New Faith Survey in Türkiye: Strong Religious Devotion Despite Decades of Secularism

[AMusee]

Over the last year or so, MuslimSkeptic readers would have seen what could be described as a demographic analysis of trends in religiosity throughout the Muslim Ummah, having covered the Arab world (see, for example, here, here, here and here)—including even the Arab youth—; the youth of the Nusantara, i.e., Indonesia and Malaysia; and at least one Central Asian country, Kazakhstan. (Though the Islamic revival in Central Asia deserves an entire dedicated article of its own.)

We are now also able to analyze the trends in Türkiye as well, thanks to a report released a few days ago: “Faith and Religiosity in Türkiye” (the PDF file is available via the link).

It has been released by the “Population and Social Policies Application and Research Center” of Marmara University (in Istanbul) and was compiled by the vice-director of the center, Dr. Zübeyir Nişancı.

All of the other academics that are involved in the research project are also Turkish and are affiliated with the Ibn Haldun University (also based in Istanbul) and the International Institute of Islamic Thought.

The actual report consists of 216 pages, but, in sha’ Allah, we’ll be focusing on some specific findings within the report which are of a greater interest to us.

Before we begin, however, it must be noted that the opening chapter is an extensive introduction, detailing the scope and method of the study. It strongly asserts that the study is nationally representative, with particular attention given to “participant confidence” and “survey participation rates” as well as the quality and standardization of the questions.

We read (pp.9-10):

The present report summarizes the results of the Turkish Faith and Religiosity Survey (TFRS), conducted between December 2021 and May 2022. The data for this report was collected through a random sampling of 1,942 individuals aged 18 and over in 12 regions of Türkiye at the Statistical Region Classification Level 1 (NUTS1), representing both rural and urban populations in proportion. Using graphs, tables, and maps, the report presents the distribution of various dimensions of religious beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors among the adult population in terms of gender, age group, education level, rural-urban residence, and geographical region.
The TFRS Project aims to achieve two main goals. The first is to examine the statistical distribution of common beliefs and religious practices in Türkiye with a more comprehensive and consistent methodological approach than previous studies. The second goal is to evaluate the efficacy of new methods for collecting reliable data in large-scale sociological and statistical studies in Türkiye.
In the pursuit of the first objective, care was taken to avoid common methodological errors that are prevalent in current research on religiosity. A significant issue that has been identified in this regard pertains to the use of flawed questionnaires in determining the distributions of religious beliefs, practices, and attitudes. Specifically, many current studies employ complex questions that are prone to elicit socially desirable responses, thereby introducing bias into the data. Furthermore, a notable proportion of current research focuses on the political dimensions of religiosity, rather than making a concerted effort to comprehensively understand religious beliefs and practices. This narrow focus detracts from the ability to gain a holistic understanding of common religious beliefs, practices, and attitudes.
To address the limitations of previous surveys, the TFRS survey questions were developed by the research team in consultation with academic experts. This process involved a thorough review of relevant local and international surveys over the course of approximately one year. In order to standardize the structure of the questions and response options, the research team considered the potential for statistical data analysis and the limitations inherent in the use of the questions. The survey contained approximately 200 questions covering various dimensions of religious beliefs, attitudes, and practices. Standardizing the response categories allowed for the examination of various aspects not directly explored in the research through the use of methods such as factor analysis.
It is well-recognized that topics related to social life are particularly prone to eliciting social desirability bias. This is especially true for issues surrounding faith and religiosity, which have the potential to create social segregation and conflict. Therefore, in research on these topics, it is likely that participants will provide responses that are influenced by a desire to conform to social expectations. In order to mitigate this bias in the present study, efforts were made to avoid statements that could be perceived as challenging the participants’ beliefs and attitudes, in order to minimize the likelihood of socially desirable responses.
In order to enhance the participation rate of the research, certain methods were implemented. Specifically, innovative field application techniques were devised to allow for comfortable and pressure-free responses to the survey questions. To facilitate this, a digital questionnaire form was created and administered electronically. Participants who were contacted in person were given the option to complete the questionnaire electronically, either immediately or at a later time, while those who were unable or unwilling to do so were interviewed instead. This approach aimed to strike a balance between the existing practices and the need for participant comfort and convenience.

Now, let’s move on to the actual findings of the report.

Belief in God Is the Norm​

The report begins with the issue of “Belief in God,” along with the following graph (p.28):

94.3% are theists, and within the remaining 5.7% of non-believers (as the reports put it), 2.5% are what we’d refer to as agnostics. Only a mere 1.5% are actual atheists.

This means that, despite all the claims and investments of New Atheists, atheists remain a small minority even among non-believers.

RELATED: The Genius of Islam | Episode 2, Dark Truths About the Atheist Mind

As for the believing 94.3%, 85.7% have firm belief, with “no doubts about it.” This is quite remarkable, especially considering that, for decades, the ruling ideology in Türkiye has been Kemalism. And, as everyone knows, Kemalism is basically State-enforced secularism. In fact, it is the most militant form of secularism too, modeled on the French concept of laïcité.

It demonstrates the internal resistance offered by Islam as a way of life that, despite the State (and thus the education system, the media and so on) pushing for secularism, the population somehow still manages to resist and remain firm. This is to the extent that even Türkiye, perhaps the most secularized Sunni-majority nation in the world, may very well be less secular than the most Christian nation in the West.

The power of Islam in society is such that İsmet Özel, once an influential Marxist ideologue, eventually came back to Islam and is now considered to be some sort of “Islamist.” You’ll scarcely find such “radical conversions” in the contemporary secularized West, which denotes Christianity’s inability to attract people towards it and persuade them of its “truth.”

A Religious Youth​

Here’s another interesting graph (p.29):

It’s understandable that the youth would be less religious than the older generations. This seems to be linked to their way of life (centered around hedonism); their consumption of pop-culture; and more. Yet even among the 18-24 demographic it is still a staggering 89%.

Contrast this with the religiosity trends in the West, where millennials (born 1981-1996) and gen Z (born after millennials) aren’t exactly known to be religiously inclined. In the United States, for example, as per a survey last year by the American Survey Center, more than a third (34%) of gen Z are “religiously unaffiliated” (compared to 29% for millennials), with 9% being agnostic and 9% being atheists.

Basically, the youth within what is perhaps the most secularized Sunni-majority nation are more religious—incomparably so, we might add!—than the youth in what is perhaps one of the most Christian Western nations.

RELATED: American Christians: Are They Actually Christian?

 

[AMusee]

Decadent Cities?​

Let’s take a look at another graph which breaks down the statistics based on geographic regions (p.31):

Anatolia’s reputation as a stronghold of traditional Islam seems to be well-earned.

The Aegean region has the highest percentage of non-believers, at 11%, and you’ll often hear both Turks and foreigners referring to cities like İzmir as being “as decadent as European cities.”

Yet, this actually seems to be somewhat of an exaggeration. You’d struggle to find any major European urban center or agglomeration with a religiosity rate of 89% or, as is the case with Istanbul, 90%.

So when we hear or talk of “Western decadence” in Turkish cities—or cities from other Muslim-majority societies—we must keep in mind that it’s relative. It is precise because Islam places such high standards for a society that “decadence” is determined very quickly, often when a society turns into a tourist location.

“Non-Belief Is Not as High as Predicted”​

This time, rather than sufficing with a graph, let us quote directly from the analysis (pp.31-32):

In the online perception survey designed to compare TFRS findings with estimates of the prevalence of belief and religious practices in Türkiye, participants were asked to report on the proportion of respondents in Türkiye who identified as belonging to one of the following categories: “I have no belief in God”, “I don’t know whether there is a God and I don’t believe there is any way to find out”, and “I don’t believe in a personal God, but do believe in a Higher Power of some kind”.
According to the results presented in Chart 1, most participants in this study estimated the prevalence rate of non-believers in Türkiye to fall within the range of 10-20%. The overall average estimate was 25.5%. However, these estimates are significantly higher than the rate of non-belief in Türkiye, as reported by the TFRS findings, which is 5.7% (as depicted in Figure 1).

It’s not only in Türkiye. If you were to ask a Westerner—or, in fact, even a Muslim—about their estimation of non-belief in Türkiye, they’d more than likely also give you a particularly high estimate. Yet, in actuality, it’s only in the field of around 5%, which is relatively low for a country with such “development” or HDI and very low considering the history of Kemalism within the country.

RELATED: Turkey and Israel Restore Full Diplomatic Relations: Kemalism and Zionism

Women Are More Religious​

Now, back to the graphs (p.34):

The female demographic is thus (slightly) more religious than men. On page 40 for example, we learn that more women pray five times a day than men do (40% to 37%); on page 45, we see that they’re also more observant of fasting during Ramadan (77% to 74%); and on page 50, we discover that 73% of Turkish women wear a headscarf, including those who wear it irregularly, while 48% wear it “always” (when you’re aware of the history of the headscarf in the country, these findings becomes even more intriguing).

RELATED: [WATCH] DEBATE: Is Hijab Good or Evil? Muslim vs. Feminist

This was an interesting point to bring up, because apparently “Islam oppresses women,” yet somehow women never see it this way. Funny how that works.

Consider also the following statistics:

 

[AMusee]

Muslim Identity Is the Most Important​

This is another very interesting graph with some added context (p.84):

As part of the TFRS study, participants were asked to rate their proximity to various identity categories in order to better understand how individuals in Türkiye related themselves with major identity categories. These categories included “Muslim,” “Nationalist,” “Islamist,” “Ataturkist” (Ataturkçü), “Religious,” “Secular” (Laik), “Sunni,” “Humanist,” “Rightist,” “Conservative” (Muhafazakar), “Socialist,” “Leftist,” “Feminist,” “LGBT+ rights advocate,” “Alevi,” “Deist,” and “Atheist,” and were rated on a scale from 1 (farthest) to 5 (closest). The results of this analysis are depicted in Figure 52, which displays the distribution of respondents’ degree of proximity to the various identity categories in Türkiye.

So the identity that most Turks feel the greatest proximity to and identify the most with is their Muslim identity.

Furthermore, 80% describe their degree of proximity with their Muslim identity as the highest, whereas it’s 55% with the next one, which is their nation. That’s a difference of 25%.

This is quite a significant number when you consider that the subsequent identity categories only differ by a few percent thereafter.

Another statistic that deserves some attention is the fact that the percentage of Turks identifying with Islamism and Kemalism is very similar (53%). Most would probably have assumed that the Kemalist identity would be much higher than the Islamist identity.

It also means that, in a way, nationalism within Türkiye is becoming “post-Kemalist.”

The fact that the Muslim identity (80%) is way above the Sunni identity (50%) is quite perplexing, since, on page 33 it was shown that 62% identify with the Hanafi madhhab and 9% with the Shafi’i madhhab, which makes it 71% identifying with normative Sunni Islam, with 15% selecting “none” (as for the remaining, Alawis were at 3% and almost 10% just didn’t want to answer). This is likely due to many of the simple Muslim layfolk not having studied the details of their madhhab, etc., especially where one madhhab is completely dominant and just seen as the norm.

Unsurprisingly, most Turks reject Leftism (65%). This shows that a major party such as the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) banks more on its ethnic minority (mainly Kurdish) vote than it does on its leftist ideals.

Also worthy of note: Turks reject feminism (66%); they reject LGBTQ+ activism very strongly (81%); and they reject atheism even more strongly (93%), which is in fact the foremost rejected identity among Turks.

Final Words​

We could go on and continue dissecting the findings of the report, but we can generally conclude by saying, al-hamdu lillah—All praise is for Allah alone.

Al-hamdu lillah, the vast majority of civil society within Türkiye remains committed to Islam.

Of course, there’s always room for betterment. I’m not denying that.

We could be cynical and say that we’ll never be satisfied until parameters like belief in God; religious practices (such as prayer); etc., attain 100%. However, we must once again remind our readers that Turkey, as the most forcefully secularized Sunni-majority nation, is a very unique case in the Muslim Ummah.

We thus ask Allah, Mighty and Majestic is He, to strengthen the Iman (faith) and ‘Ibadah (worship) of our brothers and sisters in Türkiye; and to transform the undecided non-believers into firm, committed believers. Amin.

RELATED: Mustafa Kemal Ataturk: The Man Who Tried to Destroy Islam

https://muslimskeptic.com/2023/03/28/faith-survey-turkiye/

 

[Thegoodshepherd]

It is very informative.
Good to see the utter failure of Kemalism's goal of destroying the Muslim character of Turkey.
Islam is the only thing that can help bind together the Kurds and Turks in the future and people like Erdogan can see that. The ethno-nationalist Kemalists are too stupid to see this.

 

[SPMLegend]

Bright Turkish kid explaining Shariah

 

[Omar del Sur]

Bright Turkish kid explaining Shariah

btw I just want to mention for people- if you click on captions, you can do autotranslate into English and it seems to be giving a somewhat good translation of what he's saying

 

[tyrannicalmanager]

many apostates and secularist were delighted when the previous survey showed a decline in Religiosity.