the Dolbahanta to take active measures. I think the words used are:— To encourage them or put heart into them. We see rather a cynical remark in the same Report to the effect that:— There is a wide belief that the Government intends to ensure their safety. An astonishing thing for ignorant natives living within our Protectorate to believe. The Commissioner, Mr. Byatt, like any other Englishman in that part of the country, wishes to help them, but he says he dare not do so without the express consent of the Colonial Secretary, which consent was refused. It was decided to carry cut a policy that I can only call cowardly in the extreme, by which the Camel Corps were not to help the Dolbahanta. They were to move slowly in that direction to give the impression that they were going to help. They were to move to Sheikh, and then to Burao—in the words of the Blue Book, "to encourage or put heart into" the Dolbahanta to attack the men representing the Mullah. It was a deliberate attempt to make them believe they were going to get all the assistance to which they were entitled, but which the Government never intended to give. The Mullah's atrocities at that time were increasing—there were atrocities and mutilations upon our friendly tribes. The Camel Corps reached Burao. 1652 There they had to deal with certain small matters, with various tribes. Mr. Corfield went out, and, according to the Blue Book, succeeded practically without any action at all, in saving certain stock. After that came the first reprimand for exceeding his instructions. There was one small portion of the dispatch of 23rd June, 1913, which was not read out by the Colonial Secretary, in which the Acting-Commissioner, Mr. Archer, says he cannot attempt to disguise the difficulty of the situation in which Mr. Corfield would be placed, should necessity arise, to withhold support in the face of a Dervish raid.

Imagine the situation in which a man like Mr. Corfield would be placed. On one side he would have instructions from the Colonial Secretary, given in obedience or subservience to some Members of his own party in this House, and, on the other side, his country's honour and his own. He is the man who pacified the West, the man on whom the Somali had learned still more to rely. He was the man whose name was greater in many parts of Somaliland than the name of the British Government itself. He is encouraged by the Government to give cartridges even, but not support to the Dolbahanta tribe, and heart to attack the Dervishes. Is it possible to imagine a more cowardly policy—to be ready to give moral support and to give even cartridges and to urge your friendly tribe who fought for you in the past, to attack the Mullah and then to take flight to the coast? If a cowardly policy of that kind was to be followed, the mistake of the Colonial Office was to put a brave man in to take charge of that policy. It is a mistake which was made on possibly a greater occasion, namely, the occasion of the evacuation of the Sudan. There the cowardly policy had been determined upon of withdrawal, and a man was chosen and sent out to carry out that policy. When he got there he realised that it was not consistent with the honour of his country or of himself, and he remained and died at his post. That was General Gordon. This case is very closely parallel. Mr. Corfield's instructions may have been definite, but let us examine the position in which he finds himself on the eve of the battle of Dul Madoba. A Dervish raid with 2,200 man had taken place, and it was reported that five Somali friendly tribes had been looted, and their camels and their stock had been driven off. The camel and stock of a Somali tribe are not only their wealth, but their 1653 wherewithal of existence. It is even quoted by the Acting-Commissioner:— This must inevitably cause almost unprecedented destitution. Then comes the reconnaissance in force. Mr. Corfield and the Camel Corps set out to find the Mullah's men. They had no instructions to fight, I admit. On the way out to the spot where the battle took place Mr. Corfield and the Camel Corps repeatedly met refugees, a large number of wounded men coming back from the action. One hundred riflemen and 200 spearmen joined the Camel Corps. I admit that they turned out to be of no use afterwards. Can you imagine what an appeal all these men must have made to Mr. Corfield, representing the British power, when they were faced with absolute destitution, when they looked upon Mr. Corfield to be the greatest man in the country, and when the Camel Corps had established a reputation from there to Abyssinia, where it was certainly the strongest force in the country? His instructions, if exactly carried out, would have amounted to giving cartridges and encouraging them to attack these 2,000 raiders. Is it possible for any man of Mr. Corfield's character to have obeyed instructions at that juncture? He had no time to appeal for further orders. The instructions had been definite, I admit, but could he refuse help to the Dalbahanta? He took the only possible course. He got across the line of retreat of the raiding party, and then took place the battle.

 

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SOMALILAND.
HL Deb 30 April 1914 vol 15 cc1144-80

THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES (LORD EMMOTT)

I will explain as clearly as I can why His Majesty's Government have chosen the plan that they are now pursuing. It is, of course, a change of plan. That I admit. It was hoped that the policy of coastal concentration which was carried out in 1910 and the arming of the friendlies would have enabled the friendlies to withstand the attacks of the Dervishes, and would have brought, I will not say complete peace and quiet, but at any rate a possible situation in Somaliland. It was always understood that that policy when carried out was an experimental policy and subject to change, and the Despatch at the beginning of this Blue-book shows in a very convincing way why the coastal concentration and the arming of the friendlies has broken down. In the first place, the friendlies used the arms with which they were supplied to a large extent to fight among themselves and to settle their own tribal quarrels, and by so doing they produced misery, disorder, and economic waste, and greatly weakened their power when they were attacked by the Dervishes And not only that. They did not confine their operations to British Somaliland. They also carried out depredations in Abyssinian Somaliland, in a country with which we were on friendly terms, and we could not allow raids of that kind to be pursued with impunity. Then, again, we found that the disorder was becoming so great that there were a good many refugees at Berbera causing great expense and trouble, and I admit that the effect of these refugees being there was not one to enhance our prestige. In the next place, the Mullah, although he has lost his power as a religious prophet, is still a terror in the land because of the hawklike raids he makes and the horrible mutilations he carries out upon his captives. Undoubtedly if the policy of coastal concentration had been continued there was great fear that little by little the Mullah's power would have gradually increased, and eventually even the occupation of Berbera itself would have become very difficult, if not impossible. Therefore if we were to remain in the country at all, it seemed necessary to adopt some other course.

The noble Earl said a good deal—and I have already referred to the matter— about our obligation to the friendlies. As I said, our obligation to them—we 1160 have, I think, only obligations of the "favour and protection" order to four tribes—are not so serious a matter as the policy of stiffening the backs of the Dolbahanta and other tribes who are a fringe between ourselves and the Mullah. We must keep order in the western portion of Somaliland. For our own sake we must also try to help the friendlies who are living in the direction of the Ain Valley. We cannot see anarchy spreading in the West, as it certainly was spreading before the first Camel Corps was formed, without increasing the possibility of a Dervish advance. As the noble Earl opposite has said, a Camel Corps was formed in 1912. At first it was intended to be 70 in number, but Mr. Byatt suggested its increase to 150, and that number was sanctioned. It was organised during the winter of 1912, and Mr. Corfield was brought from Nigeria in order to take command. It was most successful in its action in the western portion. It settled disputes; it did excellent work in the Hargeisa district and among the Sulagudab; it restored order in the West; it induced the tribes who had looted the Abyssinians to restore the stock; and Mr. Byatt asked for leave for the Camel Corps to move to Burao in the direction of Ber in order to inspire the Dolbahanta to take the initiative or to fight the Dervishes if they were attacked. It did a great deal to stop the spread of anarchy in Burao, and the excellent results that were obtained in Burao are borne testimony to on page 26 of the Blue-book. What effect it had on the Mullah is very doubtful. If the Mullah's letters were not such sinister preludes to something happening, it would be possible to derive amusement from the epistolary style of that extraordinary gentleman.
Then followed Dul Madoba and the retirement from Burao. But nothing that has happened has lessened the belief of the Colonial Office in the possibilities of a mobile Camel Corps in Somaliland for the purpose I have mentioned—to keep order in the West, and to give some measure of assurance to the Eastern friendlies. Acting on the advice of our representatives we have decided to recruit and organise a Camel Corps of 500—we have not yet recruited it up to its full numbers—and to hold Sheikh and Burao. We are at Sheikh at the present time, but not at Burao. We have also decided to increase 1161 the garrison of Indian troops to 400. There are a good many more Indian troops in the country than that just at present. This is the least possible modification of our policy that is likely to effect our purpose of keeping peace in the West and preventing the Dervishes from making raids in the East. A large immobile garrison in the interior is comparatively useless, and a large mobile force is unnecessary except for the purpose of capturing the Mullah, and our experience in 1903 and 1904 is against any such policy.

 

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"As a result of this manifest weakening of the Wardei they were attacked on
all fronts and it is no surprise that they could not defend themselves but had to flee for their lives. According Turnbull, 'the main contlict was in the east; and the actions fought at Afmadu, on the Deshek Wama, and at EI Lein are still- spoken of by the tribe

Ogaden were at this point led by the grand old man of the Abd Wak, Abdi Ibrahim , the Sultan, while there were a number of ' invasion commanders under him: Abdi Ibrahim was noted for his bravery and skill in war strategy which eventually led to the Ogaden dominance in the Jubaland. His remarkable leadership qualities are still remembered to this day by the Ogaden. Notable among his commanders were Magan Yussuf, the Sultan of the Mohamed Zubeer Ogaden, and Hassan Bejan of the Abdalla/Ogaden

having virtually conquered and suhordinated the Galla to Somali domination. According to Turnbull the attack lof 1865 by the Somali when the Wardei were weakened by plague was so unexpected and so violent that the Wardei were utterly broken by it.

Scattered through the fighting was, hundreds were killed; those who survived either fled to neighhouring tribes or became serfs to the Mohamed Zuheir, the Telemuggeh, or the Magabul. Many were sold as slaves in the markets of Lamu, and Zanzibar.

Had it not been for the arrival of Imperial British East African Company rule in 1885, the Wardei would have ceased to exist as a community with a separate cultural and political identity."

 

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NFD maps

 

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@embarassing @Crow @Mighty @Teeri-Alpha @diaby

 

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