Somaliland's authoritarian turn: oligarchic–corporate power and the political economy of de facto states

Manafesto

[Cali Saleebaan][Migiurtinia]
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HalimoEnthusiast

CILMIBAARIS SOO BANDHIGTAY DOWLADDA GEDDISLEYDA AH EE SOMALILAND​


Hargeysa (Wararka PP) — Geeddi-socodkii dimquraadiyadda ee maamulka goosashada doonaya ee Somaliland wuxuu ku dambeeyaay dowladnimo ku salaysan koox gancsato oo tartanka ka soo horjeedda, fursadaha ganacsigana isku kooba. Dooddani waa gunaanadka cilmibaaris ay qortay Dr Claire Elder oo ka tirsan London School of Economics, laguna soo daabacay International Affairs oo ay Oxford University Press u saarto Chatham House.
WhatsApp-Image-2021-11-02-at-20.37.50.jpeg
Dr Claire Elder: “Dowladda geddisleyda ee Somaliland way wiiqday dumuqraaddiyaynta, way kobcisay kooxo ganacsato oo aan doonayn in lala tartamo.”
Cilmibaaristu waxay bannaanka soo dhigtay sida dowlad gedidisley ahi (oligopolistic state ) ugu guuleysatay inay nabadda dhowrto laakiin wiiqdo dimuqraaddiyeynta iyadoo danteeda ku gaaraysa habka nabadgelyeynta (securitization). Dowladnimada noocan ahi waa mid ay suurtogaliyeen koox ganacsdato ah oo ka soo jeeda Hargeysa, fadhigooduna yahay Jabuuti. Dowladnimada geddisleyda ahi waxay aad u sii tisqaadday markuu uu Axmed Maxamed Siilaanyo qabtay talada maamulka Somaliland 2010-kii.
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Cilmibaaris daaha ka rogtay isku qoofalnaanta ganacsatada iyo siyaasiyiinta la jeeska ah Madaxweyne Muuse Biixi.
Claire waxay ku doodday in Somaliland ka shidaal-qaadato taliska Ismaaciil Cumar Geelle oo marmar lagu tilmaamo inuu yahay ninka xukuma Somaliland saameynta uu ku leeyahay siyaasadda Hargeysa awgeed. Muddada dheer oo uu xisbiga Kumliye talada hayo ( 2010 ilaa hadda) waxaa sii kordhay musuqmaasuqa, yaraanta awoodda dowladda, iyo ku tiirsanaanta koox ganacsato oo ka faa’iidda canshuurta yar oo ay bixiyaan. Claire waxay kale oo ku doodday in Xisbiga Waddani uu yahay rajada keliya si loo soo afjaro dowladnimada geddisleyda. Ismaciil Hurre Buubaa, Wasiirkii Arrimmaha Dibeddaa Soomaaliya, ayaa ka mid ah dadka ay waraysatay Claire. “Somaliland weli dagaalkii SNM ayay ku jirtaa. Dowlad horusocod ah ayaa loo baahan yahay. Maskax xoreyn ku salaysani meel inama geynayso” ayuu Buubaa yiri. Hadalka Buubaa waxaa sii taageeray ku shubashadii dhowr doorasho oo ka dhacay degmooyinka Somaliland ka taliso, sida ay Claire qortay.
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Muuse Biixi kama madaxbannaana qowlaysato jeebkoodu qoyan yahay oo si bareer ah ugu adeegata hay’adaha dowladda.
Dagaalladii sagaashamaadii ka dhacay waqooyiga ayaa keenay in Beesha Garxajsis, oo waagi hore wax ka dheefi jirtay habkii ismaamulka dadban ee Birtishaka (indirect rule), maamuli jirtay dhoofinta xoolaha iyo ganacsiga, ay noqoto beel la iska bahaystay, ayay Claire ku doodday. “Silaanyo ayaa aad u sii wiiqay awoodda Garxajiska” ayay qortay Claire.
Cilmibaaristu waxay xustay sida sirdoonka Galbeedku uga caawiyeen Muuse Biixi Cabdi inuu ku guuleysto tartanka madaxweynanimada sanadkii 2017-kii “mowqifkiisa la dagaallanka argagixisada awgiis” ayay qortay Claire. Waxay isweyddiisay halka siyaasadda Somaliland u socoto maadaama deeqbixiyeyaashu meelo kale ay hadda mudnaanta siinayaan.

Dr Claire Elder waxay intii u dhexeysay 2012 iyo 2017kii gorfeeye u ahayd International Crisis Group. Waxay buuggeeda qalinjibinta ka qortay dhaqaalaha siyaasiga iyo colaadda Soomaaliya ka jirtay. Waxay muddo dheer ku sugnayd Hargeysa si ay u samayso cilbimaarista salka u ah warqad cilmiyeedkeeda.
© Puntland Post, 2021




Somaliland's authoritarian turn: oligarchic–corporate power and the political economy of de facto states​

Claire Elder
Author Notes
International Affairs, Volume 97, Issue 6, November 2021, Pages 1749–1765, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiab174
Published:

 

Thegoodshepherd

Galkacyo iyo Calula dhexdood
Staff Member
I follow prices across Somalia about once a month using FAO's Somalia portal. I was always surprised to see that the prices of imported goods in Northwest (Somaliland) are above the average of Somalia as a whole.

Keep in mind that Berbera port is larger in size and capacity than Bosaso and Mogadishu put together. It also imports for Ethiopia so it should have tremendous economies of scale compared to national ports like Bosaso, Mogadishu or a regional port like Kismayo.

Price of imported commodities
($USD)
Banadir (Mogadishu Port)
Northeast (Bosaso Port)
Northwest (Berbera Port)
Middle & Lower Juba (Kismayo Port)
Diesel Fuel (1 liter)​
$0.63​
$0.68​
$0.73​
$0.88​
Petrol Fuel (1 liter)​
$0.71​
$0.74​
$0.79​
$1.00​
Wheat Flour (1 KG)​
$0.54​
$0.70​
$0.65​
$0.71​
Wheat Grain (1 KG)​
$0.68​
$0.91​
$0.70​
$0.76​
Rice (1 KG)​
$0.50​
$0.71​
$0.83​
$0.70​
Sugar (1 KG)​
$0.56​
$0.72​
$0.75​
$0.78​
Vegetable oil (1 liter)​
$1.48​
$1.68​
$1.73​
$1.81​
Cost of imported goods basket
$5.10
$6.14
$6.18
$6.64

And yet prices in Somaliland are roughly comparable to prices in Bosaso or even Kismayo, and substantially higher than Mogadishu. This should not be possible given Berbera's size and geographic advantage. The only explanation is that the government of Somaliland is allowing big merchants to extract extra profit from their own people. Prices in Northwest should be about 25-30% lower than they are. Massive extraction is going on.
 

Manafesto

[Cali Saleebaan][Migiurtinia]
VIP
HalimoEnthusiast
The Oxford research's key points and qoutes summerized
________________________

Somaliland elections

Yet every election since 2002 has also seen high rates of state interference, intimidation, rigging, and the stifling of opposition activity and media freedom, which often go under-reported where public criticism of corrupt officials and authorities is also criminalized.

SNM and Ruling class Elites
Elites have for decades used the restrictive three-party system (effectively frozen since 2002),26 along with constitutional provisions and electoral laws, to stay in power and prevent any genuine oppositional pole from emerging. The recent municipal and parliamentary elections of 2021 were no exception: at least seven candidates were detained to pre-empt any challenge to the ruling Kulmiye party.27 These heavy-handed tactics just proved less effective this time around
Siilaanyo's intimation of Djibouti style of financial governoce
Following his election in 2010, President Silanyo sought to accelerate state capture of the political economy—implementing a model of Djiboutian-style presidentialism—and he rewarded loyal business associates with new opportunities in Islamic finance and business. Yet, Silanyo was never able to rebalance the bargaining power of the state vis-à-vis domestic firms nor limit the opposition's access to political finances.
The Garhijas Domino effect
Abdirahman Ahmed Ali Tuur, who was to lead the two-year transitional government until a civilian government could take over. Yet Tuur represented the Garhajis clan, who were widely seen as beneficiaries of British indirect rule, landowners and more populous than other groups, having also commanded more fronts than other clans in the liberation fight. There was widespread concern among factions within the SNM that the Garhajis would dominate the post-independent state.37

At the 1991 Burco conference, Ahmed Silanyo and Saleban Gaal (two key actors within this faction of the SNM) even worked actively against recognition, ‘calling for the international community not to recognise Somaliland and [not to give it] any aid … saying that Somaliland was in conflict amongst its people’.38 What emerged was a ‘second liberation’ of Somaliland—an internal civil war (1992–4)—through which a new coalition of capitalist and non-dominant clan interests would seek to redistribute assets from the former colonial beneficiaries.
affiliated oligarchs and Somaliland officials (as far back as the SNM), and how these cross-border networks of ‘business–state–clan relations’ together overturned the inherited colonial state,43 became stakeholders in the civil war of 1992–4 and created an oligopolistic state opposed to democratization.

Immediately after independence, these cross-border networks seized control of strategic outposts, trade corridors, ports and imports, sidelining groups previously aligned with the statebuilding enterprise (in particular the Garhajis, who had previously dominated livestock, import/exports and the aviation sector).44 Djiboutian oligarchs and affiliated banks used credit to the Somaliland polity to secure free economic rein (without taxation).
Djbouti based corpate owners running the show
Somaliland constitutes what we can call an ‘oligopolistic state’, referring to the small number of firms and elites which, after independence—and through discreet cross-border business networks and unaccounted financial flows—colluded, either explicitly or tacitly, to limit competition and restrict the authority of the state in order to achieve above-normal market returns and protections.1

4 In particular, the deep entanglements of Somaliland's finance and politics with neighbouring Djibouti, and the polity's dependence on trade and security rents, have since underlain poor elite commitment to democratization as well as the enduring legacy of the SNM over politics.
 
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Manafesto

[Cali Saleebaan][Migiurtinia]
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HalimoEnthusiast
Muse Bihi Ecnomic Jihad
He cancelled previous contracts awarded under Silanyo, including a 20-year contract concerning ownership of the Berbera Oil Terminal (favouring Trafigura) that had allowed six domestic companies to import oil jointly.79

Bihi also cancelled Somaliland's contracts with low-cost carriers between Dubai and Hargeisa (Fly Dubai and Air Arabia) which were owned and managed by opposition groups.

One way in which he sought to maintain control was by demanding majority shares for himself and his associates in companies doing business in the country, including in Dahabshiil's fibre optic initiative.81 Yet many of these initiatives, particularly those perceived as overt concessions to the Djiboutian state, were unsuccessful. As the rainbow coalition began to fracture, Musa Bihi began to rely even more on external legitimacy, most importantly from Djibouti
 
I follow prices across Somalia about once a month using FAO's Somalia portal. I was always surprised to see that the prices of imported goods in Northwest (Somaliland) are above the average of Somalia as a whole.

Keep in mind that Berbera port is larger in size and capacity than Bosaso and Mogadishu put together. It also imports for Ethiopia so it should have tremendous economies of scale compared to national ports like Bosaso, Mogadishu or a regional port like Kismayo.

Price of imported commodities
($USD)
Banadir (Mogadishu Port)
Northeast (Bosaso Port)
Northwest (Berbera Port)
Middle & Lower Juba (Kismayo Port)
Diesel Fuel (1 liter)​
$0.63​
$0.68​
$0.73​
$0.88​
Petrol Fuel (1 liter)​
$0.71​
$0.74​
$0.79​
$1.00​
Wheat Flour (1 KG)​
$0.54​
$0.70​
$0.65​
$0.71​
Wheat Grain (1 KG)​
$0.68​
$0.91​
$0.70​
$0.76​
Rice (1 KG)​
$0.50​
$0.71​
$0.83​
$0.70​
Sugar (1 KG)​
$0.56​
$0.72​
$0.75​
$0.78​
Vegetable oil (1 liter)​
$1.48​
$1.68​
$1.73​
$1.81​
Cost of imported goods basket
$5.10
$6.14
$6.18
$6.64

And yet prices in Somaliland are roughly comparable to prices in Bosaso or even Kismayo, and substantially higher than Mogadishu. This should not be possible given Berbera's size and geographic advantage. The only explanation is that the government of Somaliland is allowing big merchants to extract extra profit from their own people. Prices in Northwest should be about 25-30% lower than they are. Massive extraction is going on.

FAO Market Update


Inflation:

Somali Shilling (SOS)-using areas: Consumer Price Index (CPI) slightly increased (2%) in September 2021 compared to August in northeast and southern regions but increased mildly (4%) in central regions. Compared to the five-year average for September (2016-2020), CPI increased (16-33%) across all regions of Somalia due to higher prices of sorghum (the main local cereal used in the consumption basket) and increases in imported food prices this year.

Somaliland Shilling (SLS)-using areas: CPI remained stable in northwest regions in September 2021 compared to August 2021. However, CPI increased (7%) in northwest regions compared to the five year average for September (2016-2020).



Exchange rate:

SOS-using areas: Exchange rates between SOS and the United States Dollar (USD) remained relatively stable in most regions of Somalia in September 2021 compared to August. Compared to the five-year average, SOS depreciated at moderate rates (6-12%) in central and southern regions of the country in September 2021. However, SOS depreciated significantly against the USD in northeast region (38%) due to continued circulation of large amount of locally printed SOS currency notes in these markets in recent years.

SISh-using areas: the exchange rate between SLS and USD was stable in September 2021 but appreciated slightly (-4%) compared to five-year average (2016-2020) for September.



Local cereal (white maize, red sorghum and white sorghum prices):

Local cereal prices mostly exhibited mild changes (≤ ±7%) in most regions of the country in September 2021 compared to the previous month. Specifically, white maize prices remained stable in Banadir and Juba Valley and (0-1%) but decreased mildly in Shabelle (12%). Red sorghum prices increased in September in northeast (4%) and Sorghum Belt (4%) while white sorghum prices increased in Hiran (2%) and northwest (7%). These increases can be attributed to reduced market supply because of low carryover stock from recent consecutive poor harvests. Similarly, compared to the five-year averages for September (2016-2020), local cereal prices in September 2021 were higher (10-54%) in most regions due to reduced supply this year. Specifically, white maize prices increased in Banadir (17%), Juba (41%) and Shabelle (40%); red sorghum prices increased in central (15%), northeast (47%) and Sorghum Belt (54%); while white sorghum prices increased in northwest (14%) and Hiran (41%).


Prices of imported food items

(rice, sugar, vegetable oil, wheat flour) exhibited mild (≤ ±10%) changes (mostly increases) in September 2021 compared to a month ago across most regions of Somalia. Compared to the five-year average, prices of most food imports were higher in most regions of Somalia mainly: southern regions (6-26% for rice, 3-25% for sugar, 48-67% for vegetable oil and 17-29% for wheat flour); central regions (23% for rice, 19% for sugar, 38% for vegetable oil and 28% for wheat flour); and northwest (20% for rice, 0% for sugar, 15% for vegetable oil and 7% for wheat flour). These price increases are mainly due to rising food prices on the international market this year. However, price of imported items were significantly higher compared to the five-year averages in northeast markets (52% for rice, 34% for sugar, 90% for vegetable oil and 53% for wheat flour). This is mainly due to depreciation of the local SOS currency as well as rising food prices on the international market this year.


Livestock (local quality goat and camel)

Prices mostly increased at mild rate (≤ ±10%) in September 2021 compared to August 2021. However, compared to the five-year average, livestock prices are still higher in most regions of Somalia: south (8-23%), central (6-21%) and northwest (6- 9%). Price increases were even higher in northeast regions (47-49%) due to the loss of purchasing value of the local currency this year. Milk prices (camel and cattle) mostly increased at mild rates (≤ ±10%) in September 2021 compared to a month ago in most regions of the country due to reduced milk availability due to drought conditions that prevailed in most regions. Compared to the five-year average for September (2016- 2020), cattle milk prices mostly exhibited mild to moderate increases in south (4-21%) and central (9%) regions but mildly lower in northwest (3%) and northeast (11%) regions. On the other hand, camel milk prices exhibited mild increases across most regions (≤ ±5%) in September. Compared the five-year average for September (2016-2020), camel milk prices mostly exhibited increases in south (5-21%) and northeast (8%) but decreased in northwest (3%) and central (17).


Labour (unskilled) wages

Remained relatively stable or changed at mild rates (≤± 9%; mostly increases) in most regions across the country in September 2021 compared to a month ago. Compared to the five-year average, labor wages are higher (3-55%) in most regions in September 2021. However, labour wage rates were stable in Juba and slightly lower (2%) in the northwest in September 2021 compared to the five-year averages.


Terms of Trade (ToT)


Between daily labour wage and cereals either remained stable or changed by ±1kg across all regions in September 2021 compared to a month ago. Compared to the five-year average for September (2016-2020), ToT between daily labor and cereals mostly declined (1-4kgs) in most regions attributable to higher cereal prices this year. However, ToT was slightly higher in central and northeast (+ 1kg) compared to the five-year averages.

ToT between local quality goat and cereal prices exhibited a mixed trend in September 2021 across the country. TOT was stable in Sorghum Belt, decreased in Juba (1%), Banadir (3%) and northeast (5%) but increased in central (5%) and northwest (7%). On the other hand, compared to the five-year average for September (2016-2020), the ToT between local quality goat and cereals was lower (1-28%) in most regions of the country attributable to higher cereal prices this year.

juba.jpg


Bay Bakool Gedo Hiiran.jpg


Shabelle.jpg

Banadir.jpg

centrl.jpg

North E.jpg
North w.jpg
 

repo

Recess
VIP
This is the first "academic" FKD paper written by naag caddan I have ever read 😂😂😂
She humiliated you from start to finish. It was a who's who of who violated HY. The replies were cringe worthy, they did was the same as you, they kept calling her cadaan.

 
She humiliated you from start to finish. It was a who's who of who violated HY. The replies were cringe worthy, they did was the same as you, they kept calling her cadaan.

Just so you know my sub was responsible for ending the civil war when Cigaal approached my elders and we supported his party UDUB and his successor Riyaale with funding coming from my family guess she's right that we're oligarchy cooperate state :icon lol::icon lol:
 

Duchess

HRH Duchess of Puntland, The Viscount of Garoowe
VIP





So basically Somaliland is Djibouti’s playground? I’m not surprised. During the recent Somaliland “elections”, Kulmiye were caught repurposing unused RPP ( Ismail Omar Geele’s political party) merch.

 

Thegoodshepherd

Galkacyo iyo Calula dhexdood
Staff Member
FAO Market Update


Inflation:

Somali Shilling (SOS)-using areas: Consumer Price Index (CPI) slightly increased (2%) in September 2021 compared to August in northeast and southern regions but increased mildly (4%) in central regions. Compared to the five-year average for September (2016-2020), CPI increased (16-33%) across all regions of Somalia due to higher prices of sorghum (the main local cereal used in the consumption basket) and increases in imported food prices this year.

Somaliland Shilling (SLS)-using areas: CPI remained stable in northwest regions in September 2021 compared to August 2021. However, CPI increased (7%) in northwest regions compared to the five year average for September (2016-2020).



Exchange rate:

SOS-using areas: Exchange rates between SOS and the United States Dollar (USD) remained relatively stable in most regions of Somalia in September 2021 compared to August. Compared to the five-year average, SOS depreciated at moderate rates (6-12%) in central and southern regions of the country in September 2021. However, SOS depreciated significantly against the USD in northeast region (38%) due to continued circulation of large amount of locally printed SOS currency notes in these markets in recent years.

SISh-using areas: the exchange rate between SLS and USD was stable in September 2021 but appreciated slightly (-4%) compared to five-year average (2016-2020) for September.



Local cereal (white maize, red sorghum and white sorghum prices):

Local cereal prices mostly exhibited mild changes (≤ ±7%) in most regions of the country in September 2021 compared to the previous month. Specifically, white maize prices remained stable in Banadir and Juba Valley and (0-1%) but decreased mildly in Shabelle (12%). Red sorghum prices increased in September in northeast (4%) and Sorghum Belt (4%) while white sorghum prices increased in Hiran (2%) and northwest (7%). These increases can be attributed to reduced market supply because of low carryover stock from recent consecutive poor harvests. Similarly, compared to the five-year averages for September (2016-2020), local cereal prices in September 2021 were higher (10-54%) in most regions due to reduced supply this year. Specifically, white maize prices increased in Banadir (17%), Juba (41%) and Shabelle (40%); red sorghum prices increased in central (15%), northeast (47%) and Sorghum Belt (54%); while white sorghum prices increased in northwest (14%) and Hiran (41%).


Prices of imported food items

(rice, sugar, vegetable oil, wheat flour) exhibited mild (≤ ±10%) changes (mostly increases) in September 2021 compared to a month ago across most regions of Somalia. Compared to the five-year average, prices of most food imports were higher in most regions of Somalia mainly: southern regions (6-26% for rice, 3-25% for sugar, 48-67% for vegetable oil and 17-29% for wheat flour); central regions (23% for rice, 19% for sugar, 38% for vegetable oil and 28% for wheat flour); and northwest (20% for rice, 0% for sugar, 15% for vegetable oil and 7% for wheat flour). These price increases are mainly due to rising food prices on the international market this year. However, price of imported items were significantly higher compared to the five-year averages in northeast markets (52% for rice, 34% for sugar, 90% for vegetable oil and 53% for wheat flour). This is mainly due to depreciation of the local SOS currency as well as rising food prices on the international market this year.


Livestock (local quality goat and camel)

Prices mostly increased at mild rate (≤ ±10%) in September 2021 compared to August 2021. However, compared to the five-year average, livestock prices are still higher in most regions of Somalia: south (8-23%), central (6-21%) and northwest (6- 9%). Price increases were even higher in northeast regions (47-49%) due to the loss of purchasing value of the local currency this year. Milk prices (camel and cattle) mostly increased at mild rates (≤ ±10%) in September 2021 compared to a month ago in most regions of the country due to reduced milk availability due to drought conditions that prevailed in most regions. Compared to the five-year average for September (2016- 2020), cattle milk prices mostly exhibited mild to moderate increases in south (4-21%) and central (9%) regions but mildly lower in northwest (3%) and northeast (11%) regions. On the other hand, camel milk prices exhibited mild increases across most regions (≤ ±5%) in September. Compared the five-year average for September (2016-2020), camel milk prices mostly exhibited increases in south (5-21%) and northeast (8%) but decreased in northwest (3%) and central (17).


Labour (unskilled) wages

Remained relatively stable or changed at mild rates (≤± 9%; mostly increases) in most regions across the country in September 2021 compared to a month ago. Compared to the five-year average, labor wages are higher (3-55%) in most regions in September 2021. However, labour wage rates were stable in Juba and slightly lower (2%) in the northwest in September 2021 compared to the five-year averages.


Terms of Trade (ToT)


Between daily labour wage and cereals either remained stable or changed by ±1kg across all regions in September 2021 compared to a month ago. Compared to the five-year average for September (2016-2020), ToT between daily labor and cereals mostly declined (1-4kgs) in most regions attributable to higher cereal prices this year. However, ToT was slightly higher in central and northeast (+ 1kg) compared to the five-year averages.

ToT between local quality goat and cereal prices exhibited a mixed trend in September 2021 across the country. TOT was stable in Sorghum Belt, decreased in Juba (1%), Banadir (3%) and northeast (5%) but increased in central (5%) and northwest (7%). On the other hand, compared to the five-year average for September (2016-2020), the ToT between local quality goat and cereals was lower (1-28%) in most regions of the country attributable to higher cereal prices this year.

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68 iq confusing absolute change and relative change.
 

Manafesto

[Cali Saleebaan][Migiurtinia]
VIP
HalimoEnthusiast
The hardcore HA Qaldaan from Twitter responds back to Drs Claire.


Abdi Daud

Anchoring on My Uncles’ Fairy Tales


Fadhi-ku-dirir (fighting while sitting) is a term used to describe political arguments between Somalilanders which employ rumours and supremacist clan-based fairy tales. Belligerent in nature, fadhi-ku-dirir is merely for entertainment and for the sake of argument itself. From a young age, I was told, don’t take your uncle’s fairy tales seriously.

However, no one has told that to Claire Elders in her latest article in the reputable International Affairs journal. In this blog, I will explain how such a scientific paper does not even meet the standards of a news article let alone peer-reviewed journals. It is an insult not to Somaliland but to science and research methods. If Claire or the publisher did not take corrective actions, it will damage the reputation of the International Affairs journal.

By recycling her elite based criticism in Somalia and some outdated research from the 90s, the author highlighted the undeniable relative oligarchy and peaceocracy in Somaliland. Reading the first paragraphs, I was happy and satisfied that at last someone is criticizing our politics without looking through the lends of clans. Unfortunately, that joy did not last as the author has jumped into the mud of tribal rhetorics which revealed major flaws in the author’s understanding of Somaliland’s civil wars history. A misunderstanding that in part explains the author’s over-exaggeration of oligarchy in Somaliland.


Misunderstanding of Somaliland’s Civil War


The author starts her alternative narrative by saying the Garhajis clan outnumbers other clans. Anyone who works with Somaliland people knows that every major clan claims to be the most populous. There is no census that has ever been conducted to answer that. Even the British Somaliland’s records were based on guesstimates based on the dia group numbers which did not take into account the fact clans pay dia differently. The author could have said instead: “the perceived domination of Garhajis clan by its leaders has led to so and so”. Even then, this narration is dead on arrival. The Somaliland clan structure makes it impossible for any clan to oppress and target another even the least `populous` clan. Except for the Gabooye, every other clan enjoys a relative local majority within its traditional territory. In this country, no clan can oppress another and so it does not really matter who is more populous than who unless in a Fadhi-ku-dirir session which I am not interested in.



The author then built on top of this fairy tale by linking ‘domination of Garhajis’ to some inherited colonial-era privileges. In every turn of this fairy tale, there is an amount of anchoring, bias and absolutism. Didn’t the British hand over Somaliland after independence to a non-Garhajis prime minister? Didn’t the author herself and others describe the union with Somalia as long and leading to loss of power to all Somalilanders? What privileges existed and then survived all that time and events? A double fallacy.

Back to the civil war. It was not about Garhajis domination. It was about any clan’s domination. If the first president of Somaliland was from any other clan, the same events would have occurred. Coming from a liberation war, any SNM leader governing Somaliland on the first day would think that through the loyalty of his clan, he can make changes without any consensus or help from the elders. That is the lesson from Somaliland civil wars, delegating the power of negotiation to the Guurti to build the nation. Also, the other lesson is to not use our clan as a source of executive power. Later, Egal managed to successfully create the identity of Somaliland institutions when he turned against his own clan members from the SNM by replacing them with Garhajis clan members. Speaking about oligarchy, this refutes the whole premise of the paper at least during that period. Egal’s civic nationalism has led to an alliance of leaders that were fighting against each other in the civil war. Compare that to the American oligarchy with Clintons and the Bushs!


Dahir Riyaale and the Guurti Sacrifice


This takes me to talk about a major event in Somaliland history where for the first time a non-elite Khat trader from the Samaroon clan becomes a president. The author is prematurely dismissive of this event calling it “accidental”. There are several counterarguments here: President Dahir Riyaale was re-elected, he is the longest-serving president in the past 2 decades and he maintained the alliance with Garhajis elites. This is enough to dismiss the alleged oligarchy during that period as well. However, here is the main counter-argument: it was not accidental. As per Somaliland’s constitution, if a president is unelected (Egal) and he dies, the next person in power is the head of the parliament which was at that time: Sh Ibrahim Sh Madar. The Guurti of Somaliland however (the alleged oligarchy elite) has chosen Riyaale instead. Sheikh Ibrahim proposed that he would voluntarily forsake the position for Riyaale to become the president in the interest of the country which stunned the then Speaker Qaybe and deputy speaker Jirde. Qaybe has on several occasions later expressed his admiration for the Sheikh's wise decision and statesmanship. The Guurti saw this would help in Somaliland for all (Somaliland la wada leeyahay) through actions and not slogans.

Siilaanyo and the new parties


In 2012, president Siilaanyo amended the electoral law. This allowed new parties to participate in national elections once every 10 years. The author mentions that new party participation was frozen since 2002, which is simply not true. Claire should have taken an interview with me as I was a Qaran supporter in 2010 following my father a Habar Awal who was a leader in Qaran which was headed by a Garhajis leader Dr Gaboose. The Irony was that we met with Abdirahman Ciro, speaker of the parliament and Garhajis supporting Dahir Riyale at the time. Ciro rejected the idea of opening new parties and said it was against the constitution, which wasn’t true. Later Ciro will be the one who will benefit from us (Qaran) when Kulmiye opens the new parties and opportunistic Ciro creates Wadani which replaces Udub. These events refute the whole narrative of Claire that Somaliland elites work against other’s clans or that political parties were frozen in 2002. The struggle of Qaran (many of its leaders were jailed) and the vision of President Siilaanyo were another example of how Somaliland kept its oligarchy at bay.

Bihi and Djibouti


From the Garhajis/Wadani based narrative, it is clear that Claire focused on only the arguments from Wadani instead of looking at Somaliland as a whole. Somaliland dual national companies in Djibouti and Somaliland were not alone in funding elections campaigns. For example, why would the author mention SomCable and not Telesom which supported Udub against Siilaanyo? Using the same arguments, one can say Telesom undermined Somaliland democracy since a Mogadishu businessman holding a majority shareholder in Telesom has funded UDUB so it wins a government fibre deal. This is a partisan and tribal view which is a common theme in the article. Omitting the other actors gives a false perception of the degree of oligarchy in Somalilland.


Read more at the link below.​
 
So basically Somaliland is Djibouti’s playground? I’m not surprised. During the recent Somaliland “elections”, Kulmiye were caught repurposing unused RPP ( Ismail Omar Geele’s political party) merch.

No, It is rather SL being playground of issaq businessman gang ( mainly Habar Awal) operating in both countries under the protection of Djibouti first lady.
 
This report is surprisingly accurate how did this women have access to such information is beyond me.

The details oddly specific. This is some insider espionage shit.
 

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