State Decay: The case of Et and the Somali demand for self-determination

[𐒋𐒖𐒆𐒔𐒖𐒕𐒈]

In the past, most of the conflicts originated from regions casually known as ‘the periphery.’ However, the war theaters in the current devastating conflicts are centered around Ethiopia’s core regions, especially Oromia and Amhara regions, undermining the traditional concepts of state authority and legitimacy.

[ ... ]
The third factor is the ever-decaying center itself that refused to democratize state structure, thus displaying its inability to peacefully hold the center and the periphery together except by brute force. Therefore, the lethal combination of a freer and assertive periphery and a progressively decaying center have weakened the hitherto state-sponsored pax Ethiopiana position.

[ ... ]
In addition to the demise of the aristocracy and a tightly knit bureaucracy, the other contributing factors to the ever-decaying state power at the center are the recent divisions within the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahdo Church (EOTC), and a dwindling foreign military support and diplomatic alliance with the center from Ethiopia’s traditional allies.

For example, the acceptance of the concept of nationality-based federalism by Ethiopia’s traditional allies in the West, the breakdown of Amhara-Tigray alliance, the proliferation of the Pentecostal Churches that are siphoning congregation members from the Orthodox Church, rapid urbanization in highland Ethiopia, a dwindling surplus transferred from the south, and institutionalization of regional governments in the last thirty years have collectively contributed to the making of deep and possibly irreparable cracks in the center.

Although Christopher Clapham still hangs on to the traditional way of explaining dangers to Ethiopia as originating from the “pastoralist zone” such as “Somalis, Borana, Oromo, Sidama, and Afar” he fails to address that the contemporary armed triangle in the African continent is the axis of Amhara-Tigray Eritrea.

[ ... ]
Over the spoils of the decaying state are three forces competing to shape Ethiopian political narrative.

• The first group calls for a central government that seeks to remove Article 39 that guaranteed the right of nations and nationalities for self-determination from the 1995 FDRE Constitution.
• The other group, from the newly formed opposition political party Sidama Federalist Party (SFP), to the oldest ones Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC), as well as armed groups such as the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), Gambella Liberation Front (GLF),
• The third group largely comes from hitherto colonized peoples the ‘periphery’ such as the Somalis, Afaris, and the Sidama, among dozens of other nations, whose core beliefs in the right to self determination is sacrosanct, and seem to settle for either complete independence or a functioning multinational democratic federal system.

https://wardheernews.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/State-Decay-The-case-of-Ethiopia-By-Faisal-Roble.pdf

 

[Mayor]

In the past, most of the conflicts originated from regions casually known as ‘the periphery.’ However, the war theaters in the current devastating conflicts are centered around Ethiopia’s core regions, especially Oromia and Amhara regions, undermining the traditional concepts of state authority and legitimacy.

[ ... ]
The third factor is the ever-decaying center itself that refused to democratize state structure, thus displaying its inability to peacefully hold the center and the periphery together except by brute force. Therefore, the lethal combination of a freer and assertive periphery and a progressively decaying center have weakened the hitherto state-sponsored pax Ethiopiana position.

[ ... ]
In addition to the demise of the aristocracy and a tightly knit bureaucracy, the other contributing factors to the ever-decaying state power at the center are the recent divisions within the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahdo Church (EOTC), and a dwindling foreign military support and diplomatic alliance with the center from Ethiopia’s traditional allies.

For example, the acceptance of the concept of nationality-based federalism by Ethiopia’s traditional allies in the West, the breakdown of Amhara-Tigray alliance, the proliferation of the Pentecostal Churches that are siphoning congregation members from the Orthodox Church, rapid urbanization in highland Ethiopia, a dwindling surplus transferred from the south, and institutionalization of regional governments in the last thirty years have collectively contributed to the making of deep and possibly irreparable cracks in the center.

Although Christopher Clapham still hangs on to the traditional way of explaining dangers to Ethiopia as originating from the “pastoralist zone” such as “Somalis, Borana, Oromo, Sidama, and Afar” he fails to address that the contemporary armed triangle in the African continent is the axis of Amhara-Tigray Eritrea.

[ ... ]
Over the spoils of the decaying state are three forces competing to shape Ethiopian political narrative.

• The first group calls for a central government that seeks to remove Article 39 that guaranteed the right of nations and nationalities for self-determination from the 1995 FDRE Constitution.
• The other group, from the newly formed opposition political party Sidama Federalist Party (SFP), to the oldest ones Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC), as well as armed groups such as the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), Gambella Liberation Front (GLF),
• The third group largely comes from hitherto colonized peoples the ‘periphery’ such as the Somalis, Afaris, and the Sidama, among dozens of other nations, whose core beliefs in the right to self determination is sacrosanct, and seem to settle for either complete independence or a functioning multinational democratic federal system.

https://wardheernews.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/State-Decay-The-case-of-Ethiopia-By-Faisal-Roble.pdf

Very insightful read. Because of the things mentioned in the article, I think a civil war in today's Ethiopia would resemble our war in the 90s

Ethiopia was able to end its civil war when the TPLF led EPRDF successfully defeated the DERG/PDRE and formed a new government. Compare that to Somalia where there were no clear winners to the war, creating a stalemate. I think Ethiopia is headed towards a similar path

It's clear that FANO wants a return to an Amharic-centric centralized government. But their goal is just too fundamentally different from what the other groups want, that I don't see how everyone could reconcile their differences. Plus I think all the deaths from the recent ethnic conflicts has hardened everyone's belief, making a compromise even less likely to happen

@GaradShabeel What are your thoughts? Do you think the relative autonomy provided by ethnic federalism has made Ethiopia more divided, such that a civil war today would be much different than the one from the 90s? What role do you think Ethnic federalism has played in causing the ongoing border disputes, and how would this further complicate a potential civil war?

 

[GaradShabeel]

Very insightful read. Because of the things mentioned in the article, I think a civil war in today's Ethiopia would resemble our war in the 90s

Ethiopia was able to end its civil war when the TPLF led EPRDF successfully defeated the DERG/PDRE and formed a new government. Compare that to Somalia where there were no clear winners to the war, creating a stalemate. I think Ethiopia is headed towards a similar path

It's clear that FANO wants a return to an Amharic-centric centralized government. But their goal is just too fundamentally different from what the other groups want, that I don't see how everyone could reconcile their differences. Plus I think all the deaths from the recent ethnic conflicts has hardened everyone's belief, making a compromise even less likely to happen

@GaradShabeel What are your thoughts? Do you think the relative autonomy provided by ethnic federalism has made Ethiopia more divided, such that a civil war today would be much different than the one from the 90s? What role do you think Ethnic federalism has played in causing the ongoing border disputes, and how would this further complicate a potential civil war?

You hit the nail on several key point in the current path of Ethiopia, much like the article above.

First of all, I'm not sure if I would assign the division of Ethiopia to the autonomy/de-centralization per se. If they instead had implemented federalism based on the old provinces (ethnically-mixed, though heavily favoring Amharas/Habeshas), we would certainly not see the degree of tribalism in the country as evident today. Not to argue against it, but I'd be dishonest if I said that the very principles of bringing ethnic elements into politics didn't have ramifications.

In the words of Meles, as enshrined in the constitution; the Eth state is a unity of 'nations, nationalities, and people', basically a bunch of diverse countries under one (political) umbrella. The term 'killil' in Amharic, doesn't even mean region/state, but rather closer in definition to reservation, as in protected land. It sound great in theory for all of us, (well, excluding beneficiaries of former imperial state), who despite varying political objectives, in no longer being regarded as third class citizens and have a chance at local rule with respect to our respective identities (languages, cultures, religions). Unfortunately, the implementation aspects have not occurred properly as agreed upon.

Speaking about the events leading up to the toppling of Mengistu & Co, it was actually lead by EPLF (the backbone of the armed struggles), along with TPLF joining later on, and subsequently EPDM and OPOD under EPRDF towards the end. In any case, most of the fighters were Eritreans and Tigrayans and when the former seceded, Ethiopia was left with mainly armed Tigrayan rebels, upwards of 100k iirc, dwarfing all other armed groups combined, giving them the final say in direction of the country and becoming the successor.

I have to give creed to TPLF who were clever, when they used false promises while consolidating power, before turning on them after establishing an authoritarian state. One such, was the inclusion of the article of right of self-determination to satisfy certain communities during the transitional period, in particular Oromos and Somalis. By the time insurgency was resumed, it was already too late as they were back to square one of fighting a state.

 

[GaradShabeel]

@GaradShabeel What are your thoughts? Do you think the relative autonomy provided by ethnic federalism has made Ethiopia more divided, such that a civil war today would be much different than the one from the 90s? What role do you think Ethnic federalism has played in causing the ongoing border disputes, and how would this further complicate a potential civil war?

Looking back at the political development of last three decades in Eth, most issues can be tied to ethnic federalism (EF), or federalism at large, in one way or another. Trying to understand whether it has made Ethiopia more divided boils down to who you ask. Someone who's fierce anti-EF by principle will naturally tell you how terrible of the said ideology is, even if there were no issues, due to personal bias. Likewise, the same can be said about me, given my personal stance. Despite its shortcomings (not in theory, but in practice), I hail EF as the greatest 'reform' to have come out of Ethiopia to date.

Nevertheless, as I mentioned, EF forms its basis on the concept of nation-states, whereby a certain region is the homeland of a certain nationality/people. If your ethnic-identity doesn't conform with the constitutionally assigned tribe to your region of residence, or your region of origin for that matter, of course you'd object it. As much as I don't agree with Amharas on many issues, I do accept this critique that EF could prevent the unity of a country (if not implemented correctly), which otherwise creates institutional discriminations.

However, I don't pay much attention to their concerns, given how their political aspirations builds on the similar premises; to return back to the old Amharic-centered state in terms of linguistic, cultural, and religious superiority using state means. The reason why they are so affected by EF is also because they are the most widespread people, who live outside of their 'native' territory. Again, this is as a result of former regimes who used them as a tool to expand their imperialism, at the expense of the local natives.

Back to the concept of nation-states, this is obviously the root cause to some of the current ongoing border issues. For the simple fact that most people don't want fall under a state that regard you as more or less, a guest, in another man's homeland.

When the borders were being drawn, they failed to into consideration to number of issues, in particular, lack of consultation with the locals. For instance, the conflict in western Sitti stems from how that territory was given to Afars, in the name of 'Afar historical land', but they never got to control it until 2014-ish when they forced DDS to sign over. Even then, status-quo more or less remained until the country descended into chaos 2017-18 and Afars wanted to establish authority there, against the locals will. The aftermath is well known by now.

Likewise, when it came to accepting the desires of people, by exercising their right of self-determination of the internal borders, it was awarded through political favors. The referendum of the Somali-Oromo borders came from the request of largely Oromo elites/politicians. When Somalis made similar request alongside Somali-Afar borders, it was declined. Oromos were also given a special zone for their people in the Amhara state, something other people have been denied. Another case in point, Oromo is one of two official languages in Harar. Other regions with diverse people haven't been granted the same rights. I'm not blaming Oromos, only highlighting the unfairness of the gov't and being disingenuous in their attempts at maintaining the unity amongst its people.

Prior to EF, there were obviously some type of borders between the different ethnic groups. In our region, it was more or less similar to the one between Somali clans. Open borders, but everyone knew their place, except during occasional conflicts.

So when a gov't comes in and start demarcating borders, and telling locals that you belong to one side and others on another side, which in part is true as you fall under different jurisdictions; the actual new borders start affecting the social cohesion between the locals. People who may have gotten along before, may as a result of flawed borders, cause animosity at best and a war at worse. With every land dispute concerning the regional state, you've now got an additional layer of competing interests. As evident, some of the states have exacerbated relations between border communities.

Another factor to consider, there were less division back then than today. When you had successive governments that catered to a minority group, and regarded the rest of the population as third class citizens, there were some type of unity behind shared/common struggles. At least politically, everything from being disfranchised to being denied the right to learn your language. Since EF have alleviate some of those issues, that unity doesn't exist to the same degree today, if any at all.

 

[GaradShabeel]

@GaradShabeel What are your thoughts? Do you think the relative autonomy provided by ethnic federalism has made Ethiopia more divided, such that a civil war today would be much different than the one from the 90s? What role do you think Ethnic federalism has played in causing the ongoing border disputes, and how would this further complicate a potential civil war?

What do I think about a possible civil war?

As in the case of downfall of Derg, the state is currently being weakened from within. We're seeing cracks of it today; Ethiopia trying to contain large-scale famines, battling rebel groups, financial woes from debts, the devastation of the recent war draining on resources, strained relations with neighbors etc. It's raising concerns that a large scale civil war may be on the way.

While acknowledging these factors, I can't foresee that it will reach a stage where the state looses control of the entire country leading to an all out-war. That will require other ethnic ethnic groups, starting with their political elites, to turn on Abiy. Outside of FANO, and the already weak OLA, nothing (internally) major is threatening his reign.

During the final years of Mengistu and MSB, more rebel groups erupted taking advantage of the power vacuum. Today, Oromo are his main base support, Tigrayans are against him but politically neutral, and will remain so, unless they see an opportunity to act. Somalis and Afars will remain docile and unbothered by the political changes. Not sure about Sidamas tho. Amharas are on the loose, but some of their elites are onboard with Abiy since he's still entertaining a highly desired political move; to enact a referendum in western Tigray. This is one of the main reason as to why the Amhara state didn't cut their ties with the federal gov't like Tigray.

With that said, if a civil war breaks out, it will most likely end up between Amharas/FANO and Oromos/ENDF. Amharas are increasingly viewing Abiy's government as turning Ethiopia into Oromummaa. Tensions are growing by the day and the deadly war against FANO has spilled over to civilians. Though, Abiy can contain them for now, but who knows for how long. What's certain is that Ethiopian politics will be continue being dominated by the conflicting interests of Amharas and Oromos for as long as that country continue existing.

 

[Aseer]

What do I think about a possible civil war?

As in the case of downfall of Derg, the state is currently being weakened from within. We're seeing cracks of it today; Ethiopia trying to contain large-scale famines, battling rebel groups, financial woes from debts, the devastation of the recent war draining on resources, strained relations with neighbors etc. It's raising concerns that a large scale civil war may be on the way.

While acknowledging these factors, I can't foresee that it will reach a stage where the state looses control of the entire country leading to an all out-war. That will require other ethnic ethnic groups, starting with their political elites, to turn on Abiy. Outside of FANO, and the already weak OLA, nothing (internally) major is threatening his reign.

During the final years of Mengistu and MSB, more rebel groups erupted taking advantage of the power vacuum. Today, Oromo are his main base support, Tigrayans are against him but politically neutral, and will remain so, unless they see an opportunity to act. Somalis and Afars will remain docile and unbothered by the political changes. Not sure about Sidamas tho. Amharas are on the loose, but some of their elites are onboard with Abiy since he's still entertaining a highly desired political move; to enact a referendum in western Tigray. This is one of the main reason as to why the Amhara state didn't cut their ties with the federal gov't like Tigray.

With that said, if a civil war breaks out, it will most likely end up between Amharas/FANO and Oromos/ENDF. Amharas are increasingly viewing Abiy's government as turning Ethiopia into Oromummaa. Tensions are growing by the day and the deadly war against FANO has spilled over to civilians. Though, Abiy can contain them for now, but who knows for how long. What's certain is that Ethiopian politics will be continue being dominated by the conflicting interests of Amharas and Oromos for as long as that country continue existing.

Can you give predictions for the somali region, dir dhaba, sitti and mabye harar if all hell breaks loose?

 

[GaradShabeel]

Can you give predictions for the somali region, dir dhaba, sitti and mabye harar if all hell breaks loose?

It's difficult to predict for what would happen to the Somali region. If we're talking about the federal government loosing control over the country, then the regional administration will most likely resume full control and try to manage the region, until they can reconcile with other states in Ethiopia under a transitional government and decide the fate of the country. The reg'l gov't would probably try to appeal to the public to remain calm and refrain from any destabilizing action. Maybe use security forces, if necessary, to maintain order.

However, there would be two options. First being, the various clans in DDS through consensus find a common path for the future of the region, but this will never happen. Not even worth trying, lol. It's more likely that some clans, with similar political objectives, start allying with each other. The second option, mass-revolts occur in which the reg'l gov't can't control and every clan will take over their clan territory.

Also, one thing is for certain, no new state will ever succeed in establishing a country from Ethiopia. Whether it's by Somalis or anyone else. The only way achievable would be through permission from a sitting government and that's a pipe dream. From the point of view of IC, if SL failed gaining recognition despite being a separate (colonial) entity prior to joining Somalia, then Ethiopian regions with no such a history will totally fail. Though, it doesn't mean that some regions may try.

For DDS, most clans already live next to their clansmen across the 'border' and the most realistic scenario would be attempt at joining Somalia (including SL, maybe Djibouti and possibly NFD/Kenya too). Not sure about the fate of those clans living inlands. I wouldn't be surprised if some wanted to remain in Ethiopia too.

Harar is already de-facto part of Oromia (capital of East Hararghe), so they will take over it with ease. Sitti is part of DDS today, maybe you're referring to the territory Afar disputes? If Afar no longer receives military support from Arat kilo, then reer Sitti won't have much problem taking their land back. Not sure if IOG would want reer Sitti to even be part of Djibouti, or if the Djibouti-Afars there would accept it. They may demand that the Afar region also joins. This is pure speculations tho, so don't take may words for it.

Dir Dhaba depends on the local Somali clans and neighboring Oromo clans. Neither side want to join DDS or Oromia, hence their current status of special city-state. But Oromia elites would surely want that region to remain in Oromia/Ethiopia, and they may very well try to use all resources to make it happen.

The border disputes will flare up again alongside DDS-Oromia. If Oromo reg'l gov't still stands, then I would be very concerned. Not only may they use military means to settle border issues, then may even push towards the borders towards Somalia. But if they stay out, and it remains between local Oromo and Somali clans, then not much will change aside from small gains for either side, but it could end up being bloody.

Even amongst ourselves, we might see border disputes that could lead to clashes. Though, it may affect primarily pastoral clans to a higher degree than sedentary/urban ones.

These scenarios are based on the premises that the federal gov't falls and no successive administration can establish authority. And there will be conflict between mainly Amharas & their allies, and Oromos & allies in taking over the country. If one side captures Addis and get their hands on army arsenal, expect them to come for the Somali region and resurrect Ethiopia. In the end, it's survival of the fittest.

 

[Aseer]

It's difficult to predict for what would happen to the Somali region. If we're talking about the federal government loosing control over the country, then the regional administration will most likely resume full control and try to manage the region, until they can reconcile with other states in Ethiopia under a transitional government and decide the fate of the country. The reg'l gov't would probably try to appeal to the public to remain calm and refrain from any destabilizing action. Maybe use security forces, if necessary, to maintain order.

However, there would be two options. First being, the various clans in DDS through consensus find a common path for the future of the region, but this will never happen. Not even worth trying, lol. It's more likely that some clans, with similar political objectives, start allying with each other. The second option, mass-revolts occur in which the reg'l gov't can't control and every clan will take over their clan territory.

Also, one thing is for certain, no new state will ever succeed in establishing a country from Ethiopia. Whether it's by Somalis or anyone else. The only way achievable would be through permission from a sitting government and that's a pipe dream. From the point of view of IC, if SL failed gaining recognition despite being a separate (colonial) entity prior to joining Somalia, then Ethiopian regions with no such a history will totally fail. Though, it doesn't mean that some regions may try.

For DDS, most clans already live next to their clansmen across the 'border' and the most realistic scenario would be attempt at joining Somalia (including SL, maybe Djibouti and possibly NFD/Kenya too). Not sure about the fate of those clans living inlands. I wouldn't be surprised if some wanted to remain in Ethiopia too.

Harar is already de-facto part of Oromia (capital of East Hararghe), so they will take over it with ease. Sitti is part of DDS today, maybe you're referring to the territory Afar disputes? If Afar no longer receives military support from Arat kilo, then reer Sitti won't have much problem taking their land back. Not sure if IOG would want reer Sitti to even be part of Djibouti, or if the Djibouti-Afars there would accept it. They may demand that the Afar region also joins. This is pure speculations tho, so don't take may words for it.

Dir Dhaba depends on the local Somali clans and neighboring Oromo clans. Neither side want to join DDS or Oromia, hence their current status of special city-state. But Oromia elites would surely want that region to remain in Oromia/Ethiopia, and they may very well try to use all resources to make it happen.

The border disputes will flare up again alongside DDS-Oromia. If Oromo reg'l gov't still stands, then I would be very concerned. Not only may they use military means to settle border issues, then may even push towards the borders towards Somalia. But if they stay out, and it remains between local Oromo and Somali clans, then not much will change aside from small gains for either side, but it could end up being bloody.

Even amongst ourselves, we might see border disputes that could lead to clashes. Though, it may affect primarily pastoral clans to a higher degree than sedentary/urban ones.

These scenarios are based on the premises that the federal gov't falls and no successive administration can establish authority. And there will be conflict between mainly Amharas & their allies, and Oromos & allies in taking over the country. If one side captures Addis and get their hands on army arsenal, expect them to come for the Somali region and resurrect Ethiopia. In the end, it's survival of the fittest.

So in no scenario would galbeed ever be able to be separate or atleast rejoin somalia? So it truly is impossible for them to come back is what your implying? I appreciate the non bias and shedding the true reality thanks bro.

 

[GaradShabeel]

So in no scenario would galbeed ever be able to be separate or atleast rejoin somalia? So it truly is impossible for them to come back is what your implying? I appreciate the non bias and shedding the true reality thanks bro.

That comes down how Ethiopia disintegrates. If they fully collapse, like in the case of Somalia in the 90s, then everyone in DDS would try to consolidate their clan territory and likely try to join their clansmen in other parts of Somalia/weyn.

But if Ethiopia disintegrates partially, then it depends on the circumstances. Will Somalis arm themselves and ally with others to finish off the collapsing state? Or will we take the peaceful approach and instead attempt at invoking the right of self-determination (despite the objection of the weakening state)? Will the other ethnic groups ally with each other and swiftly take over as the next legitimate gov't (just like TPLF/EPRDF in the 90s)? Will the west give lifeline to the current gov't preventing the disintegrating state?

There're many factors to consider, but whether Somalis leave Ethiopia depends on the power vacuum. But it's definitely not too late, albeit unlikely any time soon. As long as Ethiopia exist, these division will continue existing.

 

[Aseer]

That comes down how Ethiopia disintegrates. If they fully collapse, like in the case of Somalia in the 90s, then everyone in DDS would try to consolidate their clan territory and likely try to join their clansmen in other parts of Somalia/weyn.

But if Ethiopia disintegrates partially, then it depends on the circumstances. Will Somalis arm themselves and ally with others to finish off the collapsing state? Or will we take the peaceful approach and instead attempt at invoking the right of self-determination (despite the objection of the weakening state)? Will the other ethnic groups ally with each other and swiftly take over as the next legitimate gov't (just like TPLF/EPRDF in the 90s)? Will the west give lifeline to the current gov't preventing the disintegrating state?

There're many factors to consider, but whether Somalis leave Ethiopia depends on the power vacuum. But it's definitely not too late, albeit unlikely any time soon. As long as Ethiopia exist, these division will continue existing.

Is the clan divisions in galbeed bad? Or is it not that bad and can be mended easily through reconciliation and such since it is crucial for the clans in galbeed to be unified on their goal to reach secession and become a interim government that some parts will join somalia or Djibouti.

 

[GaradShabeel]

Is the clan divisions in galbeed bad? Or is it not that bad and can be mended easily through reconciliation and such since it is crucial for the clans in galbeed to be unified on their goal to reach secession and become a interim government that some parts will join somalia or Djibouti.

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[Aseer]

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They should hold clan meetings during those times to make it happen a mutual alliance.

 

[Mayor]

@GaradShabeel man you gave such a detailed response. I am going to save this and come back to read this a couple of more times so I can process it all. Thank you for taking the time to educate me on all of this. I always appreciate and look forward to your analysis

 

[GaradShabeel]

@GaradShabeel man you gave such a detailed response. I am going to save this and come back to read this a couple of more times so I can process it all. Thank you for taking the time to educate me on all of this. I always appreciate and look forward to your analysis

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[Mayor]

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Nah but you actually answer the question that man deflected like I’ve never seen before