Your right but if you want the army to only be Hawiye, how do expect them to liberate Southwest state and Jubaland? The Hawiye kids will loose their sense of nationalism if you turn them into a clan militia.
Chief of the Somalia Armed Forces, General Odowaa Yusuf, stated that any officer who participates in the fighting in Laascanod loses their membership
- Thread starter bidenkulaha
- Start date
Sxb why speaking like this western hoyo mataalo has any political power back home
bro speaking to him like the guy is the president kkkk
bidenkulaha
GalYare
No I’m saying that his ideology is destructive if it’s put into action.Sxb why speaking like this western hoyo mataalo has any political power back home
bidenkulaha
GalYare
My intelligence ends in Galmudug ngl. I got decent connections there with QQ administrationSxb why speaking like this western hoyo mataalo has any political power back home
The armed forces is registered by using 4.5. Everything in Somalia is “4.5”. Hurdada kakac if you think this will prevent any Darood from registering. However, I support any future exclusion that Xamar promotes.
This will only serve to awaken my people from the cursed nationalism that they chase after.
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bidenkulaha
GalYare
I’d say the SNA is more than 70% hawiye. Which of that hawiye overwhelming majority is Hiraab. It’s not 4.5
0117
Reborn
The "War" in LA will have significant implications towards how the IC will view training soldiers in Somalia.
The only positive to come out of it is that you're left with troops that will annihilate the mortal enemy in Al Shabab and restore peace in Somalia InshaaAllah.
Imagine spending millions on troops to then see them fight in some battle in a city that was untouched in the Somali civil war
What happens when you leave a military post like Danab in Somalia.Wouldn't you be punished like other armies across the world?
You have family members in gudida?
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Loool. Assume 1000 soldiers are being trained. This will be divided into 4.5. Hawiye and other clans fill up their sections, but not darood. Some dblocks, mx and other darood sub clans register themselves for the Darood section but many positions are left unfilled. As a result, Hawiye is the majority.
bidenkulaha
GalYare
Someone who actually sees the implications of this.The "War" in LA will have significant implications towards how the IC will view training soldiers in Somalia.
The only positive to come out of it is that you're left with troops that will annihilate the mortal enemy in Al Shabab and restore peace in Somalia InshaaAllah.
Imagine spending millions on troops to then see them fight in some battle in a city that was untouched in the Somali civil war
What happens when you leave a military post like Danab in Somalia.Wouldn't you be punished like other armies across the world?
Many underestimate how much the US will be alarmed about the risk of inflaming SL vs Somalia border wars. With PSF and a bunch of Harti militias, SNA defections etc all joining the war against SL this’ll affect future arms procurement and conscription.
And on your desertion point, most countries arrest them. But clearly Somalia can’t exactly go into Laascaanood, search for these people and arrest them. And neither will the communities/militias there cooperate.
bidenkulaha
GalYare
So you agree tho? For example the 15,000 being trained by UAE right now are nearly all hawiye. They’ll be based in Galmudug and Hirshabelle. Sure it’s likely the 4.5 slot from other clans like dir and Darood aren’t filled but it ends up working out with hawiye being the majority of the SNA.
Chief of Somalia Armed Forces kuye balo ku ciyaadhey as if that means anything in south somalia, boowe SFG is a paper government that doesn't even control Xamar meel kale iska dhaaf.
Officially numbering 27,000 soldiers (but more likely composed of around 23,000), the SNA is riddled with ghost soldiers, old and sick soldiers incapable of effective fighting or patrolling, and untrained units. Although vetting procedures for recruitment now exist on paper, they are not implemented, allowing a steady flow of unqualified people onto the army’s payroll. Many soldiers do not own a weapon. Around 60 per cent of the army’s personnel lack any real military capacity.
he SNA also lacks logistical, sustainment and medevac capacities. Although Turkey now runs a respected military academy for non-commissioned officers in Mogadishu, and British training of the SNA receives high accolades, many SNA soldiers have not received even basic training, let alone training at the battalion level or higher. The army lacks embedded international advisors, with the exception of the Danab Brigade, which has been trained and mentored by US special operations forces. These shortfalls are remarkable, given the USD $1 billion international investment in the SNA since 2012.
[..]
The SNA’s poor performance points to a crucial characteristic of Somalia’s army: it is more of a conglomeration of militias than a coherent fighting force. After its complete collapse in 2009, the SNA was reconstituted via a clan-based recruitment drive in which fully formed clanand warlord-based militias were incorporated into the army. Many newly recruited units were merely handed booklets about their new role within the SNA, and received no additional training or instructions about the chain of command.
Hybrid Conflict, Hybrid Peace How militias and paramilitary groups shape post-conflict transitions
he SNA also lacks logistical, sustainment and medevac capacities. Although Turkey now runs a respected military academy for non-commissioned officers in Mogadishu, and British training of the SNA receives high accolades, many SNA soldiers have not received even basic training, let alone training at the battalion level or higher. The army lacks embedded international advisors, with the exception of the Danab Brigade, which has been trained and mentored by US special operations forces. These shortfalls are remarkable, given the USD $1 billion international investment in the SNA since 2012.
[..]
The SNA’s poor performance points to a crucial characteristic of Somalia’s army: it is more of a conglomeration of militias than a coherent fighting force. After its complete collapse in 2009, the SNA was reconstituted via a clan-based recruitment drive in which fully formed clanand warlord-based militias were incorporated into the army. Many newly recruited units were merely handed booklets about their new role within the SNA, and received no additional training or instructions about the chain of command.
Hybrid Conflict, Hybrid Peace How militias and paramilitary groups shape post-conflict transitions
Calaami
Garaadka Guud ee Beesha Calaamka
Kek I find the grave of an MJ who died to free HAG land I’m spitting on the dumb nigga tombstone
Of course I agree with hawiye being majority, that’s why odawaa is the general of hawiye armed forces. You wrote paragraphs saying dblocks returning to LA will have an impact on US policy on training/recruitment which it won’t. Every clan will always have their section of 4.5 to fill up.
Those Majerteeen died lebrating hutu from alshabab Are ahlu nar
those who died lebrating harti land from qaranka barida weyn are ahlu janan 
