Historical context: Which way to the sea?
Ethiopia has been landlocked and has sought a sea outlet intermittently for most of her history, at least since the Middle Ages. In 1776, Edward Gibbon, a renowned English historian, wrote: βEncompassed on all sides by the enemies of their religion, the Ethiopians slept near thousand years, forgetful of the world by whom they were forgotten.β6 Moreover, encouraged by the scramble for Africa among rival European powers in the nineteenth century, Emperor Menelik II of Ethiopia intensified his search for access to the sea. In 1878, in a letter to the heads of the governments of Italy, France, Germany, and England, he stated, βMy road to the coast, to Zeila, Tojura, and Aden is at present closed by the Muslims.β7
Before 1952, when Eritrea (a former Italian colony on the Red Sea) was federated with Ethiopia, the eyes of Ethiopiaβs leaders were fixated on the Eritrean port of Assab and the Somali port of Zeila, both on the Red Sea.8 Menelikβs efforts ended in failure. However, Emperor Haile Selassie, who ruled Ethiopia from 1930 to 1974, relentlessly sought to gain sea access. In a letter to the United Nations in 1948, he wrote: βPrior to the race of European powers to divide up Africa, Ethiopia included an extensive coastline along the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean.β9 Haile Selassie tried to annex Zeila, a historical Somali port town, to Ethiopia between the late 1920s and early 1950s. To secure Zeila, he initiated a radical strategy of negotiating colonial power to exchange the Haud region for Zeila, which the current MoU is said to be centered
on, and which is adjacent to Djibouti. Haud is a large swath of Somali territory and has been part of present-day Ethiopia since the Anglo-Ethiopian treaty of 1897 when Britain ceded it to Ethiopia for the latterβs support in suppressing Somali clans.10 That attempt failed, primarily because, based on strategic interests, the colonial powersβ particularly Britain and Ethiopiaβfailed to reach an agreement. There was also fear of repercussions from Somalis in those areas.11
Recommendations
For Somalia:
For Somaliland:
For Ethiopia:
For the International Community:
For All Parties:
Ethiopia has been landlocked and has sought a sea outlet intermittently for most of her history, at least since the Middle Ages. In 1776, Edward Gibbon, a renowned English historian, wrote: βEncompassed on all sides by the enemies of their religion, the Ethiopians slept near thousand years, forgetful of the world by whom they were forgotten.β6 Moreover, encouraged by the scramble for Africa among rival European powers in the nineteenth century, Emperor Menelik II of Ethiopia intensified his search for access to the sea. In 1878, in a letter to the heads of the governments of Italy, France, Germany, and England, he stated, βMy road to the coast, to Zeila, Tojura, and Aden is at present closed by the Muslims.β7
Before 1952, when Eritrea (a former Italian colony on the Red Sea) was federated with Ethiopia, the eyes of Ethiopiaβs leaders were fixated on the Eritrean port of Assab and the Somali port of Zeila, both on the Red Sea.8 Menelikβs efforts ended in failure. However, Emperor Haile Selassie, who ruled Ethiopia from 1930 to 1974, relentlessly sought to gain sea access. In a letter to the United Nations in 1948, he wrote: βPrior to the race of European powers to divide up Africa, Ethiopia included an extensive coastline along the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean.β9 Haile Selassie tried to annex Zeila, a historical Somali port town, to Ethiopia between the late 1920s and early 1950s. To secure Zeila, he initiated a radical strategy of negotiating colonial power to exchange the Haud region for Zeila, which the current MoU is said to be centered
on, and which is adjacent to Djibouti. Haud is a large swath of Somali territory and has been part of present-day Ethiopia since the Anglo-Ethiopian treaty of 1897 when Britain ceded it to Ethiopia for the latterβs support in suppressing Somali clans.10 That attempt failed, primarily because, based on strategic interests, the colonial powersβ particularly Britain and Ethiopiaβfailed to reach an agreement. There was also fear of repercussions from Somalis in those areas.11
Recommendations
For Somalia:
- It is imperative that Somalia actively assert its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Enhanced engagement with Somaliland is necessary, acknowledging the deep-seated aspirations for secession among some segments while aiming for a resolution that respects the collective will of all Somali people. Discussions should be approached with a vision for unity that accommodates diverse aspirations through inclusive governance, potentially offering broad autonomy to Somaliland. This approach would address fears of marginalization while preserving national unity and promoting cooperation.
For Somaliland:
- Somaliland needs to recognize that not all communities within its territory support secession. Negotiations should be guided by realism and pragmatism, aiming for an agreement that addresses Somalilandβs legitimate concerns while acknowledging the benefits of a united Somalia. This requires moving beyond the zero-sum mentality that has prevailed over the last thirty years.
For Ethiopia:
- Ethiopiaβs demand for βsea accessβ does not justify infringing upon the sovereignty of another nation. Ethiopia is a landlocked country, and demanding territorial waters, a naval base, and a commercial port that belong to another country is an act of aggression. This could result in a prolonged conflict with Somalis both within Somalia and in the diaspora, as well as within Ethiopia itself. History has shown that Somalis have defended their territory against Ethiopian advances, notably forcing a retreat in 2006. Further, any attempt by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed to cross into Somalia could significantly bolster al-Shabaab in a manner reminiscent of the groupβs emergence following Ethiopiaβs previous military ventures, which ended in failure.
For the International Community:
- The international community must extend beyond mere affirmations of Somaliaβs territorial integrity to actively discourage any actions that threaten Somaliaβs sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity. A firmer stance against Prime Minister Abiy Ahmedβs aggression is required, one that emphasizes the need to respect international laws and norms. Diplomatic pressure, along with offers of mediation and support for dialogue, should be pursued vigorously, as heightened nationalism and fear have created a conducive environment for conflict.
For All Parties:
- International organizations such as the United Nations, African Union, Arab League, and Intergovernmental Authority on Development must recognize that the Memorandum of Understanding, as it stands, risks igniting an avoidable and unnecessary war. Such a conflict would likely result in the exponential and overnight metastasis of al-Shabaab, the largest and most resourceful Al-Qaeda affiliate in the Horn of Africa, and in the growth of ISIS, which has a foothold in Somalia. A cloud of war is hovering over the Horn, presenting a clear and present danger that necessitates action, not mere affirmation.