US Central Intelligence Agency African Bulletin May 16, 1986 Somalia: Mohamed Siad Barre moves against his religious extremist opponents + President (Mohamed) Siad (Barre) launched a crackdown last month on Islamist leaders protesting the government's tight control over religious teachings, arresting about two dozen sheikhs from the north and two of Mogadishu's most important religious figures.
Siad has maintained tight control over Islamist activities since taking power in 1969, and the arrests reflect his growing concern about the potential spread of Islamic fundamentalism among the military and urban youth. Although fundamentalism itself is unlikely to threaten Siad's grip on power, it could undermine a regime already weakened by political, military and economic ills and Siad's crackdown could complicate relations with Saudi Arabia, a major aid donor and patron of Islam in Somalia. + Somalia's Islamic heritage: Nearly 99% of Somalis are Sunni Muslims, and the country's constitution states that Islam is the state religion. In the past, Islam was an important unifying factor for the Somali people and contributed to the development of national identity. An example of this is the Somali national hero Mohamed Hassan Abdullah, described as the “mad mullah” who led a 20-year jihad against the British colonial administration earlier this century, but the history and customs of the country’s nomadic tribes have limited the role of tradition.
Religious in daily life. According to academic sources, Somali tribes have long attached importance to the role and duties of the tribal warrior leader, in effect giving religious leaders a less valuable position in society. In addition, traditional Somali tribal rituals often conflict with strict Wahabbi Muslim observance, and today many Somalis do not submit to the full rigors of Wahabbi Islam's teachings. The 1969 coup that brought General Siad Barre to power further restricted Wahabbism influence.
Although the established regime condemned atheism and insisted that “scientific socialism” was compatible with Islam, Siad moved quickly to reinforce the separation of religious and secular power, criticized the Nasserite concept of Islamic socialism as a “tool” of neo-colonialism and capitalism, and strongly warned religious leaders against interference in politics. Government-sponsored seminars and training courses for religious leaders were organized to ensure that only Islamic doctrine consistent with the regime's ideology was taught.
The government's response to religious revival: According to the US Embassy in Mogadishu, a group of young sheikhs - some of whom received religious training in Iraq and Saudi Arabia - have risen to the forefront of once again challenging government control of religious activities. These sheikhs reportedly preach strict Islamic beliefs and are less inclined than the older generation of leaders to go along with government directives on politically acceptable interpretations of the Qur’an.
The US Embassy reported that senior government officials were concerned that the increasingly independent spirit of these leaders would attract urban youth, many of whom were unemployed and disaffected. As a precaution, Somali security forces were reportedly ordered several months ago to tighten their surveillance of religious leaders and all those who claim That Somalia must become more Islamic. The government's suspicions of growing religious unrest were confirmed in mid-April when demonstrations protesting Siad's control of religious sermons and teachings took place in several cities and Siad responded by arresting Islamist leaders in two northern cities and Mogadishu and expelling an Egyptian religious teacher.
In the capital, two of the city's most important Islamist leaders were reportedly arrested even though they did not participate in the demonstrations. In our opinion, Siad may have been concerned that they might denounce his movements and call for further protests and possibly violence, and the presidential bodyguard was already reinforced after the crackdown in case of a violent backlash. The government also fears that fundamentalism will spread to the already disaffected army - the main pillar of support for the regime. The regime recently warned Somali military personnel of the evils of religious fanaticism and called on officers to be particularly wary of extremist Islamic groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood. The government issued a circular in late 1985 to all military commands emphasizing the need for prior government approval of all religious sermons, services, and instructions in the armed forces.
Security officials are investigating possible links between recently arrested Islamist leaders and local opponents of the Siad regime, including forty military officers who were arrested on charges of plotting a coup in early April. The Saudi worker According to the US Embassy, Riyadh has aggressively promoted Islam in Somalia by funding the construction of mosques, establishing Quranic schools, and transporting Somali youth to Saudi Arabia for religious training. At the same time, the Saudis tried to use their significant economic influence as a major trading partner and aid donor to persuade Siad to ease government restrictions on Islam and establish Sharia law. Siad has deftly avoided making any major concessions to the Saudis, while at the same time managing to keep their economic aid flowing, but in recent months Riyadh has increased its public and private criticism of his religious policies.
Future prospects We believe that Islamic fundamentalism, despite its rise in Somalia, does not pose any direct threat to Siad's grip on power. Tribalism still dominates Somali society, and there is no evidence to suggest that religious fervor can transcend this deep-rooted trait, particularly in the military. In addition, Siad's apparent willingness to act quickly—and often proactively—against suspected religious leaders will likely deter any significant growth of fundamentalism in the near term. However, fundamentalism can attract sectors of Somali society where the importance of clan ties is not clear – for example, among unemployed or educated youth in urban areas. Tribal divisions in the government and military are deep, and religious unrest can spark additional hostilities or further inflame old rivalries. Although Siad wishes to avoid jeopardizing crucial Saudi economic aid, his track record suggests that he will not hesitate to deal harshly with any threats to his rule.
Siad has maintained tight control over Islamist activities since taking power in 1969, and the arrests reflect his growing concern about the potential spread of Islamic fundamentalism among the military and urban youth. Although fundamentalism itself is unlikely to threaten Siad's grip on power, it could undermine a regime already weakened by political, military and economic ills and Siad's crackdown could complicate relations with Saudi Arabia, a major aid donor and patron of Islam in Somalia. + Somalia's Islamic heritage: Nearly 99% of Somalis are Sunni Muslims, and the country's constitution states that Islam is the state religion. In the past, Islam was an important unifying factor for the Somali people and contributed to the development of national identity. An example of this is the Somali national hero Mohamed Hassan Abdullah, described as the “mad mullah” who led a 20-year jihad against the British colonial administration earlier this century, but the history and customs of the country’s nomadic tribes have limited the role of tradition.
Religious in daily life. According to academic sources, Somali tribes have long attached importance to the role and duties of the tribal warrior leader, in effect giving religious leaders a less valuable position in society. In addition, traditional Somali tribal rituals often conflict with strict Wahabbi Muslim observance, and today many Somalis do not submit to the full rigors of Wahabbi Islam's teachings. The 1969 coup that brought General Siad Barre to power further restricted Wahabbism influence.
Although the established regime condemned atheism and insisted that “scientific socialism” was compatible with Islam, Siad moved quickly to reinforce the separation of religious and secular power, criticized the Nasserite concept of Islamic socialism as a “tool” of neo-colonialism and capitalism, and strongly warned religious leaders against interference in politics. Government-sponsored seminars and training courses for religious leaders were organized to ensure that only Islamic doctrine consistent with the regime's ideology was taught.
The government's response to religious revival: According to the US Embassy in Mogadishu, a group of young sheikhs - some of whom received religious training in Iraq and Saudi Arabia - have risen to the forefront of once again challenging government control of religious activities. These sheikhs reportedly preach strict Islamic beliefs and are less inclined than the older generation of leaders to go along with government directives on politically acceptable interpretations of the Qur’an.
The US Embassy reported that senior government officials were concerned that the increasingly independent spirit of these leaders would attract urban youth, many of whom were unemployed and disaffected. As a precaution, Somali security forces were reportedly ordered several months ago to tighten their surveillance of religious leaders and all those who claim That Somalia must become more Islamic. The government's suspicions of growing religious unrest were confirmed in mid-April when demonstrations protesting Siad's control of religious sermons and teachings took place in several cities and Siad responded by arresting Islamist leaders in two northern cities and Mogadishu and expelling an Egyptian religious teacher.
In the capital, two of the city's most important Islamist leaders were reportedly arrested even though they did not participate in the demonstrations. In our opinion, Siad may have been concerned that they might denounce his movements and call for further protests and possibly violence, and the presidential bodyguard was already reinforced after the crackdown in case of a violent backlash. The government also fears that fundamentalism will spread to the already disaffected army - the main pillar of support for the regime. The regime recently warned Somali military personnel of the evils of religious fanaticism and called on officers to be particularly wary of extremist Islamic groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood. The government issued a circular in late 1985 to all military commands emphasizing the need for prior government approval of all religious sermons, services, and instructions in the armed forces.
Security officials are investigating possible links between recently arrested Islamist leaders and local opponents of the Siad regime, including forty military officers who were arrested on charges of plotting a coup in early April. The Saudi worker According to the US Embassy, Riyadh has aggressively promoted Islam in Somalia by funding the construction of mosques, establishing Quranic schools, and transporting Somali youth to Saudi Arabia for religious training. At the same time, the Saudis tried to use their significant economic influence as a major trading partner and aid donor to persuade Siad to ease government restrictions on Islam and establish Sharia law. Siad has deftly avoided making any major concessions to the Saudis, while at the same time managing to keep their economic aid flowing, but in recent months Riyadh has increased its public and private criticism of his religious policies.
Future prospects We believe that Islamic fundamentalism, despite its rise in Somalia, does not pose any direct threat to Siad's grip on power. Tribalism still dominates Somali society, and there is no evidence to suggest that religious fervor can transcend this deep-rooted trait, particularly in the military. In addition, Siad's apparent willingness to act quickly—and often proactively—against suspected religious leaders will likely deter any significant growth of fundamentalism in the near term. However, fundamentalism can attract sectors of Somali society where the importance of clan ties is not clear – for example, among unemployed or educated youth in urban areas. Tribal divisions in the government and military are deep, and religious unrest can spark additional hostilities or further inflame old rivalries. Although Siad wishes to avoid jeopardizing crucial Saudi economic aid, his track record suggests that he will not hesitate to deal harshly with any threats to his rule.
