Could a Benevolent Autocracy save Somalia?

[Zak12]

Which system? The public sector? If so , I think it's already starting to unravel in some ways. People are losing trust in foreign-driven governance, and local communities are building parallel systems that actually serve their needs , from security to business to social services. The question isn’t if it breaks, but how fast it gets replaced by something more Somali-led and locally grounded.

This shift is accelerating especially now that funding sources from the EU, US, and others are drying up. Without that foreign lifeline, the current system can’t sustain itself for much longer

Locals arguable had no trust with FGS to begin with. Businesses barely pay their taxes to FGS and instead invest and pay for their own ecosystem. There is a complete and total economic disconnect between the federal government and the public.

The only thing FGS has sway in is national policies and diplomacy. Unfortunately I'm not sure how much the private sector is able to influence politics or prevent outside interference like that crappy Turkish oil deal.

Either way, FGS is on its way out since it is only sustained by foreign funding and not by taxes.

 

[Afrax]

It wasn’t internal rot that brought Kacaan down at all. In fact, several foreign-sponsored coup attempts failed. They also failed to trigger mutinies within the Somali military, and the political leadership remained largely cohesive and intact.

'failed to set off mutinies within the Somali military"
View attachment 362673

View attachment 362674

That’s exactly why external actors , Ethiopia, the Soviets bloc, Isreal and others , shifted tactics. They began organizing proxy groups abroad to wage asymmetric warfare and create unrest. The goal was to bleed Somalia’s economy, exhaust the state militarily, and wear down its central government.

There were even attempts to infiltrate NSS (Somalia’s equivalent of the CIA), and they still couldn’t fracture the core leadership.

So no ,the collapse wasn’t because of internal rot or a personality cult alone. It was sustained external sabotage that eventually wore down the state’s capacity to respond on all fronts.

The social organizations and unions that were represented within the government actually functioned as political parties. And in some ways, they were better than the so-called political parties in the West , which are often controlled by elite donors or lobbyists. These Somali organizations genuinely represented civil society: youth, workers, women, professionals, and communities. That’s far closer to real democratic representation than the party-brand games others play.

External pressure played its role but was not the definitive reason. Internal rot played more crucial role. Barres administration allowed the one thing defining and uniting the nation to become a source of resentment and misery for vast sections of the population. Phrases like ''Cida Villada'' became notorious and widespread for a reason. I don't know how any person can deny these developments, ''xaafad reer hebel'' and ''xafiis reer hebel'' were the talk of the town.

This resentment was why the external sabotage was so effective not due to its intensity or scale. In the contrary, Mengistu's administration scaled down in their interference. The DERG were surprised when they saw many high ranking generals, officials and intellectuals line up to seek their assistance. Suddenly less was more, it didn't make any sense to them at first.

By the way, I deep dived into your post history, you allude to this same development in many cases. I will never be convinced to support one party rule for Somalis, it simply won't work long term, maximum life time of 15 years in which time the decay is irreversible.

 

[Zak12]

External pressure played its role but was not the definitive reason. Internal rot played more crucial role. Barres administration allowed the one thing defining and uniting the nation to become a source of resentment and misery for vast sections of the population. Phrases like ''Cida Villada'' became notorious and widespread for a reason. I don't know how any person can deny these developments, ''xaafad reer hebel'' and ''xafiis reer hebel'' were the talk of the town.

This resentment was why the external sabotage was so effective not due to its intensity or scale. In the contrary, Mengistu's administration scaled down in their interference. The DERG were surprised when they saw many high ranking generals, officials and intellectuals line up to seek their assistance. Suddenly less was more, it didn't make any sense to them at first.

By the way, I deep dived into your post history, you allude to this same development in many cases. I will never be convinced to support one party rule for Somalis, it simply won't work long term, maximum life time of 15 years in which time the decay is irreversible.

Let's be honest, the resentment was held only by those groups of individuals, not by the Somali public. Barre was in fact still popular during the 80s contrary to what some might think. The most damning evidence of that is the fact that those rebel groups had to set up base in Ethiopia instead of Somalia. If there was real resentment it would show through protests and a huge recruitment drive among Somalis by SNM, SSDF, USC ect you know, like what rebels managed to do in Syria, Sudan, and even Ethiopia. Instead they needed heavy foreign arms and in one case (1982) a literal invasion from Ethiopia with ENDF forces.

But in the end, we know those traitors who went to Ethiopia didn't actually care to be better than Kacaan since they chose to destroy Mogadishu (USC) and attack other Somali clans (SNM).

 

[Afrax]

Let's be honest, the resentment was held only by those groups of individuals, not by the Somali public. Barre was in fact still popular during the 80s contrary to what some might think. The most damning evidence of that is the fact that those rebel groups had to set up base in Ethiopia instead of Somalia. If there was real resentment it would show through protests and a huge recruitment drive among Somalis by SNM, SSDF, USC ect you know, like what rebels managed to do in Syria, Sudan, and even Ethiopia. Instead they needed heavy foreign arms and in one case (1982) a literal invasion from Ethiopia with ENDF forces.

But in the end, we know those traitors who went to Ethiopia didn't actually care to be better than Kacaan since they chose to destroy Mogadishu (USC) and attack other Somali clans (SNM).

I'm not sure why but I just don't have the energy to go into this right now. Your post exhausted me mentally.

 

[Zak12]

I'm not sure why but I just don't have the energy to go into this right now. Your post exhausted me mentally.

If you feel like that then make sure not to get a heart attack when Idilina responds.

 

[Afrax]

I have to say this last thing:

You know what the irony is? In trying so hard to control Somalia through the public sector, foreign actors completely overlooked the private sector , and in doing so, they left it wide open for Somalis to take full ownership.

The result? Somalia now has one of the only African economies that is entirely locally owned and operated. No foreign conglomerates dominating the markets, no puppet monopolies, just Somalis building systems based on trust, necessity, and cooperation.

While foreign powers fought to control ministries and politicians, ordinary Somalis quietly built telecoms, fintech financial systems, logistics networks, factories/plants, energy/fishing/agro companies and domestic production chains all from the ground up.

Pretty much true, private sector is keeping the nation alive.

The private sector will be key in winning back civic and political control of the country , and in reclaiming our future.

I doubt this will come to fruition, if Somalia gets access to global financial mechanisms. After all private sector desires no, to little regulations and oversight. Private sector led processes usually breed weak institutions.

Without strong institutions the private sectors of small scale economies like ours are unable to resist FDI. All these companies will be bought or be out scaled by companies that have access to FDI. Leading to the same outcome as the other African counties, if not worse.

What I'm trying to say is we will be left little to no control, since we rely so heavily on private sector-->Which was just bought by FDI and indirectly the whole country.

 

[Idilinaa]

External pressure played its role but was not the definitive reason. Internal rot played more crucial role. Barres administration allowed the one thing defining and uniting the nation to become a source of resentment and misery for vast sections of the population. Phrases like ''Cida Villada'' became notorious and widespread for a reason. I don't know how any person can deny these developments, ''xaafad reer hebel'' and ''xafiis reer hebel'' were the talk of the town.

This resentment was why the external sabotage was so effective not due to its intensity or scale. In the contrary, Mengistu's administration scaled down in their interference. The DERG were surprised when they saw many high ranking generals, officials and intellectuals line up to seek their assistance. Suddenly less was more, it didn't make any sense to them at first.

By the way, I deep dived into your post history, you allude to this same development in many cases. I will never be convinced to support one party rule for Somalis, it simply won't work long term, maximum life time of 15 years in which time the decay is irreversible.

There was no widespread resentment toward the administration or any popular civil uprising against the regime at all.

This is how Siad Barre was received in Mogadishu after his accident in 1986:

'' Presidet Mohammed Siad Barre returned hom last month after a month long stay in hospital.......Thousands of Somalis waving green branches to symbolise life and rebirth, filled the streets of the capital to welcome their leader''

This is how life in Mogadishu was assessed:

What was shared by Ltkhalifa actually further proves my assessment. Imma add a few details in an article later but i have to comment on this. Remember the valuation for Somali currency at the time was 6 Sh per USD according to the former finance minister who worked during that time.

The fact that the poverty line was Sh 6,990/month = $1,165/month .

The Food poverty line: Sh 4,990/month = $831/month

Extreme poverty: Below Sh 4,000/month = $667/month

That means even the poorest 17% of urban Somalis were earning more than what educated middle-class professionals were making in most African countries during the same period , where $100–200/month was considered a solid salary.

Even more striking, these Somalis still had access to food, healthcare, and basic housing. The structure was relatively egalitarian

If you adjust it into today's money counted the inflation, the poverty line in Mogadishu was - $4,300/month , Food poverty $3,080/month and extreme poverty $2,470/month

This is more than double the federal minimum wage in the US today which is 1,160 USD per month.

Shanty areas being rare means lack of slums and malnutrition even rarer.

Not only does it speaks to the level wealth they had but also the wealth redistribution was good as well. Compressed wage structure where even those earning at the bottom weren’t in destitution.

Land distribution policies as well which explains why everyone had access to basic housing.

It makes sense why people in Mogadishu had such adoration and love for him. When you provide housing, food, water, electricity, education, employment, good wages, and a decent standard of living , people will respond with loyalty and appreciation. He worked for the good of the people, and they gave him a hero’s welcome.



This is how life in Northern Somalia (present-day Somaliland) was also described. All of them recount happy, carefree lives before the conflict in the late 1980s: These are firsthand testimonies recorded in 1991 , raw, fresh, and not distorted by nostalgia.

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It's very important testimonies because you will see people gasslight their memories.

It confirms what that elder in Somaliland said wasn’t romanticism, but an accurate recollection of life during the Kacaan era:

When listening i couldn't help but think that it really sounds a lot like how Somali elders describe life during the Kacan govt.

The only people who resented the regime were not the wider Somali public , but disgruntled individuals and political figures who had been demoted, sidelined, or punished for corruption, betrayal, or opportunism under the SRC. These grievances existed long before the fall of the regime and had more to do with their personal loss of power than any mass dissatisfaction.

In fact, SNM’s own journal admitted:

''We contacted most of the clans....After this complete failure to gain support from the non-isaaq clans we asked ourselves: what shall we do?

Likewise, U.S. assessments at the time stated about the SSDF and lack of organized opposition inside Somalia

'' there is no organized opposition to his regime within Somalia''
'' The group's acceptance of Ethiopian assistance and it's narrow clan make up have weakened its appeal to the Somali populace''

SSDF faced the same failure , they couldn’t draw support from the broader Somali public and were entirely based abroad, particularly in Ethiopia. Their leaders had to run to Ethiopia, Israel, and other foreign actors for support, because they had little credibility inside Somalia.

So when people today construct conspiracies and shallow clan narratives to discredit the Kacaan government, they are rewriting history , omitting the betrayal of their country, and the fact that the Somali public largely stood by the government until the very end. After the conflict, they hijacked the narrative and fed it to a population devastated by war and desperate for answers.

 

[Afrax]

There was no widespread resentment toward the administration or any popular civil uprising against the regime at all.

This is how Siad Barre was received in Mogadishu after his accident in 1986:

'' Presidet Mohammed Siad Barre returned hom last month after a month long stay in hospital.......Thousands of Somalis waving green branches to symbolise life and rebirth, filled the streets of the capital to welcome their leader''
View attachment 362968

This is how life in Mogadishu was assessed:



It makes sense why people in Mogadishu had such adoration and love for him. When you provide housing, food, water, electricity, education, employment, good wages, and a decent standard of living , people will respond with loyalty and appreciation. He worked for the good of the people, and they gave him a hero’s welcome.



This is how life in Northern Somalia (present-day Somaliland) was also described. All of them recount happy, carefree lives before the conflict in the late 1980s: These are firsthand testimonies recorded in 1991 , raw, fresh, and not distorted by nostalgia.
It's very important testimonies because you will see people gasslight their memories.

It confirms what that elder in Somaliland said wasn’t romanticism, but an accurate recollection of life during the Kacaan era:


The only people who resented the regime were not the wider Somali public , but disgruntled individuals and political figures who had been demoted, sidelined, or punished for corruption, betrayal, or opportunism under the SRC. These grievances existed long before the fall of the regime and had more to do with their personal loss of power than any mass dissatisfaction.
View attachment 362966

In fact, SNM’s own journal admitted:

''We contacted most of the clans....After this complete failure to gain support from the non-isaaq clans we asked ourselves: what shall we do?
View attachment 362967

Likewise, U.S. assessments at the time stated about the SSDF and lack of organized opposition inside Somalia

'' there is no organized opposition to his regime within Somalia''
'' The group's acceptance of Ethiopian assistance and it's narrow clan make up have weakened its appeal to the Somali populace''

View attachment 362970

SSDF faced the same failure , they couldn’t draw support from the broader Somali public and were entirely based abroad, particularly in Ethiopia. Their leaders had to run to Ethiopia, Israel, and other foreign actors for support, because they had little credibility inside Somalia.

So when people today construct conspiracies and shallow clan narratives to discredit the Kacaan government, they are rewriting history , omitting the betrayal of their country, and the fact that the Somali public largely stood by the government until the very end. After the conflict, they hijacked the narrative and fed it to a population devastated by war and desperate for answers.

Two things can be true. Life was better under Siad than post 90s and there was wide spread resentment. Life in Syria or Libya was better under Gaddafi or Assad, but it doesn't mean there wasn't widespread resentment waiting to be exploited or about to reach critical point.

 

[Idilinaa]

Let's be honest, the resentment was held only by those groups of individuals, not by the Somali public. Barre was in fact still popular during the 80s contrary to what some might think. The most damning evidence of that is the fact that those rebel groups had to set up base in Ethiopia instead of Somalia. If there was real resentment it would show through protests and a huge recruitment drive among Somalis by SNM, SSDF, USC ect you know, like what rebels managed to do in Syria, Sudan, and even Ethiopia. Instead they needed heavy foreign arms and in one case (1982) a literal invasion from Ethiopia with ENDF forces.

But in the end, we know those traitors who went to Ethiopia didn't actually care to be better than Kacaan since they chose to destroy Mogadishu (USC) and attack other Somali clans (SNM).

What’s more is that every country has its share of anti-government lunatics, opportunists, and extremists , that’s not unique to Somalia.

Take Norway and Singapore, two of the most stable, wealthy, and well-governed countries in the world:

Singapore dealt with a series of bombings and violent subversive acts throughout the 1960s and 70s, including the MacDonald House bombing by anti-government elements.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MacDonald_House_bombing

Norway had one of the worst domestic terrorist attacks in Europe when an extremist bombed a political party HQ and massacred 70 people at a youth camp in 2011.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_Norway_attacks

But the key difference is this: in Somalia, these fringe rebels weren’t just left to stew in isolation , they were actively armed, trained, housed, and politically backed by hostile foreign governments like Ethiopia. In one case, the 1982 invasion, Ethiopian forces directly entered Somalia alongside SSDF rebels, did the same with SNM as well when they stormed the two Northern cities.

That’s the crux of the issue , Somalia didn’t fall from internal rot or mass resentment. It was externally driven sabotage, weaponizing a handful of political opportunists and extremists against the Somali state.

There wasn’t a mass uprising. There weren’t waves of recruits pouring in like you saw in Syria or Ethiopia. These rebel groups had to base themselves outside Somalia because the Somali population didn’t support them.

Frankly, the same thing happened after the collapse of the Somali state ,foreign actors continued to arm and fund fringe lunatics, while the wider Somali population was focused on restoring order, protecting their communities, and rebuilding. The strategy never changed: install puppets who’ll serve foreign interests in exchange for personal gain.

 

[Idilinaa]

Pretty much true, private sector is keeping the nation alive.

I doubt this will come to fruition, if Somalia gets access to global financial mechanisms. After all private sector desires no, to little regulations and oversight. Private sector led processes usually breed weak institutions.

Without strong institutions the private sectors of small scale economies like ours are unable to resist FDI. All these companies will be bought or be out scaled by companies that have access to FDI. Leading to the same outcome as the other African counties, if not worse.

What I'm trying to say is we will be left little to no control, since we rely so heavily on private sector-->Which was just bought by FDI and indirectly the whole country.

It's not simply the private sector keeping Somalia alive , it's the communal economic support systems that underpin it.

Somalia's private sector isn’t unregulated. It has internal credit-based regulatory frameworks, with the public sector and central bank playing an oversight role. Many sectors are run through business cooperatives, where risk is shared, financing is pooled, and accountability is mutual , that’s how small ventures scale into large, community-tied enterprises.

I’ve explained this to you before: Somalia’s private sector doesn’t operate like Western capitalism, which is driven by shareholder value and profit maximization. Somali enterprises are community-rooted, cooperative, and reinvest profits locally.

That's why your assumption that Somali businesses will be bought out by foreign investors (FDI) doesn’t hold up. Somali-owned businesses in Kenya and Ethiopia still dominate their markets, despite those countries being far more open to FDI. That proves that ownership resilience isn’t just possible , it's already happening.

Having a strong local private sector also gives us leverage , we can fund public sector institutions, create public-private partnerships and regain full control over development without dependency on donor aid or foreign institutions.

Even analysts and international observers have noted that Somalia's private sector is the backbone of its recovery and will be key in reshaping the future public sector:

Somalia: A Resilient Private Sector Leads Public Prosperous

The private sector has emerged as a vital force in Somalia's recovery and development following the civil war that began in 1991. With the establishment of a more stable government around 2012, the…

sonna.so

Private sector key in accelerating Somalia’s economic growth

Private sector key in accelerating Somalia’s economic growth

garoweonline.com

 

[Idilinaa]

Two things can be true. Life was better under Siad than post 90s and there was wide spread resentment. Life in Syria or Libya was better under Gaddafi or Assad, but it doesn't mean there wasn't widespread resentment waiting to be exploited or about to reach critical point.

Widespread resentment is usually rooted in something tangible , economic collapse, exclusion, repression ,not just manufactured feeling. That didn’t exist at a wide scale under Kacaan.

Also, Somalia was far more participatory and inclusive during that era than people give it credit for. There were broad-based unions, civil organizations, and local structures that allowed for real involvement , it wasn’t some closed-off autocracy like Gaddafi’s Libya or Assad’s Syria. So they’re not really comparable.

 

[Afrax]

It's not simply the private sector keeping Somalia alive , it's the communal economic support systems that underpin it.

Somalia's private sector isn’t unregulated. It has internal credit-based regulatory frameworks, with the public sector and central bank playing an oversight role. Many sectors are run through business cooperatives, where risk is shared, financing is pooled, and accountability is mutual , that’s how small ventures scale into large, community-tied enterprises.

I’ve explained this to you before: Somalia’s private sector doesn’t operate like Western capitalism, which is driven by shareholder value and profit maximization. Somali enterprises are community-rooted, cooperative, and reinvest profits locally.

That's why your assumption that Somali businesses will be bought out by foreign investors (FDI) doesn’t hold up. Somali-owned businesses in Kenya and Ethiopia still dominate their markets, despite those countries being far more open to FDI. That proves that ownership resilience isn’t just possible , it's already happening.

Having a strong local private sector also gives us leverage , we can fund public sector institutions, create public-private partnerships and regain full control over development without dependency on donor aid or foreign institutions.

Even analysts and international observers have noted that Somalia's private sector is the backbone of its recovery and will be key in reshaping the future public sector:

Somalia: A Resilient Private Sector Leads Public Prosperous

The private sector has emerged as a vital force in Somalia's recovery and development following the civil war that began in 1991. With the establishment of a more stable government around 2012, the…

sonna.so

Private sector key in accelerating Somalia’s economic growth

Private sector key in accelerating Somalia’s economic growth

garoweonline.com

The bolded part is a good joke.

@Idilinaa I like your optimism. Don't lose it.

 

[Idilinaa]

The bolded part is a good joke.

@Idilinaa I like your optimism. Don't lose it.

The bolded part is true i am not pulling it out of my behind the private sector functions on trust based systems like internal credit network systems, risk sharing through business partnerships and cooperative models

https://research.diis.dk/en/publications/entrust-we-must-the-role-of-trust-in-somali-economic-life

The public sector and central bank offer some regulatory oversight over the major entreprises, telecoms and private financial services.

You can also read about it here:

https://nca.gov.so/regulations/

Some oversight exists between ministries (Commerce, Finance) and regional authorities when dealing with licensing, taxation, and regulation although its a bit uneven and evolving.

 

[Idilinaa]

Locals arguable had no trust with FGS to begin with. Businesses barely pay their taxes to FGS and instead invest and pay for their own ecosystem. There is a complete and total economic disconnect between the federal government and the public.

The only thing FGS has sway in is national policies and diplomacy. Unfortunately I'm not sure how much the private sector is able to influence politics or prevent outside interference like that crappy Turkish oil deal.

Either way, FGS is on its way out since it is only sustained by foreign funding and not by taxes.

Aside from the taxing businesses issue. I have to say that at this early stage, the most sustainable model is what Kacaan pursued, building strong, state owned enterprises and export driven industries that generated direct national revenue. That approach reduced the tax burden on everyday people and allowed the state to fund services, salaries and infrastructure without leaning entirely on foreign aid or squeezing citizens.

You can’t extract taxes from a population that hasn’t been economically empowered first. Basically the majority are already carrying the weight of infrastructure, services, and development on their own. They have so many living expenses and services they have to pay for out of pocket for education, health, security, water, electricity etc, so adding formal taxes on top of that becomes crippling.

You can see how crippling this taxation has been for Somalis in NFD, Ogaden and during the colonial systems. They never even provided public services or development in return.

Take NFD for example , locals are still complaining about the same neglect. Garissa and Mandera sit on major rivers that could be used for hydroelectric power and clean drinking water, and there's extensive farmland. But nothing meaningful has been developed. It’s the same extractive model: take from the people without investing in their future.


You need to build collective earning power by investing in productive sectors, agriculture, manufacturing, fisheries, logistics, build up internal markets, before you talk about tax-based revenue.

That’s also one of the main reasons the FGS model is failing , beyond its legitimacy crisis. It reversed the logic of state building, instead of first investing in and empowering society, it tries to tax a population it has given nothing to. So it comes across as predatory and extractive, not representative or developmental.

Right now, Somalia’s private sector is the only functioning engine of growth, but without integration into a Somali-led public framework, foreign actors will keep exploiting that disconnect, like with the Turkish oil deal or the various Gulf entities. The goal should be a hybrid model: a strong private sector working in tandem with a state that actually serves the people, not one propped up by foreign funds.

 

[Zak12]

Aside from the taxing businesses issue. I have to say that at this early stage, the most sustainable model is what Kacaan pursued, building strong, state owned enterprises and export driven industries that generated direct national revenue. That approach reduced the tax burden on everyday people and allowed the state to fund services, salaries and infrastructure without leaning entirely on foreign aid or squeezing citizens.

You can’t extract taxes from a population that hasn’t been economically empowered first. Basically the majority are already carrying the weight of infrastructure, services, and development on their own. They have so many living expenses and services they have to pay for out of pocket for education, health, security, water, electricity etc, so adding formal taxes on top of that becomes crippling.

You can see how crippling this taxation has been for Somalis in NFD, Ogaden and during the colonial systems. They never even provided public services or development in return.

Take NFD for example , locals are still complaining about the same neglect. Garissa and Mandera sit on major rivers that could be used for hydroelectric power and clean drinking water, and there's extensive farmland. But nothing meaningful has been developed. It’s the same extractive model: take from the people without investing in their future.


You need to build collective earning power by investing in productive sectors, agriculture, manufacturing, fisheries, logistics, build up internal markets, before you talk about tax-based revenue.

That’s also one of the main reasons the FGS model is failing , beyond its legitimacy crisis. It reversed the logic of state building, instead of first investing in and empowering society, it tries to tax a population it has given nothing to. So it comes across as predatory and extractive, not representative or developmental.

Right now, Somalia’s private sector is the only functioning engine of growth, but without integration into a Somali-led public framework, foreign actors will keep exploiting that disconnect, like with the Turkish oil deal or the various Gulf entities. The goal should be a hybrid model: a strong private sector working in tandem with a state that actually serves the people, not one propped up by foreign funds.

Do Puntland and Somaliland follow that hybrid model? From what I can glean on locals over in northern Somalia also have a thriving private sector but they actually have a state that invests in public services and projects and most importantly, regulates imports and exports.

 

[Idilinaa]

Do Puntland and Somaliland follow that hybrid model? From what I can glean on locals over in northern Somalia also have a thriving private sector but they actually have a state that invests in public services and projects and most importantly, regulates imports and exports.

Both Puntland and Somaliland have institutional structures that invest in public services like education, security and infrastructure ( like roads, ports, power grids etc.) in the fishing thread i showed example of how they invested in cold chain infrastructure. They regulate import/export, issue licenses, and collect local taxes. There is also some coordination with the private sector in development, like PPP(Private Public Partnership)

As well as the Banadir Administration, it is technically under FGS but in reality functions semi-independently from it and closely cooperates with local businesses.
They engage in what is called municipal-level service delivery (garbage collection, roads, markets) and tax businesses for those services. Local businesses are heavily involved in maintaining basic infrastructure , some companies even directly pave roads, support hospitals, or power districts (e.g., BECO and Hormuud).

FGS on the other hand not only lacks legitimacy but also institutional structures to provide services. It relies on external funding, and when it attempts to tax or control the economy often come across as extractive or disconnected. It doesn’t build infrastructure, provide utilities, or regulate market in any meaningful way.

It has little to no enforcement capability on trade, customs, or licensing , those are often managed de facto by regional states or private actors.

 

[X29]

Both Puntland and Somaliland have institutional structures that invest in public services like education, security and infrastructure ( like roads, ports, power grids etc.) in the fishing thread i showed example of how they invested in cold chain infrastructure. They regulate import/export, issue licenses, and collect local taxes. There is also some coordination with the private sector in development, like PPP(Private Public Partnership)

As well as the Banadir Administration, it is technically under FGS but in reality functions semi-independently from it and closely cooperates with local businesses.
They engage in what is called municipal-level service delivery (garbage collection, roads, markets) and tax businesses for those services. Local businesses are heavily involved in maintaining basic infrastructure , some companies even directly pave roads, support hospitals, or power districts (e.g., BECO and Hormuud).

FGS on the other hand not only lacks legitimacy but also institutional structures to provide services. It relies on external funding, and when it attempts to tax or control the economy often come across as extractive or disconnected. It doesn’t build infrastructure, provide utilities, or regulate market in any meaningful way.

It has little to no enforcement capability on trade, customs, or licensing , those are often managed de facto by regional states or private actors.

So what is the point of the fgs we need to protest across Somalia to end this buffoonish government

 

[Idilinaa]

So what is the point of the fgs we need to protest across Somalia to end this buffoonish government

It's what i said in the other page:

Somaliland and Puntland often operate with a misplaced superiority complex toward Mogadishu. The only reason Xamar is so politically volatile is because foreign powers recognize it as the capital. When you want to control or destabilize a country, you target its capital , and that’s exactly what's been happening.
Foreign actors use the FGS as a pressure point to fragment Somalia while they maintain separate diplomacy with the regional states to further divide and weaken us.

Somalis need a civic movement to wake up people to the actual realities.