bidenkulaha
GalYare
3k Danab, 5k Gorgor, 5k Eritrean trained, 17k UAE funded (trained in Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, Egypt) soon to join.This is the Hutu army.
Officially numbering 27,000 soldiers (but more likely composed of around 23,000), the SNA is riddled with ghost soldiers, old and sick soldiers incapable of effective fighting or patrolling, and untrained units. Although vetting procedures for recruitment now exist on paper, they are not implemented, allowing a steady flow of unqualified people onto the army’s payroll. Many soldiers do not own a weapon. Around 60 per cent of the army’s personnel lack any real military capacity.
he SNA also lacks logistical, sustainment and medevac capacities. Although Turkey now runs a respected military academy for non-commissioned officers in Mogadishu, and British training of the SNA receives high accolades, many SNA soldiers have not received even basic training, let alone training at the battalion level or higher. The army lacks embedded international advisors, with the exception of the Danab Brigade, which has been trained and mentored by US special operations forces. These shortfalls are remarkable, given the USD $1 billion international investment in the SNA since 2012.
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The SNA’s poor performance points to a crucial characteristic of Somalia’s army: it is more of a conglomeration of militias than a coherent fighting force. After its complete collapse in 2009, the SNA was reconstituted via a clan-based recruitment drive in which fully formed clanand warlord-based militias were incorporated into the army. Many newly recruited units were merely handed booklets about their new role within the SNA, and received no additional training or instructions about the chain of command.
Hybrid Conflict, Hybrid Peace How militias and paramilitary groups shape post-conflict transitions
This should increase the number of soldiers to around 25k from recent training and conscripted outside of the past ‘clan militia joins SNA’ process.