Detente with Damascus could give MBZ a new regional asset, positioning Abu Dhabi as a third external force in Syria, behind Moscow and Tehran.
The Syrian war has been raging since the country’s 2011 uprising (SANA/AFP)
The UAE is pushing hard for Syria’s return to the Arab fold. After joining the majority of Arab states in boycotting Damascus during the Syrian war and voting to suspend Syria from the Arab League, Abu Dhabi is now leading efforts to reverse that decision. Its Syrian embassy has been reopened, it has offered investment in Syria’s shattered economy, and this month, it sent Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed to Damascus to meet President Bashar al-Assad - the highest-level contact between the two states in a decade.
The UAE has recently become an unofficial cheerleader for Syria, but what is the UAE’s angle? Why has it shifted from isolating Syria to urging reconciliation, despite Assad’s recalcitrant behaviour? Various reasons have been offered: to lure Assad away from Iran, to outflank Turkey, to take advantage of economic opportunities, or to pave the way for UAE-brokered Syria-Israel peace talks. Yet, a closer examination of these explanations suggests none has much chance of success.
It should be noted that the UAE was never the most vocal critic of the Syrian regime. While it joined the anti-Assad chorus in 2011 and sent aid to the rebels, its involvement in the war was nothing like its commitment to other conflicts, such as those in Libya and Yemen, or the involvement in Syria of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey. In fact, Dubai remained a safe haven for many pro-Assad figures and their wealth throughout the war, including Assad’s mother and sister, who both relocated there. The road to reconciliation was thus shorter for Abu Dhabi than for Riyadh, Doha or Ankara.
It should be noted that the UAE was never the most vocal critic of the Syrian regime. While it joined the anti-Assad chorus in 2011 and sent aid to the rebels, its involvement in the war was nothing like its commitment to other conflicts, such as those in Libya and Yemen, or the involvement in Syria of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey. In fact, Dubai remained a safe haven for many pro-Assad figures and their wealth throughout the war, including Assad’s mother and sister, who both relocated there. The road to reconciliation was thus shorter for Abu Dhabi than for Riyadh, Doha or Ankara.
But this doesn’t explain the UAE’s sudden cheerleading for Assad. Some have argued the motivations are economic, with reconstructing Syria’s war-torn economy presenting an investment opportunity. Yet this seems a stretch. Even if UAE investors were able to navigate the US Caesar sanctions, Syria remains an unstable, corrupt and unappealing market. Even Assad’s longstanding friends in Iran, Russia and China are reluctant to invest. Some investment might follow detente with Assad, but this is not driving it.
Equally unrealistic is the idea that Assad might reconcile with Israel. Some have posited that the UAE’s newfound enthusiasm for Damascus is linked to the Abraham Accords. With Israel and the UAE enjoying diplomatic relations and fast-growing economic ties, might MBZ be positioning himself as mediator between the long-warring neighbours?
Again, this misjudges Assad’s position. The “resistance axis” against Israel and the West remains an important pillar of what little domestic legitimacy he has left, and this will be no more quickly abandoned than the occupied Golan Heights that Israel would surely refuse to give back in any such peace. Add to that Assad’s ties to Iran, which Israel (and any UAE-led peace process) would want to end.
Moreover, Israel does not seem to expect or want the UAE to broker a peace deal. It is happyfor a weak Assad to remain in Damascus, as Syria’s pariah status lessens any international pressure on handing back the Golan Heights. The UAE’s economic and diplomatic support might shore up Assad, but it would not likely lead to a full recovery of either Syria’s military or reputation, which is fine by Israel.
The Syrian war has been raging since the country’s 2011 uprising (SANA/AFP)
The UAE is pushing hard for Syria’s return to the Arab fold. After joining the majority of Arab states in boycotting Damascus during the Syrian war and voting to suspend Syria from the Arab League, Abu Dhabi is now leading efforts to reverse that decision. Its Syrian embassy has been reopened, it has offered investment in Syria’s shattered economy, and this month, it sent Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed to Damascus to meet President Bashar al-Assad - the highest-level contact between the two states in a decade.
The UAE has recently become an unofficial cheerleader for Syria, but what is the UAE’s angle? Why has it shifted from isolating Syria to urging reconciliation, despite Assad’s recalcitrant behaviour? Various reasons have been offered: to lure Assad away from Iran, to outflank Turkey, to take advantage of economic opportunities, or to pave the way for UAE-brokered Syria-Israel peace talks. Yet, a closer examination of these explanations suggests none has much chance of success.
It should be noted that the UAE was never the most vocal critic of the Syrian regime. While it joined the anti-Assad chorus in 2011 and sent aid to the rebels, its involvement in the war was nothing like its commitment to other conflicts, such as those in Libya and Yemen, or the involvement in Syria of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey. In fact, Dubai remained a safe haven for many pro-Assad figures and their wealth throughout the war, including Assad’s mother and sister, who both relocated there. The road to reconciliation was thus shorter for Abu Dhabi than for Riyadh, Doha or Ankara.
It should be noted that the UAE was never the most vocal critic of the Syrian regime. While it joined the anti-Assad chorus in 2011 and sent aid to the rebels, its involvement in the war was nothing like its commitment to other conflicts, such as those in Libya and Yemen, or the involvement in Syria of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey. In fact, Dubai remained a safe haven for many pro-Assad figures and their wealth throughout the war, including Assad’s mother and sister, who both relocated there. The road to reconciliation was thus shorter for Abu Dhabi than for Riyadh, Doha or Ankara.
But this doesn’t explain the UAE’s sudden cheerleading for Assad. Some have argued the motivations are economic, with reconstructing Syria’s war-torn economy presenting an investment opportunity. Yet this seems a stretch. Even if UAE investors were able to navigate the US Caesar sanctions, Syria remains an unstable, corrupt and unappealing market. Even Assad’s longstanding friends in Iran, Russia and China are reluctant to invest. Some investment might follow detente with Assad, but this is not driving it.
The Iran factor
A more popular explanation is that the Emirati leader, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed (known as MBZ), hopes reconciliation can persuade Assad to cut or limit his ties to Iran. With Assad desperate for funds, might he be willing to lessen his ties to Tehran in exchange for Emirati money? This is not likely. While Assad might pay lip service to reducing Iran’s visible presence in Syria, especially given Tehran is unpopular among his own loyalists, any serious break with Iran is unthinkable. Tehran, alongside Moscow, has saved his regime. It is not something he will readily forget or sacrifice on the altar of economic recovery.Equally unrealistic is the idea that Assad might reconcile with Israel. Some have posited that the UAE’s newfound enthusiasm for Damascus is linked to the Abraham Accords. With Israel and the UAE enjoying diplomatic relations and fast-growing economic ties, might MBZ be positioning himself as mediator between the long-warring neighbours?
Again, this misjudges Assad’s position. The “resistance axis” against Israel and the West remains an important pillar of what little domestic legitimacy he has left, and this will be no more quickly abandoned than the occupied Golan Heights that Israel would surely refuse to give back in any such peace. Add to that Assad’s ties to Iran, which Israel (and any UAE-led peace process) would want to end.
Moreover, Israel does not seem to expect or want the UAE to broker a peace deal. It is happyfor a weak Assad to remain in Damascus, as Syria’s pariah status lessens any international pressure on handing back the Golan Heights. The UAE’s economic and diplomatic support might shore up Assad, but it would not likely lead to a full recovery of either Syria’s military or reputation, which is fine by Israel.
