As AUSSOM funding dries up LSE paper suggests focusing on negotiations

[Itsnotthateasy]

Strategic updates

Identifying topics of emerging strategic importance in foreign policy.

www.lse.ac.uk

... this paper proposes reconceptualising AUSSOM as a critical tool for enabling productive negotiations between the FGS and Al Shabaab, by recognising that the mission’s greatest value is its ability to deter the group from making major military gains.

...resolving the mission’s funding challenges first requires re-conceptualising its value to improving peace and stability in Somalia, as a mission with clear and feasible objectives is more likely to elicit financial contributions... the primary objective of AMISOM—the degrading of Al Shabaab—was not fully attainable... AMISOM’s successor, the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), which took over in 2022, was similarly mandated to degrade the group with a view to handover security responsibilities to the FGS, despite the fact that this was clearly unfeasible.

The Funding Gap

Most importantly, the funding gap for AUSSOM remains large and could trigger changes in the mission and Somalia’s security, if it remains unfilled. Of the estimated $166.5 million of AUSSOM’s budget for 2025-2026, only $4.5 million is confirmed (UNSC, 2025). The AU has also attempted to mobilise $20 million from the AU’s Peace Fund (AUPSC, 2025). The UK has historically pledged between £10-£20 million per year and is expected to continue a similar level of support.16 The EU has provisionally earmarked €60 million for Somalia from the European Peace Facility for the year but has yet to clarify how this will be divided between the AU and the SNA.17 Regardless, it would be a major decrease in their contribution. These commitments may cover around half the annual budget of the mission. They would not address the AU’s existing arrears of $93.9 million and liabilities for January-June of 2025 of $92 million (Beshah and Dersso, 2025). In this context, there is general agreement that there needs to be a donor conference to generate further pledges. The UK, as the penholder on Somalia at the UNSC, has sought to mobilise momentum for such an initiative, but finding a host and agreeing a date has proven challenging. Various diplomatic sources are also sceptical as to whether such an initiative will generate all the required funds.18 Even if a donor conference were to fill the gap for this year, the need to constantly generate funds in this way leaves the mission’s long-term financing uncertain.

 

[Itsnotthateasy]

The paper isn't convincing how AUSSOM could force negotiations where ATMIS and AMISOM failed. Seems like people are just saying anything to keep the cash cow going.

 

[El Nino]

AUSSOM as a critical tool for enabling productive negotiations between the FGS and Al Shabaab, by recognising that the mission’s greatest value is its ability to deter the group from making major military gains.

This is basically a roundabout way of saying lay down your arms and AU forces will exit the country.



AMISOM forces are not the major challenge for AS, its westerners. Without support from american airstrikes and EU paying and equipping the AU forces, AS would have already took over.

AS would have to stop being radicals and rebrand like Jolani after agreeing to a peace deal. I don’t think thats likely, but its very possible.

 

[Itsnotthateasy]

This is basically a roundabout way of saying lay down your arms and AU forces will exit the country.



AMISOM forces are not the major challenge for AS, its westerners. Without support from american airstrikes and EU paying and equipping the AU forces, AS would have already took over.

AS would have to stop being radicals and rebrand like Jolani after agreeing to a peace deal. I don’t think thats likely, but its very possible.

They used say they would degrade them to the point they were forced to negotiate. Now they want AU to defend only and stay forever? Where is the SNA in this equation. It's a grift.