MbZ needed Yemen's southern ports and waterways to underpin his 'Maritime Empire' and extend his security realm. But now the Yemeni resistance is set to blow a hole in those plans.
UAE Crown Prince Mohammad bin Zayed bet on his Yemen war to consolidate his maritime and security ambitions. It may have backfired.
Photo Credit: The Cradle
On 3 January, a UAE-flagged vessel carrying ‘military supplies’ was seized by Yemeni resistance movement Ansarallah, which disseminated photos of the war contraband widely on social media.
One week earlier, Yemen’s Armed Forces launched a ballistic missile strike on Shabwah province, an area under the control of UAE-backed militias.
If a new strategy of targeting Emirati interests – instead of mainly Saudi ones – is taking shape in Yemen, these incidents are likely to have a ripple effect on the UAE’s role in both Yemen and the wider region.
Ambition and contest inside a house of glass
At the onset of the war on Yemen in 2015, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates divided their military-strategic roles in Yemen in accordance with country’s former partition lines of 1967–1990.
Back then, Yemen was divided into two separate states, north and south. The oil-rich north was attached to Saudi Arabia, while the communist south received significant aid and other assistance from its alliance with the USSR.
After the dissolution of the USSR, the nation unified under Ali Abdullah Saleh, the president of the former North Yemen since 1978, firmly consolidating the country under the influence of Saudi Arabia.
The UAE began its role as a regional player in West Asia after the death of Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan in 2004.
The ambitious Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, Mohammad bin Zayed Al Nahyan (MbZ), subsequently took full control of the UAE. He overhauled his predecessor’s visions and prepared the UAE for a post-oil era, in which the country would transform from a traditional Gulf oil-dependent country to one with a diversified economy.
Briefly, the UAE’s diversified economy rested on the construction of mega projects funded by oil revenues, such as ports and airports that turned the UAE into a regional, free trade zone hub for importing and exporting oil, jewelry, electronics and other goods. The economy of the UAE would be further boosted by foreign investments in tourism, air transport, and real estate.
In the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, foreign investments as well as real estate sectors depreciated, and the UAE struggled to achieve full recovery until 2019. Then, as others in the Arabian Peninsula, the Emirati economy took another bashing from the effects of COVID-19 on its tourism industry and the subsequent instability of the global oil market.
These downturns increased the importance of ports and airports in MbZ’s grand scheme. Today, re-exports (non-petroleum) account for almost 50 percent of total exports, making maritime security an ultimate priority for UAE foreign policy.
Ultimately, the success of MbZ has been in transforming the UAE from an absolute realm of sand to an absolute realm of glass, and his fortunes can remain intact as long as those glass towers stand.
A coalition of differing goals
When Ansarallah (the Houthis) – a northern Yemeni resistance movement against western and Gulf interventionism – took over the capital city of Sanaa, a coalition spearheaded by Saudi Arabia and the UAE was formed to push back and destroy it.
UAE officials claim that their role in the coalition is to support the ‘legal’ government of Hadi, who was overthrown by the Yemeni people in a popular uprising, and who subsequently sought protection in Riyadh.
Generally speaking, the UAE adamantly opposes any popular Islamic or resistance movements across the region, from the Polisario on the Atlantic Ocean to the Islamic Brotherhood on the Persian Gulf. The UAE has also periodically employed the hollow excuse of ‘restraining Iran’s influence’ to justify their aggressions in Yemen and elsewhere in the region.
However, the real reason for the conflict waged on Yemen by Saudi Arabia and the UAE has little to do with politics – and much more to do with the geography of South Yemen.
It’s all about geography…and location
Along the coastlines of Yemen are ports and islands overlooking the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Sea, the Red Sea, the Horn of Africa, and the Bab al-Mandab strait.
Division of labor: Saudi interests lie primarily in Yemen’s north; the UAE’s ambitions, in the south.
The foreign policy of the UAE today is determined mainly by maritime trading and security. Control of Yemen’s south will assist the UAE in maintaining its regional trading dominance and will secure the waterways and airports to avoid future vulnerabilities.
Maritime trading will be determined in the upcoming years by the Maritime Silk Road, which is part of China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Engineered to connect around 60 countries, the $4 trillion project will bolster the strategically-located Yemen as a vital hub of maritime trading, naturally diminishing the UAE’s location and role.
For the UAE, the three key sites in connection with maritime trading are the Aden governorate, Socotra Island, and Bab al-Mandab strait:
First is Aden province which includes Aden Port City, purported to be part of the Maritime Silk Road. It has the biggest container terminal in Yemen and is located on the Gulf of Aden near one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world.
Aden also now hosts the country’s largest airport after the war coalition in 2015 destroyed the airport in Sanaa. Currently, Aden is under the control of the UAE.
Then there is Socotra, a unique natural and isolated wonder, a well-sized island surrounded by the Gulf of Aden, the Indian Ocean, and the Arabian Sea. It faces the Horn of Africa from the west, and is also located on one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world. Currently, Socotra is controlled by the UAE.
Finally, there is the Bab al-Mandab strait, which will be an essential part of the Maritime Silk Road. The strait connects the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea, via the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, and is shared by three countries: Yemen, Djibouti, and Eritrea. Around 20,000 ships pass through the strait each year, and the total petroleum flows through Bab al-Mandab account for nine percent of global supply.
The UAE is currently in control of the Bab al-Mandab strait.
Yemen’s importance in China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative – BRI

UAE Crown Prince Mohammad bin Zayed bet on his Yemen war to consolidate his maritime and security ambitions. It may have backfired.
Photo Credit: The Cradle
On 3 January, a UAE-flagged vessel carrying ‘military supplies’ was seized by Yemeni resistance movement Ansarallah, which disseminated photos of the war contraband widely on social media.
One week earlier, Yemen’s Armed Forces launched a ballistic missile strike on Shabwah province, an area under the control of UAE-backed militias.
If a new strategy of targeting Emirati interests – instead of mainly Saudi ones – is taking shape in Yemen, these incidents are likely to have a ripple effect on the UAE’s role in both Yemen and the wider region.
Ambition and contest inside a house of glass
At the onset of the war on Yemen in 2015, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates divided their military-strategic roles in Yemen in accordance with country’s former partition lines of 1967–1990.
Back then, Yemen was divided into two separate states, north and south. The oil-rich north was attached to Saudi Arabia, while the communist south received significant aid and other assistance from its alliance with the USSR.
After the dissolution of the USSR, the nation unified under Ali Abdullah Saleh, the president of the former North Yemen since 1978, firmly consolidating the country under the influence of Saudi Arabia.
The UAE began its role as a regional player in West Asia after the death of Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan in 2004.
The ambitious Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, Mohammad bin Zayed Al Nahyan (MbZ), subsequently took full control of the UAE. He overhauled his predecessor’s visions and prepared the UAE for a post-oil era, in which the country would transform from a traditional Gulf oil-dependent country to one with a diversified economy.
Briefly, the UAE’s diversified economy rested on the construction of mega projects funded by oil revenues, such as ports and airports that turned the UAE into a regional, free trade zone hub for importing and exporting oil, jewelry, electronics and other goods. The economy of the UAE would be further boosted by foreign investments in tourism, air transport, and real estate.
In the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, foreign investments as well as real estate sectors depreciated, and the UAE struggled to achieve full recovery until 2019. Then, as others in the Arabian Peninsula, the Emirati economy took another bashing from the effects of COVID-19 on its tourism industry and the subsequent instability of the global oil market.
These downturns increased the importance of ports and airports in MbZ’s grand scheme. Today, re-exports (non-petroleum) account for almost 50 percent of total exports, making maritime security an ultimate priority for UAE foreign policy.
Ultimately, the success of MbZ has been in transforming the UAE from an absolute realm of sand to an absolute realm of glass, and his fortunes can remain intact as long as those glass towers stand.
A coalition of differing goals
When Ansarallah (the Houthis) – a northern Yemeni resistance movement against western and Gulf interventionism – took over the capital city of Sanaa, a coalition spearheaded by Saudi Arabia and the UAE was formed to push back and destroy it.
UAE officials claim that their role in the coalition is to support the ‘legal’ government of Hadi, who was overthrown by the Yemeni people in a popular uprising, and who subsequently sought protection in Riyadh.
Generally speaking, the UAE adamantly opposes any popular Islamic or resistance movements across the region, from the Polisario on the Atlantic Ocean to the Islamic Brotherhood on the Persian Gulf. The UAE has also periodically employed the hollow excuse of ‘restraining Iran’s influence’ to justify their aggressions in Yemen and elsewhere in the region.
However, the real reason for the conflict waged on Yemen by Saudi Arabia and the UAE has little to do with politics – and much more to do with the geography of South Yemen.
It’s all about geography…and location
Along the coastlines of Yemen are ports and islands overlooking the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Sea, the Red Sea, the Horn of Africa, and the Bab al-Mandab strait.

The foreign policy of the UAE today is determined mainly by maritime trading and security. Control of Yemen’s south will assist the UAE in maintaining its regional trading dominance and will secure the waterways and airports to avoid future vulnerabilities.
Maritime trading will be determined in the upcoming years by the Maritime Silk Road, which is part of China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Engineered to connect around 60 countries, the $4 trillion project will bolster the strategically-located Yemen as a vital hub of maritime trading, naturally diminishing the UAE’s location and role.
For the UAE, the three key sites in connection with maritime trading are the Aden governorate, Socotra Island, and Bab al-Mandab strait:
First is Aden province which includes Aden Port City, purported to be part of the Maritime Silk Road. It has the biggest container terminal in Yemen and is located on the Gulf of Aden near one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world.
Aden also now hosts the country’s largest airport after the war coalition in 2015 destroyed the airport in Sanaa. Currently, Aden is under the control of the UAE.
Then there is Socotra, a unique natural and isolated wonder, a well-sized island surrounded by the Gulf of Aden, the Indian Ocean, and the Arabian Sea. It faces the Horn of Africa from the west, and is also located on one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world. Currently, Socotra is controlled by the UAE.
Finally, there is the Bab al-Mandab strait, which will be an essential part of the Maritime Silk Road. The strait connects the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea, via the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, and is shared by three countries: Yemen, Djibouti, and Eritrea. Around 20,000 ships pass through the strait each year, and the total petroleum flows through Bab al-Mandab account for nine percent of global supply.
The UAE is currently in control of the Bab al-Mandab strait.
