Transforming our politics beyond sub-clan rivalry
Mareeg.com- Like conflicts and wars elsewhere, rivalry is at the heart of both the collapse of the state and its continuing fragility in Somalia. The Daarood-Hawiye rivalry, and competition between them and the Isaaq shaped much of the post-independence politics of Somalia. The roots of these rivalries lie in the quest for power to have control over the state. My present article deals with a pernicious subset of this larger conflict. I argue that the enduring rivalry between Habargidir-Muddullood presents a particularly complex and difficult challenge for building peace, security and the state in Somalia. No less threatening to the legitimacy and effectiveness of the state is the strategic rivalry between Majeerteen-Mariixaan. I further posit that the contentious politics between these two pairs represent the putative Daarood-Hawiye rivalry and, if anything, the lessons drawn by these sub-clans have been largely dysfunctional. I use international relations theory and, in particular, theories of interstate rivalries to frame conceptual and methodological issues. However, my discussion is based on the historical record rather than abstract theorizing about Somali clan conflict.
It is fair to say that the three major clan families named above (i.e., Daarood, Hawiye, & Isaaq)[3]are always searching for opportunities to gain power over their rivals, with hegemony or domination as their final goal. The access to power and wealth that comes with control over the state – the ability to dole out state jobs, to capture international aid and loans, to tax and deploy troops, [to print money and (if you fancy) arrogate yourself the powers to expropriate private property & real estate, and/or commandeer the major economic and financial interests of your country, be it foreign or domestic], all with the mantle of legitimacy of a recognized state – proved too attractive and fostered a zero-sum game among clans in Somalia.[4]
There are, however, significant levels of internal heterogeneity and fractionalization within these big clans themselves, and not all of their subgroups would be intent on dominating others. In fact, most sub-clans and/or lineages in these clan families do not engage conflictually for political power and supremacy with most others. Instead, a small number of pairs of sub-clans are responsible for a vastly disproportionate share of total conflict and the consequent unnecessary death and destruction. The notion of ‘pairs’ or ‘dyads’ is important here because, as they say, it “takes two to tango”. I argue that a lion’s share of Somalia’s unending intra-state crisis can be traced to the enduring and strategic rivalry between Habargidir-Muddullood & Majeerteen-Mariixaan.I’d even go further to say that this historical and continuing rivalry has been an obstacle to political settlement in Somalia.Indeed, it’s my view that our myriad and interlocking political challenges can be eased off, if we fully understand and call this rivalry to account. Let’s call a spade a spade, andelect new leaders from outside of these dyads in August 2012 to usher in a new era ofcompromise, trust and cooperation in the political process.
What I am advancing here is not a theory, but reasonable assumptions based on evidence. After all, a theory is only as good as the evidence that supports it and the absence of that evidence will make it unrealistic or false. I advance these assumptions because they explain and make sense of a large number of traits that we see in these sub-clan rivalries. To my complete and utter surprise, this deadly sub-clan rivalry at the highest levels of our politics which, in my view, played (and still plays) a central role in the ‘identity and emotional framing of the conflict’ has never been adequately addressed, either in the Somali studies literature or in the endless diplomatic mediation of the Somalis.[5]
It seems that we’re not alone in this, for scholars of war causality have virtually ignored rivalry dynamics altogether until quite recently. The normal tendency has been to either take each war as a singular event or all wars as being the same. In both extremes, the idea that the main participants in a conflict have a history and the fact that that history probably has some bearing on whether and when conflict escalates [or rather how it gets terminated] get overlooked or pushed aside.[6]
That should no longer be an option for us. I suggest rivalry between sub-clans is an extremely fertile area where the space for research, information, and effective action is nearly boundless. Sadly, to cover this topic satisfactorily would require a volume of material which could never be squeezed into a single article, two or three, or even a book. Therefore, I have chosen a few examples that should hopefully illustrate the point. These examples would seek to embrace both political theory and practical contentious politics between these sub-clans.
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didn't read all of it but got the jist of it
