The same PM (Col. Nur), who was:
- Accused of being an agent (for Walad Abdalla), and proved to be in his sabotaging of the Sudan agreement between al Shabab|ICU, and the TFG?
- The same Ethiopians opposition started calling our 'brethren ' a day after A Yusuf's resignation?
- The same Ethiopians TFG opposition had been spying for?
- The same Ethiopians who laid the foundation for the stable Xamar opposition is so proud of today?
1."Col. Nur was an agent sabotaging the Sudan agreement"
The 2008 Sudan talks were a legitimate effort by PM Nur Adde to negotiate with the ICU’s moderate wing (including Sheikh Sharif). Calling this "sabotage" is revisionism A.Yusuf rejected peace outright, preferring Ethiopian occupation.
The same TFG factions accusing Nur of betrayal were themselves propped up by Ethiopia, an occupying force. If negotiating with Somalis (ICU) makes one a "traitor," what does inviting foreign armies make Yusuf?
Nur’s real "crime" was prioritizing Somali-led dialogue over Ethiopian bullets a stance later vindicated when Sharif and ex-ICU leaders joined the government. Yusuf’s refusal to talk empowered Al-Shabaab’s extremists.
2. "Opposition called Ethiopians ‘brethren’ after Yusuf’s fall"
Post-Yusuf, Ethiopia’s role shifted from invasion (2006–2009) to diplomatic engagement. Even Sheikh Sharif later worked with Addis Ababa out of necessity not love.
Many in A.Yusuf’s camp collaborated with Ethiopia when it suited them (e.g., Puntland’s security deals). The "brethren" rhetoric is political opportunism, not a moral stance.
If working with Ethiopia later discredits the opposition, then Yusuf’s total dependence on Ethiopian tanks discredits him far more.
3. "TFG opposition spied for Ethiopians"
A.Yusuf’s government openly coordinated with Ethiopian intelligence feeding Ethiopia intelligence to target ICU figures from 2006–2008 so accusing opponents of the same is pure hypocrisy.
Unverified accusations can’t erase Yusuf’s documented collaboration with Ethiopia’s occupation.
4. "Ethiopians laid the foundation for stable Mogadishu"
Ethiopia’s 2006 invasion destabilized Somalia, creating the vacuum for Al-Shabaab. Mogadishu’s later stability came from:
AMISOM’s sacrifice (Uganda/Burundi troops).
Somalis reconciling (ex-ICU joining government).
Ethiopia withdrawing (2009).
Ethiopia’s role today: Even now, Ethiopian troops in Somalia stir tensions hardly a "stabilizing" force.
No, the plan was to design a National security programme together by the FGS and FMSs, yet the FGS decided to unilaterally build what they called SNA, which was later disbanded, and replaced with Macawisley.
Did you want mature FMSs like PL and JL to rely upon pseudo SNA Macawisley at XSM's whim? I bet you reckon that is acceptable.
Do you object to XSM airlifting troops to Ras Kamboni for the simple purpose of overthrowing JL's legitimate President on the grounds of his disagreeing with his demands?
Could you envisage Dacish operation in Bari under his command?
1."FGS Unilaterally Built the SNA, Later Replaced with Macawisley"
The SNA was never disbanded it remains the official national army, though underfunded and weak thanks to HSM. Macawisley are local clan militias temporarily armed to fight Al-Shabaab, not a replacement.
Puntland and Jubaland refused to integrate their forces into a unified SNA, then blamed the FGS for its weakness. You can’t reject federal authority and demand a strong national army.
2.
"Should FMSs Rely on Pseudo-SNA Macawisley?"
They are local fighters defending their lands not a federal force. The FGS arms them because the SNA is too weak, thanks partly to FMS resistance to integration.
No one is forcing them to "rely" on Macawisley they’re free to fight Al-Shabaab without FGS help if they distrust Mogadishu.
3.
"FGS Airlifted Troops to Ras Kamboni to Overthrow Jubaland’s President"
Yes, the 2023 Ras Kamboni deployment was political interference but Jubaland’s President Madobe is no saint. He’s blocked SNA operations, hosted Kenyan forces without FGS approval, and rigged elections (2019).
FMS routinely defy Mogadishu (e.g., cutting ties, signing foreign deals), yet cry "federal overreach" when challenged.
4.
"Could You Envision Daesh Operations in Bari Under His Command?"
Maybe under a strong SNA
So, you wanted the Constitution to detail National security programme, and Defence strategies? Again, N Security programme incl . Defence policies was intended to be designed together by the FGS and FMSs, and not unilateraly drafted in dark allies by rogue agents in Xamar.
The main requirement: FMSs would maintain their own local armies, out of which a FGS army would be formed in the future - No FGS armies could exist without the FMSs. In its current form, there can not be FGS armies on the ground in FMSs. Reason: FGS in its current form poses a grave danger to State bulding process, and more so to FMSs that it could not be trusted with armed forces. Case in point: Farmajo (Dhusamareeb & Baydhaba) & XSM (Ras Kamboni).
Postscript:
Under the right, competent leadership, FGS can implement and advance Powers entrusted unto it; four Powers. As and when so has been realised, then we could discuss cooperative federalism, till then let FMSs develop, and progress. Let FGS stabilise Xamar.
1."The Constitution Should Not Detail National Security Programmes – They Must Be Negotiated"
The Provisional Constitution explicitly grants the FGS authority over national defense, foreign policy, and citizenship. It does not require FMS approval to establish a national army but calls for cooperation in implementation.
The 2017 National Security Architecture (agreed by FGS and some FMS) was a negotiated framework, but Puntland and Jubaland later rejected it, not due to vagueness but over political disputes (e.g., resource-sharing, election interference).
The constitution does not prohibit the FGS from building a national army. FMS demands for veto power over defense policies contradict the federal supremacy clause.
2. "FMS Armies Must Form the Foundation of the SNA – No FGS Army Without Them"
The idea that FMS forces would voluntarily merge into the SNA is idealistic. In practice:
FMSs (especially PL and JL) treat their forces as sovereign armies, resisting integration.
The SNA exists independently (though weak) because waiting for FMS cooperation would mean no national army at all.
Other federal states (e.g., Ethiopia, US) maintain federal armies alongside regional forces without requiring regional consent to deploy nationally.
Somalia cannot afford to let FMSs hold national security hostage. The SNA’s legitimacy comes from the constitution, not FMS approval.
3. "FGS Cannot Be Trusted with Armed Forces"
Yes, both HSM and Farmajo misused the SNA for political ends.
But FMSs are no saints:
Jubaland invited Kenyan troops without FGS approval.
Puntland collaborates with Ethiopia and UAE, undermining Mogadishu.
The solution is oversight (e.g., parliamentary scrutiny, judicial review), not disarming the FGS while FMSs stockpile weapons.
If FMSs distrust the FGS, the answer is strong institutions, not Balkanized militaries that empower warlords.
4. "Let FMSs Develop First – FGS Should Stabilize Mogadishu"
This implies Somalia can tolerate competing armies indefinitely. Al-Shabaab exploits such divisions.
FMS Free-Riding: Puntland and Jubaland benefit from FGS-led international recognition, aid, and diplomacy while blocking federal cohesion.
Federalism requires shared sacrifice, not FMSs demanding autonomy while refusing nation-building duties.
5. "Cooperative Federalism Only After FGS Proves Competence"
FMSs actively sabotage the FGS (e.g., rejecting tax reforms, boycotting security talks), then blame it for being "weak."
Functional federalism requires both levels to cooperate from Day 1—not wait for perfection
FMS leaders must stop using "federalism" as a cover for anti-centralization agendas.
Bottom Line:
Somalia’s survival depends on
balancing federal authority with regional buy-in—not letting FMSs veto every national initiative. The alternative is perpetual fragmentation, which only benefits Al-Shabaab and foreign meddlers.
